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Proof Theory and Meaning

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Handbook of Philosophical Logic

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 166))

Abstract

The meaning of a sentence determines how the truth of the proposition expressed by the sentence may be proved and hence one would expect proof theory to be influenced by meaning-theoretical considerations. In the present Chapter we consider a proposal that also reverses the above priorities and determines meaning in terms of proof. The proposal originates in the criticism that Michael Dummett has voiced against a realist, truth-theoretical, conception of meaning and has been developed largely by him and Dag Prawitz, whose normalization procedures in technical proof theory constitute the main technical basis of the proposal.

Dedicated to Stig Kanger on the Occasion of his 60th birthday.

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Authors
  1. Göran Sundholm
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computing, Imperial College, London, England

    D. Gabbay

  2. FNS, University of Tuebingen, West Germany

    F. Guenthner

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© 1986 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Sundholm, G. (1986). Proof Theory and Meaning. In: Gabbay, D., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Synthese Library, vol 166. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5203-4_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5203-4_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8801-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-5203-4

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