Abstract
Logicians and mathematicians may be envied (or perhaps pitied) for needing a single concept of truth, namely that of formal truth. And they must be commended for having subjected it to a rigorous theory, namely Tarski’s, now incorporated into model theory. Moreover, since in this theory the concept of (formal) truth is derivative (definable in terms of satisfaction in a model), formal scientists need not regard it as basic. Besides, this concept of truth raises no questions of confrontation with any factual facts: in logic and mathematics checking and proving are purely conceptual operations.
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© 1974 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Bunge, M. (1974). Truth. In: Semantics II: Interpretation and Truth. Treatise on Basic Philosophy, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9922-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9922-6_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0573-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-9922-6
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