Abstract
In the present paper I shall discuss one of the less obvious criteria of adequacy that any satisfactory analysis of confirmation must meet, viz. the requirement that if such an analysis purports to explicate the concept of confirmation or support which is in common use in natural science it must be capable of explicating or elucidating the concept of what scientists call an ‘anomaly’.
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References
See the remarks by Florian Cajori in the appendix to his edition of Newton’s Mathematical Principles, 1962, p. 648ff.
E.g. R. G. Swinburne, ‘Falsifiability of Scientific Theories’, Mind 73 (1964) p. 434ff; and I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (ed. by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave), Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 138ff.
Cf. I. Lakatos, ‘Popper on Demarcation and Induction’, Note 17, forthcoming in The Philosophy of Sir Karl Popper (ed. by P. Schilpp).
For a more detailed account of this inductive logic see my The Implications of Induction (1970) §§ 5–13; and also my ‘The Inductive Logic of Progressive Problemshifts’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 95/96 (1971) 62–77.
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© 1973 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Cohen, L.J. (1973). The Paradox of Anomaly. In: Bogdan, R.J., Niiniluoto, I. (eds) Logic, Language, and Probability. Synthese Library, vol 51. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2568-3_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2568-3_7
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