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Reductive Explanation: A Functional Account

  • Chapter
PSA 1974

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 32))

Abstract

Philosophical discussions of reduction seem at odds or unsettled on a number of questions :

  1. (i)

    Is it a relation between real or between reconstructed theories, and if the latter, how much reconstruction is appropriate?1 Or is reduction best construed as a relation between theories at all?2

  2. (ii)

    Is it primarily connected with theory succession, with theoretical explanation, or with both? 3

  3. (iii)

    Is translatability in principle sufficient, or must we have the translations in hand, and if the former, how do we judge the possibility of translation when we don't have one?4

  4. (iv)

    What is the point of defending the formal model of reduction if it doesn't actually happen (HullS, Ruse 6), or if the defense has the consequence that if reductions occur, they are trivial and uninformative (Hull 7), or merely incidental consequences of the purposeful activity of the scientist qua scientist in devising explanations (Schaffner 8)? Furthermore:

  5. (v)

    At least in biology, most scientists see their work as explaining types of phenomena by discovering mechanisms, rather than explaining theories by deriving them from or reducing them to other theories, and this is seen by them as reduction, or as integrally tied to it. 9

  6. (vi)

    None of the symposiasts present are suggesting inadequacies in the kinds lo of mechanisms postulated by molecular geneticists for the explanation of more macroscopic genetic phenomena.

  7. (vii)

    Nonetheless, two of them (Ruse in his earlier work, though no longer, and Hull) seem to suggest that there is no reduction (only a replacement), and the third (Schaffner) suggests that a reduction is occurring, but is a merely incidental consequence of the activity of these scientists.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Philosophy, The University of Chicago, USA

    William C. Wimsatt

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  1. William C. Wimsatt
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Boston University, USA

    R. S. Cohen

  2. University of Western Ontario, Canada

    C. A. Hooker

  3. University of Guelph, Canada

    A. C. Michalos

  4. University of Waterloo, Canada

    J. W. Van Evra

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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Wimsatt, W.C. (1976). Reductive Explanation: A Functional Account. In: Cohen, R.S., Hooker, C.A., Michalos, A.C., Van Evra, J.W. (eds) PSA 1974. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 32. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1449-6_38

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1449-6_38

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

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