Abstract
It is customary to oppose knowledge to opinions. But what constitutes knowledge, and what is only opinion? What are the criteria for making such a division? The fact is that today we have at our disposal many criteria for making the division, and it is not difficult to enumerate them. To quote in random order, by way of example: observation, reliable evidence, rigorous application of method, the use of a precise language testing by experiment, power of anticipation, formalisation, ability to proceed to applications, usefulness of these applications, accountability to certain principles or to acquired knowledge, impartiality, accepted views of specialists, etc. Usually we bear in mind a few of these criteria and attempt to coordinate them; whereas others, which we do not consider indispensable or relevant, are put aside; this varies according to the knowledge envisaged … And one would be in greater difficulty trying to find a justification for such criteria! But this is not our purpose here. If we mention it, it is only in order to make it clear that we will not be concerned with such matters,nor with such question as when it is permissible to characterise this or that as ‘opinion’ or ‘knowledge’? Our subject is different:we want to raise questions concerning the use which is made of this opposition between knowledge and opinions, concerning the ideology which underlines this opposition, and concerning the resultant effects for the sciences.
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Notes and References
This way of opposing knowledge to opinions is illustrated in the well-known book of Jacques Monod, Le Hasard et la Necessite, Essai sur la Philosophie Naturelle de la Biologie Moderne, Le Seuil, Paris, 1970. It must be realised that on this point Monod has merely illustrated what is an everyday and generalised practice of the dominant thinking.
On this point, see the works of Mario Bunge, especially Scientific Research, Springer, N.Y. 1967.
While we must denounce the manner in which this permits the ruling authorities to justify the oppression and repression of people in the name of the so-called ‘objective’ demands of reality, it does not follow that we should only accept individual values as significant, and that social and economic realities are to be despised. In both cases the dualism of subjectivity/objectivity produces mystification, and one remains a prisoner of the individual/reality opposition.
The question is then asked, in terms of rational scientific knowledge, and first of all in terms of physics: What is ascribable to reason and what to data? Such a question is based on a presupposition: that of the dualism of reason and data. This dualism determines the very meaning of the question and anticipates the answer which will be given by allowing no way forward other than the division of the ‘dowry’ between data and reason. A dead end.
Foucault, M., Les Mots et Les Choses Gallimard, Paris, 1966.
Althusser, L., L’ldeologie et appareils ideologiques d’etat (“Notes pour une recherche”), La Pensee, no. 151, June 1970, p. 29.
There can be no other culture, no other reason, no other knowledge, apart from those of the dominant class.
How can those who are in power make us believe that they are on the side of reality, objectivity and reason? By taking account of their knowledge. It is through the acquisition of knowledge (at school and at university) that one passes from subjectivity to objectivity. It is knowledge which guarantees the objectivity and rationality of the leaders.
It will simply be noted here that there is an ambiguity in the word operational which is connected as much to operationalism as to operational research... Such an ambiguity is no accident. The two different interpretations of the word ‘operational’ translate the same option: that of putting in parentheses reality, or the question: What is it? What about the nature of things, their meaning and value? (What about light, matter..., the good of man?) This is done to the benefit of another preoccupation which could be roughly formulated as follows: provided that it works... (operational concepts, economy, functionalism-functional, economic, efficient...) There is need for an analysis of how the ideological implications of that operational ideal are articulated in the ideology of objectivity we are analysing, but this is not our present purpose.
researchers who stood up against the arms race or against the war in Vietnam have, at the same time, continued to receive military funds. Everybody found that normal, because for researchers, research as such is the main priority, a priority which requires money (...) “Science is considered as a neutral field with its own laws”. Les scientifiques et la course aux armements, entretien de Pierre Thuillier avec Milton Leitenberg, in La Recherche, Paris, No. 19 January 1972, p. 16.
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© 1979 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Franck, R. (1979). Knowledge and Opinions. In: Nowotny, H., Rose, H. (eds) Counter-Movements in the Sciences. Sociology of the Sciences a Yearbook, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9421-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9421-8_3
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