Abstract
Philosophy should never lose sight of the distinction between the realm of experience and the realm of discourse. Discourse is first of all about experience, but since discourse is also a proper part of experience, it may be about itself and be self-referential or reflexive. This reflexivity affords no reason for becoming confused about the distinction, however. Discourse is that highly specialized area of experience wherein concepts or meanings are related to each other and also to those parts of experience which are not discursive. The relatedness of concepts is definitive of discourse. Experience is whatever any center of sensitivity undergoes, but the undergoing is not passive. Experience is action — that special kind of action called transaction. I shall call that area of experience outside the realm of discourse ‘concrete experience’.
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References
Alfred Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. IV (1943–44), PP. 341–375. His longer and more technical article (written earlier) is translated under the title “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,” in his Logic, Semantics, Mathematics, ( Oxford, 1956 ).
The Semantic Conception of Truth“, p. 366.
Ibid., p. 361.
Sovereign Reason, (Glencoe, Ill., 1954 ), P. 340.
Of Induction With Especial Reference to Mr. J. Stuart Mill’s System of Logic, ( London, 1849 ), P. 42.
Ibid., P. 34
Judgment and Reasoning in the Child, (Paterson, N. J., 1959 ), P. 144.
Translated under the title “Continuity and Irrational Numbers” in Essays on the Theory of Numbers,(LaSalle, Ill., 1948). W. W. Beman, translator.
For a fuller treatment of veridical perception, see my article “Perception and Epistemology” in Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIII (1964), especially at pages 38–41.
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© 1965 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Lee, H.N. (1965). A Fitting Theory of Truth. In: The Problem of Truth. Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-7640-8_5
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