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Species as Entities of Biological Theory

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What the Philosophy of Biology Is

Part of the book series: Nijhoff International Philosophy Series ((NIPS,volume 32))

Abstract

Species play a central role in evolutionary biology. They are generally the locus of most discussions of taxonomic and structural diversity. Species are said to be the active participants in a host of postulated processes. Thus, species speciate, go extinct, compete, interact, disperse, predate, or are selected.

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© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Cracraft, J. (1989). Species as Entities of Biological Theory. In: Ruse, M. (eds) What the Philosophy of Biology Is. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 32. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1169-7_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1169-7_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7020-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1169-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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