Abstract
Physics should have helped us to realize that a temporal theory of a phenomenon X is, in general, more than a simple combination of two components: the statics of X and the ordered set of temporal instants. The case in which all functions from times to world-states are allowed is uninteresting; there are too many such functions, and the theory has not begun until we have begun to restrict them. And often the principles that emerge from the interaction of time with the phenomena seem new and surprising. The most dramatic example of this, perhaps, is the interaction of space with time in relativistic space-time.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Al-Hibri, A.: 1978, Deontic Logic, Washington, DC.2
Åqvist, L.: 1967, ‘Good Samaritans, contrary-to-duty imperatives, and epistemic obligations’, Nôus 1, 361–379.
Åqvist, L. and Hoepelman, J.: 1981, ‘Some theorems about a “tree” system of deontic tense logic’, in Hilpinen [1981], pp. 187–221.
Bennett, J.: 1982, ‘Counterfactuals and temporal direction’, Xerox, Syracuse University.
Burgess, J.: 1979, ‘Logic and time’, J. Symbolic Logic 44, 566–582.
Burgess, J.: 1980, ‘Decidability and branching time’, Studia Logica 39, 203–218.
Burgess, J.: ‘The unreal future’, Theoria, forthcoming.
Carnap, R.: 1956, Meaning and Necessity, 2nd. edn, Univ. Chicago Press.
Castañeda, H.-N.: 1981, ‘The paradoxes of deontic logic: the simplest solution to all of them in one fell swoop’, In Hilpinen [1981], pp. 37–85.
Chellas, B.: 1969, The Logical Form of Imperatives, Perry Lane Press, Stanford.
Chellas, B.: 1971, ‘Imperatives’, Theoria 37, 114–129.
Chisholm, R.: 1974, ‘Practical reason and the logic of requirement’, in S. Körner (ed.), Practical Reason, New Haven, pp. 1–16.
Code, A.: 1976, ‘Aristotle’s response to Quine’s objections to modal logic’, J. Philosophical Logic 5, 159–186.
DeCew, J.: 1981, ‘Conditional obligation and counterfactuals’, J. Philosophical Logic 10, 55–72.
DeWitt, B.: 1973, ‘Quantum mechanics and reality’, in DeWitt and Graham [1973], pp. 155–165.
DeWitt, B. and Graham, N. (eds.): 1973, The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton.
Downing, P.: 1959, ‘Subjunctive conditionals, time order, and causation’, Proc. Aristotelian Society 59, 125–140.
Edwards, J.: 1957, Freedom of the Will, Yale University Press, New Haven. (First published in Boston, 1754.)
Fine, A.: 1982, ‘Joint distributions, quantum correlations, and commuting observables’, J. Mathematical Physics 23, 1306–1310.
Føllesdal, D. and Hilpinen, R.: 1971, ‘Deontic logic: an introduction’, in Hilpinen [1971], pp. 1–35.
Frede, D.: 1970, Aristoteles und die’ seeschlacht’, Göttingen.
Gabbay, D.: 1981, ‘An irreflexivity lemma with applications to axiomatizations of conditions on tense frames’, in U. Mönnich (ed.), Aspects of Philosophical Logic, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 67–89.
Greenspan, P.: 1975, ‘Conditional oughts and hypothetical imperatives’, J. Philosophy 72, 259–276.
Grice, P. and Strawson, P.: 1956, ‘In defense of a dogma’, Philosophical Review 65, 141–158.
Gurevich, Y. and Shelah, S.: ‘Branching time logic’, J. Symbolic Logic, forthcoming.
Hannson, B.: 1971, ‘An analysis of some deontic logics’, in Hilpinen [1971], pp. 121–147.
Hare, R.: 1963, Freedom and Reason, OUP, Oxford.
Harper, W.: 1975, ‘Rational belief change, Popper functions, and counterfactuals’, Synthese 30, 221–262.
Harper, W.: 1981, ‘A sketch of some recent developments in the theory of conditionals’, in Harper et al [1981], pp. 3–38.
Harper, W., Stalnaker, R., and Pearce, G. (eds): 1981, Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Hilpinen, R. (ed.): 1971, Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Hilpinen, R. (ed.): 1981, New Studies in Deontic Logic, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Hintikka, J.: 1969, ‘Deontic logic and its philosophical morals’, in J. Hintikka (ed.), Models for Modalities, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 184–214.
Hintikka, J.: 1971, ‘Some main problems of deontic logic’, in Hilpinen [1971], pp. 59–104.
Howard, R.: 1971a, Dynamic Probabilistic Systems, Volume I: Markov Models, New York.
Howard, R.: 1971b, Dynamic Probabilistic Systems, Volume II: Semi-Markov and Decision Processes, New York.
Jackson, F.: 1977, ‘A causal theory of counterfactuals’, Australasian J. Philosophy 55, 3–21.
Jeffrey, R.: 1965, The Logic of Decision, New York.
Jeffrey, R.: 1979, ‘Coming true’, in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds), Intention and Intentionality, Ithaca, NY, pp. 251–260.
Kamp, J. A. W.: 1979, ‘The logic of historical necessity, part I’, unpublished typescript.
Kaplan, D.: 1978, ‘On the logic of demonstratives’, J. Philosophical Logic 8, 81–98.
Kratzer, A.: 1977, ‘What “must” and “can” must and can mean’, Linguistics and Philosophy 1, 337–355.
Kripke, S.: 1972, ‘Naming and necessity’, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 253–355.
Kvart, I.: 1980, ‘Formal semantics for temporal logic and counterfactuals’, Logique et analyse 23, 35–62.
Lehrer, K. and Taylor, R.: 1965, ‘Time, truth, and modalities’, Mind 74, 390–398.
Lewis, C. I.: 1918, A Survey of Symbolic Logic, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Lewis, D.: 1970, ‘Anselm and actuality’, Nôus 4,175–188.
Lewis, D.: 1973, Counterfactuals, OUP, Oxford.
Lewis, D.: 1979a, ‘Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow’, Nôus 13, 455–476.
Lewis, D. 1979b, “Scorekeeping in a language game.” J. Philosophical Logic 8, 339–359.
Lewis, D.: 1981, ‘A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance’, in Harper et al. [1981], pp.259–265.
Lukasiewicz, J.: 1967, ‘On determinism’, in S. McCall, (ed.), Polish Logic, OUP, Oxford, pp. 19–39.
McKinney, A.: 1975, ‘Conditional obligation and temporally dependent necessity: a study in conditional deontic logic’, Doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.
Montague, R.: 1962, ‘Deterministic theories’, in Decisions, Values, and Groups 2. Pergamon Press, Oxford, pp. 325–370.
Montague, R.: 1968, ‘Pragmatics’, in R. Klibansky (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy: A. Survey, Florence, pp. 101–122.
Nishimura, H.: 1979a, ‘Is the semantics of branching structures adequate for chronological modal logics?’, J. Philosophical Logic 8, 469–475.
Nishimura, H.: 1979b, ‘Is the semantics of branching structures adequate for non-metric Ockhamist tense logics?’, J. Philosophical Logic 8, 477–478.
Normore, C.: 1982, ‘Future contingents’, in N. Kretzman et al, Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, CUP, Cambridge, pp. 358–381.
Powers, L.: 1967, ‘Some deontic logicians’, Nôus 1, 381–400.
Prior, A.: 1957, Time and Modality, OUP, Oxford.
Prior, A.: 1967, Past, Present, and Future, OUP, Oxford.
Schlipp, P. (ed.): 1963, The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Open Court, LaSalle.
Scott, D.: 1967, ‘A logic of commands’, mimeograph, Stanford University.
Seeskin, K.: 1971, ‘Many-valued logic and future contingencies’, Logique et analyse 14, 759–773.
Slote, M.: 1978, ‘Time and counterfactuals’, Philosophical Review 87, 3–27.
Sorabji, R.: 1980, Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, NY.
Sosa, E. (ed.): 1975, Causation and Conditionals, OUP, Oxford.
Stalnaker, R.: 1978, ‘A theory of conditionals’, in N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, OUP, Oxford, pp. 98–112.
Thomason, R.: 1970, ‘Indeterminist time and truth-value gaps’, Theoria 36, 264–281.
Thomason, R.: 1981a, ‘Deontic logic as founded on tense logic’, in Hilpinen [1981], pp. 165–176.
Thomason, R.: 1981b, ‘Deontic logic and the role of freedom in moral deliberation’, in Hilpinen [1981], pp. 177–186.
Thomason, R.: 1981c, ‘Notes on completeness problems with historical necessity’, Xerox.
Thomason, R.: 1982, ‘Counterfactuals and temporal direction’, Xerox, University of Pittsburgh.
Thomason, R. and Gupta, A.: 1981, ‘A theory of conditionals in the context of branching time’, in Harper et al. [1981 ], pp. 299–322.
Van Eck, J.: 1981, ‘A system of temporally relative modal and eontic predicate logic and its philosophical applications’, dissertation, Rijksuniversiteit de Groningen.
Van Fraassen, B.: 1966, ‘Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic’, J. Philosophy 63, 481–495.
Van Fraassen, B.: 1971, Formal Semantics and Logic, Macmillan, New York.
Van Fraassen, B.: 1981, ‘A temporal framework for conditionals and chance’, in Harper et al. [1981], pp. 323–340.
Von Wright, G.: 1968, ‘An essay in deontic logic’, Acta Philosophica Fennica 21, 1–110.
Werner, B.: 1974, ‘Foundations of temporal modal logic’, doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison.
Wiggins, D.: 1973, ‘Towards a reasonable libertarianism’, in T. Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action, London, pp. 33–61.
Wigner, E.: 1971, ‘Quantum-mechanical distribution functions revisited’, in W. Yourgraw and A. van der Merwe (eds.), Perspectives in Quantum Theory, MIT, Cambridge, MA, pp.25–36.
Woolhouse, R.: 1973, ‘Tensed modalities’, J.Philosophical Logic 2, 393–415.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Thomason, R.H. (1984). Combinations of Tense and Modality. In: Gabbay, D., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Synthese Library, vol 165. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6259-0_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6259-0_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-6261-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6259-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive