Abstract
It may not be an overstatement to say that the development of Husserl’s thought can be adequately grasped if only we followed the development of his concept of intentionality. The same could also be said of the development of phenomenology after Husserl. There are no doubt some excellent studies on Husserl’s concept of intentionality1, but what is still lacking is a comprehensive account which would take into account the total Husserliana which are only now coming to be made available to scholars. Furthermore, we also do not have a study which undertakes to assess Husserl’s concept of intentionality from the point of view of the criticisms and challenges emerging out of the writings of the post-Husserlian phenomenologists. This paper will make an attempt to fulfil these two needs but only within the brief compass permissible here. There will be first an attempt to explore the philosophical relationship of Husserl’s concept of intentionality to Brentano’s. An exposition will next be given of Husserl’s concept through the various phases of its development. This will be followed by a reference to the criticisms and challenges made by the later phenomenologists like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and the concluding part of the paper will seek to evaluate the points made by the critics and in that connection take a fresh look at Husserl’s thought against the new perspective gained thereby.
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References
Special references may be made to: H. Spiegelberg, ‘Der Begriff’ der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl’, Philosophische Hefte 5 (1936), 75–91;
L. Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, Schröder, Hamburg, 1949, pp. 59–69;
A. Gurwitsch, ‘On the Intentionality of Consciousness’ in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl (ed. by M. Färber, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1940;
A. De Waelhens, ‘L’idée phénoménologique d’intentionnalité’, in Husserl et la Pensée Moderne (ed. by H. L. Van Breda and J. Taminiaux ), Martinus Nühoflf, The Hague, 1959.
In fact, Chisholm regards this as the ontological part of the Brentano thesis. Cf. Chisholm’s essay on #x2018;sIntentionality#x2019;s in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. by P. Edwards ), Colliers & Macmillan, New York, 1967.
F. Brentano, The True and the Evident (English translation by R. M. Chisholm et al.). Rout ledge & Kegan Paul, London, p. 78.
F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Vol. II, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 133–138.
Ibid.
E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, 4th ed., Max Niemeyer, Halle, 1928 (to be henceforth referred to as LU), ILL, pp. 370ff.
Ibid, p. 369.
Cf. E. Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie, Husserliana, Vol. IX, Martinus Nijhoff.The Hague, 1962 (to be henceforth referred to as P. Ps.), p. 268; Erste Philosophie, I, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1956 (to be henceforth referred to as EP), pp. 349; Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie, Martinus Nühoff, The Hague, 1954 (to be henceforth referred to as Krisis), p. 236.
P.Ps., pp. 314, pp. 260–266.
According to G. Berger, the category of noema is more fundamental than that of being or of non-being. Cf. G. Berger, Le cogito dans la philosophic de Husserl, Paris 1941. p. 54.
A. Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, Northwestern University Press, 1966.
R. M. Chisholm, ‘Sentences about Believing’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. LVI, 1955–56, pp. 125–147; ‘On some Psychological Concepts and the “Logic” of Intentionality’ in Intentionality, Minds, and Perception (ed. by H.N. Castañeda), Wayne State University, 1966, pp. 11–35; also his Encyclopedia article.
L. Landgrebe, loc. cit.
H. Spiegelberg, loc. cit., p. 86.
Contrast Quinton, ‘Mind and Matter’ in Brain and Mind, Modern Concepts of the Nature of Mind (ed. by J. R. Smythies), Humanities Press, New York, 1965. Quinton argues (p. 224) that the Brentano thesis rules out behaviourism. It surely does, if intentionally is regarded as was done by Brentano himself as a criterion of the mental, and if behaviour is understood in a mechanistic way, not otherwise.
A. Diemer, Edmund Husserl, Versuch einer systematischen Darstellung seiner Phänomenologie, Meisenheim, 1956.
Cf. J. N. Mohanty, Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964, pp. 80–86.
Cf. P. Ricccur, Freedom and Nature. The Voluntary and the Involuntary (transl. by E. V. Kohak), Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 205ff.
Cf. P. Ricceur, Husserl, An Analysis of his Phenomenology (transl. by E. G. Ballard and L. E. Embrce ), Northwestern University Press, 1967, p. 192.
T. W. Adorno, Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie, Studien über Husserl und die phänomenologische Antinomien, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1956, p. 171.
E. Husserl, Ideas I (references will be made to the Boyce Gibson translation in the paperback edition which will be henceforth referred to as Ideas I ), p. 250.
A. Gurwitsch, Studies, pp. 138–139.
Ideas I, p. 267.
For elaboration of this point, see J. N. Mohanty, ‘Notas a las lecciones de Husserl sobre laconcienciadel tiempo’, Dianoia, Anuario de Filosofia, Mexico, 1968, pp. 82–95.
R. Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution, Martinus Nühoff, The Hague, 1964, pp. 92–93, 100, 114–115.
Ideas I, p. 226.
Gaston Berger, bearing witness to Husserl’s later thought in this matter, refers to “how much the word ‘construction’ could irritate Husserl” (Gurwitsch, Studies, p. 160). For an account of the different stages of Husserl’s attitude towards the notion of productive synthesis, see Iso Kern, Husserl und Kant, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964, pp. 249ff.
P. Ricoeur, Husserl, p. 41.
E. Husserl, Ideen, I (Husserliana edition), p. 100. (This edition will be referred to as Ideen I.)
Ideen I, § 82.
Ideen I, § 95.
Ideen I, § 117.
Ideen II (Husserliana, Vol. IV), Martinus Nühoff, The Hague, 1952, § 4.
E. Husserl, Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis (1918–1926), Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, p. 196.
Cartesian Meditations, translated by D. Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, § 38 (to be henceforth referred to as CM).
P.Ps., pp. 98–99.
Formale und Transzendentale Logik (to be henceforth referred to as FuTL), Max Niemeyer. Halle 1929, p. 184.
R. Sokolowski, loc. cit., p. 172.
G. Funke, Zur transzendentalen Phänomenologie, Bonn 1957, pp. 12–13; CM § 32.
Thus T. Seebohm, ‘Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Transzendental-Philosophie’. Bouvier, Bonn, 1962:“… ist die genetische Intcntionalanalysc auf die Zusammenhänge dieser Typen in der Einheit des Bewußtseinsstromes selbst gerichtet.” This surely is not eo ipso a historically oriented programme.
For example, in P.Ps., p. 431.
CM, § 19.
CM,§ 64.
CM, p. 47.
Krisis, p. 240.
EP, II, pp. 318–319.
P.Ps., p. 428.
FuTL, p. 208; § 94.
G. Brand, Welt, Ich und Zeit, nach unveröffentliehen Manuskripten E. Husserls, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1955, p. 23.
E. Fink, Studien zur Phänomenologie, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966, p. 219.
M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, London, 1962, Introduction.
J. J. Kockelmans, Phenomenology and Physical Science. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physical Science, Duquesne University Press, 1966, pp. 53ff.
J.-P. Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego. An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness, translated by F. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick, Noonday, New York, 1957.
J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, Translated by H. E. Barnes (to be henceforth referred to as BN), Methucn, London, 1957, p. Ixi.
BN, p. 4.
BN, p. Ixiii.
BN, p. 109.
BN, p. lix.
L. Landgrebe, ‘Prinzipien der Lehre vom Empfinden’ in Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 8 (1954) 193–209.
H. U. Asemissen, Strukturanalytische Probleme der Wahrnehmung in der Phänomenologie Husserls, Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte 73,26–34, Kölner Universitätsvcrlag, 1957.
M. Merleau-Ponty, loc. cit., 243. Also sec the same work, pp. 213, 267, 405.
This is so according to Diemer.
BN, p. lx.
BN, p. Ixi.
T. Langan, Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Reason, Yale University Press, 1966, p. 23f.
M. Merleau-Ponty, loc. cit., p. xvii.
Cf. ibid., pp. 124–125.
Cf. ibid., pp. 57, 58–59.Also, Merleau-Ponty, M., Signs (transl. by McCleary), Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 173.
M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 137.
M. Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1949, pp. 15, 44.
BN, p. 85.
P. Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, 61.
This is the argument of Natanson in his ‘The Empirical and Transcendental Ego’ in For Roman Ingarden. Nine Essays in Phenomenology (ed. by A. T. Tymieniecka), Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1959.
Ideen II, § 28; but the doctrine of the autogenesis of the ego is surely suggested in the same work, p. 102.
Ibid, p. 310f.
P.Ps., pp. 207–208.
CM, § 32. On ‘habitualities’, see P. Ricoeur, Husserl, pp. 54–55.
G. Funke, loc. cit., pp. 22–23.
Seebohm, e.g., holds that the concept of hyle may be non-sensualistically interpreted within the framework of the intentionality thesis. See loc. cit. p. 97 fn. 18.
P. Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, pp. 373–409.
Ideas I, § 53.
Ibid., § 53.
Section 2, Chapter 3.
Ideen II, pp. 56, 158f.
Ibid., p. 151.
Ibid., p. 151f.
Ibid., p. 153.
Ideen III, p. 118.
Ibid., p. 124. From this point of view, Ricocur’s statement (in his Husserl, p. 61) that the distinction between existence and objectivity is not known to Husserl may only be conditionally accepted.
CM, § 28.
P.Ps., p. 197.
Ideen I, § 38.
P. Ricceur, Freedom and Nature, pp. 387–389. 04
CM, esp. § 9.
Krisis, p. 474.
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Mohanty, J.N. (1970). Husserl’s Concept of Intentionality. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Analecta Husserliana. Analecta Husserliana, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3326-8_6
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