Abstract
It is shown that in game models of asymmetric animal conflicts where the opponents assume different roles like “owner” and “intruder,” evolutionarily stable strategies must be pure strategies if a condition of inf ormation asymmetry holds. The condition is satisfied if two opponents always have different roles. Information about the opponent’s role may be incomplete.
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© 1988 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Selten, R. (1988). A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts. In: Models of Strategic Rationality. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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