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The Constitution of Objects in Kant’s Philosophy and in Modern Physics

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Kant and Contemporary Epistemology

Part of the book series: The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science ((WONS,volume 54))

Abstract

From a historical point of view the main goal of Kant’s transcendental deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason was to show that there are well defined limits for the validity of the synthetic judgements a priori. Since objects of experience are constituted by means of certain categories, the general statements which follow from these categories are a priori valid for all objects of experience, but the a priori validity is also restricted to these objects. “Consequently, there can be no a priori knowledge, except of objects of possible experience.”

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Notes and References

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  17. It should be emphasized that the “unsharpness” which is meant here, corresponds to an objective indeterminateness which must not be confused with the observer’s subjective ignorance or the experimental inaccuracy, respectively. (Cf. also Ref. 15, p. 893 and Ref. 16, p. 170).

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Mittelstaedt, P. (1994). The Constitution of Objects in Kant’s Philosophy and in Modern Physics. In: Parrini, P. (eds) Kant and Contemporary Epistemology. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 54. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0834-8_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0834-8_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4359-5

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