Abstract
The last decade has produced a long series of articles criticizing a variety of precise definitions in philosophy on the grounds that they do not correspond to distinctions made in ordinary usage. We are told that all distinctions in ordinary languages are fuzzy. There are no sharp borderlines to be found in nature, and all attempts to impose them by the analytical philosopher are bound to lead to violations of ordinary usage. These points have been made, most eloquently, by a number of distinguished philosophers.
The author is indebted to T. J. Duggan for constructive criticism of an earlier version of this paper.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
Bibliography
The 12 basic items in chronological order
Morton G. White, ‘The Analytic and Synthetic: an Untenable Dualism’ in John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, The Dial Press, New York, 1950, pp. 316–330.
W. V. O. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, The Philosophical Review 60 (1951) 20–43.
Benson Mates, ‘Analytic Sentences’, The Philosophical Review 60 (1951) 525–534.
John G. Kemeny, ‘Extension of the Methods of Inductive Logic’, Philosophical Studies 3 (1952) 38–42.
R. M. Martin, ‘On ‘Analytic’’, Philosophical Studies 3 (1952) 42–47.
Rudolf Carnap, ‘Meaning Postulates’, Philosophical Studies 3 (1952) 65–73.
John G. Kemeny, Reviews of [2], [3], and [5], The Journal of Symbolic Logic 17 (1952) 281–284.
W. V. O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953.
John G. Kemeny, Review of [8], The Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (1954) 134–138.
John G. Kemeny, ‘A New Approach to Semantics’, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 21 (1956) 1–27 and 149–161.
H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, ‘In Defense of a Dogma’, The Philosophical Review 65 (1956) 141–158.
Morton G. White, Toward Reunion in Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1956.
Additional Bibliography
Rudolf Carnap, Introduction to Semantics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1948.
Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, I11., 1950.
Carl G. Hempel, Review of [1], The Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (1951) 210–211.
Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim. Studies in the Logic of Explanation’, Philosophy of Science 15 (1948) 135–175.
Leon Henkin, ‘Completeness in the Theory of Types’, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (1950) 81–91.
John G. Kemeny, ‘The Use of Simplicity in Induction’, The Philosophical Review 62 (1953) 391–408.
Alfred Tarski, ‘Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen’, Studia Philosophica 1 (1936) 261–405
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1964 D. Reidel Publishing Company/Dordrecht-Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kemeny, J.G. (1964). Analyticity Versus Fuzziness. In: Gregg, J.R., Harris, F.T.C. (eds) Form and Strategy in Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3603-0_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3603-0_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-3605-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-3603-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive