Abstract
Realism and relativism stand opposed. This much is apparent if we consider no more than the realist aim for science. The aim of science, realists tell us, is to have true theories about the world, where ‘true’ is understood in the classical correspondence sense. And this seems immediately to presuppose that at least some forms of relativism are mistaken. The truth which realists aim for is absolute or objective, rather than relative to ‘conceptual scheme’ or ‘paradigm’ or ‘world-view’ or anything else. And the world which realists seek the truth about is similarly independent of ‘conceptual scheme’ or ‘paradigm’ or ‘world-view’ or anything else. If realism is correct, then relativism (or some versions of it) is incorrect.
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Musgrave, A. (1988). The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism. In: Nola, R. (eds) Relativism and Realism in Science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2877-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2877-0_10
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