Abstract
I would like to explore some of the brief comments made by Prof. Harsanyi about applying normative notions of rationality for positive purposes in the social sciences. I share some of the usual puzzlement about such use. How is it that rationality theory, as derived from classical economics to mean something like efficient goal-directed behaviour, serves the dual function of prescribing conditionally what behaviour ought to be and also of describing, predicting, and explaining actual behaviour? After all, rationality has traditionally been associated with other normative disciplines, mainly logic, epis-temology, and ethics. And no one seriously takes these domains to serve this dual function. Normative they are, but positive they are not.
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© 1977 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Leach, J.J. (1977). The Dual Function of Rationality. In: Butts, R.E., Hintikka, J. (eds) Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1141-9_24
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