Abstract
How do rational-choice explanations explain? What are their limits and limitations? I want to discuss these questions in three steps. In Section I the topic is the more general category of intentional explanation of behavior. Section II adds the specifications needed to generate rational-choice explanation. Section III considers more closely the power of rational-choice theory to yield unique deductions. In particular, this concerns the possible nonunicity and even nonexistence of optimal choice.
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References
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Elster, J. (1988). The Nature and Scope of Rational-Choice Explanation. In: Ullmann-Margalit, E. (eds) Science in Reflection. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 110. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2957-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2957-9_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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