Abstract
In many essential respects, Michael Dummett’s work on the theory of meaning defines new directions and new rôles for this field. To the extent that a theory of meaning will be able to take on these new rôles, it will also assume a new, and greater importance, to which Dummett himself has drawn much attention. The development of a systematic theory of meaning is “the most urgent task that philosophers are now called upon to carry out”, he writes in “Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to Be?”.
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References
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© 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Prawitz, D. (1987). Dummett on a Theory of Meaning and Its Impact on Logic. In: Taylor, B.M. (eds) Michael Dummett. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3541-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3541-9_5
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