Abstract
CastaŇeda has developed an intricate ontology of mind and its place in the world order. Consciousness is nothing but intentionality, CastaŇeda holds, and the ontological structure of intentionality is simply that of a dyadic relation, a relation between a person and a proposition or state of affairs. To make good on this straightforward, traditional analysis of mental acts, CastaŇeda appeals to a less straightforward ontology of individuals and properties, his ontology of guises. His guise ontology is in some ways Meinongian, and his analysis of intentionality is even more Meinongian. His resulting ontology of mind and world is a form of (onto-)logical atomism and also a brand of neutral monism.
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Woodruff Smith, D. (1986). Mind and Guise. In: Tomberlin, J.E. (eds) Hector-Neri Castañeda. Profiles, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4534-0_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4534-0_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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