Abstract
In the first edition “Paralogisms of Pure Reason” Kant suggests that “the substance which in relation to outer sense possesses extension” might be “in itself the possessor of thoughts and that these thoughts can by means of its own inner sense be consciously represented.” On this hypothesis, which is a purely speculative one, “the thesis that only souls (as particular kinds of substances) think would have to be given up, and we should have to fall back on the common expression that men think, that is. that the very same being which, as outer appearance is extended is, in itself, internally a subject and is not composite, but is simple and thinks.” (A359–60).
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© 1974 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Sellars, W. (1974). Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person. In: Essays in Philosophy and Its History. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2291-0_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2291-0_11
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