Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity

  • Book
  • © 1994

Overview

Editors:
  1. James W. Friedman

    1. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA

    View editor publications

    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought (RETH, volume 35)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

Log in via an institution
eBook USD 16.99 USD 84.99
Discount applied Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (10 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-x
    Download chapter PDF

  2. Introduction

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1
      Download chapter PDF

    2. Introduction and Overview

      • James W. Friedman
      Pages 3-15

    3. A Review of Refinements, Equilibrium Selection, and Repeated Games

      • James W. Friedman
      Pages 17-47

    4. Coordination in Games: A Survey

      • Gary Biglaiser
      Pages 49-65

  3. General Issues in Coordination

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 67-67
      Download chapter PDF

    2. Incorporating Behavioral Assumptions into Game Theory

      • Matthew Rabin
      Pages 69-87

    3. On the Concepts of Strategy and Equilibrium in Discounted Repeated Games

      • William Stanford
      Pages 89-101

    4. The “Folk Theorem” for Repeated Games and Continuous Decision Rules

      • James W. Friedman, Larry Samuelson
      Pages 103-127

    5. Alternative Institutions for Resolving Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction and Preplaycommunication

      • Russell Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Thomas W. Ross
      Pages 129-146

  4. Coordination in Specific Economic Contents

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 147-147
      Download chapter PDF

    2. The Dynamics of Bandwagons

      • Joseph Farrell, Carl Shapiro
      Pages 149-184

    3. Dynamic Tariff Games with Imperfect Observability

      • Andreas Blume, Raymond G. Riezman
      Pages 185-205

    4. Coordination Theory, The Stag Hunt and Macroeconomics

      • John Bryant
      Pages 207-225

  5. Back Matter

    Pages 227-230
    Download chapter PDF
Back to top

Keywords

About this book

Coordination is extremely important in economic, political, and social life. The concept of economic equilibrium is based on the coordination of producers and consumers in buying and selling. This book reviews the topic of coordination from an economic, theoretical standpoint. The aim of this volume is twofold: first, the book contributes to the ongoing research on the economics of coordination; and second, it disseminates results and encourages interest in the topic. The volume contains original research on coordination including general game-theoretic questions, particular coordination issues within specific fields of economics (i.e. industrial organization, international trade, and macroeconomics), and experimental research.

Editors and Affiliations

  • University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA

    James W. Friedman

Bibliographic Information

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Back to top

Search

Navigation