Abstract
By general agreement, the new economic analysis of law began with the near-simultaneous publication roughly 25 years ago of “The Problem of Social Cost” [1] and “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts” [2]. Though no one doubts the subsequent flourishing of the endeavor, many question its significance, and most cannot articulate its fundamental challenge to more traditional understandings and analyses of law. Frequently, critics have considered fundamental to economic analysis of law the claim either that the law ought to be or was in fact efficient. Occasionally, critics have dismissed the endeavor as obfuscation through the introduction of a new technical jargon and formal mathematical techniques into the verbal tangle of the law.
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© 1988 Lewis A. Kornhauser
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Kornhauser, L.A. (1988). The New Economic Analysis of Law: Legal Rules as Incentives. In: Mercuro, N. (eds) Law and Economics. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 19. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1079-9_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1079-9_2
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