Abstract
France established river contracts in 1981 to control pollution and flooding, manage hydraulic structures, and raise stakeholder awareness. Greater decentralization in the country, followed by European Union (EU) water obligations, has encouraged contractual arrangements of this kind. River contracts include 5-year study and works programs that allow towns, industrial companies, and farmers to pool their resources and set common objectives at the watershed scale. The state subsidizes some of the projects, thereby encouraging local players to commit themselves more to managing water resources. The results, however, fall short of the environmental objectives initially targeted by public authorities, suggesting that river contracts never replace fines and other coercive instruments.
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Notes
- 1.
The decentralization law (1982) created the principle by which local authorities were independent in terms of managing their territory. Local authorities in France are administrative structures, distinct from the state administration, that take care of the interest of residents living in a given territory. The following three levels of government are considered to be local authorities: communes (similar to cities, also referred to in this book as municipalities), départements (departments), and régions (regions). The commune is the lowest administrative division. It is headed by a mayor elected for a 6-year term. The région is the largest local administrative division.
- 2.
According to the French Ministry of Agriculture, the total number of farms was 1.6 million in 1970 and fewer than 600,000 in 2003. The average surface area of the farms is now 70 ha (700,000 m2) (Source: http://agriculture.gouv.fr/evolution-des-exploitationsconsulted on June 29, 2011).
- 3.
The area covered by each one of the six authorities does not correspond exactly to watersheds. For example, the Loire-Brittany authority takes care of the Loire watershed as well as coastal rivers in Brittany. See Chap. 2.
- 4.
Water authorities are state public administrative bodies under the French Ministry of Ecology and Ministry of Finance. They are managed by a board of directors that includes representatives from local authorities, various types of users, the state, and the water authority. The president of the board of directors and the manager of the authority are appointed by the government. Cf. Law no. 64-1245 of December 16, 1964, concerning the status and distribution of water and pollution control measures.
- 5.
More than 10 billion euros between 2007 and 2012.
- 6.
The Water Framework Directive (2000/60) was designed to improve regulation and management of Europe’s water resources. See Chap. 3.
- 7.
Circulars of February 5, 1981, and November 12, 1985, relating to the creation of river contracts.
- 8.
The changes made to river contracts by the Ministry of the Environment in the early 1990s and then in 2004 had several consequences. In particular, relatively large river basins were given approval by the National Approval Committee and the procedure was extended to include bays, estuaries, and lakes. They were henceforth referred to as “environmental contracts” (Cf. Ministerial circular of October 24, 1994, relating to the 10-year plan to restore and maintain rivers and defining the purpose, content, and procedure for drawing up river contracts.
- 9.
Comité National d’Agrément.
- 10.
The ministerial circular of January 30, 2004, which transferred the approval procedure to basin committees, removed the solemn and exceptional character of the first river contracts; only a few of them were adopted and the minister of the environment sometimes came to sign the documents in person.
- 11.
Latour and Le Bourhis showed the extent to which the implementation of a local water policy depends on the determination of local elected representatives (1995).
- 12.
Municipalities work together at two levels in the context of a river contract. First, they become jointly liable financially, insofar as each contributes to a structure in which they are grouped. The contributions from the municipalities vary according to tax revenue, number of inhabitants, length of river concerned, etc. These contributions are used to pay staff (engineers and technicians) responsible for designing, monitoring, and evaluating the river contract. Second, they are technical partners in the sense that they draw up a program that does not penalize any of them.
- 13.
Laws on the environment voted by the French parliament often correspond to European directives transposed into French law.
- 14.
The ONEMA (l’Office National de l’Eau et des Milieux Aquatiques) is the national public establishment created by the Water Act of 2006. The ONEMA is charged with “conducting and supporting at national level actions aimed at encouraging comprehensive, sustainable and balanced management of water resources, aquatic ecosystems, fisheries and fish stocks.”
- 15.
The financial contribution of private-sector players (leisure sector, hydroelectric producers, and farming) is very limited. In fact, they help finance water policy via “pollution” and “consumption” charges and through the local and national taxes they are required to pay (which contribute respectively to the budgets of local authorities—including municipalities—and the state).
- 16.
In this instance, the river committee.
- 17.
One of the weaknesses of river contracts concerns evaluation at the half-way stage and end of the program. Those responsible for the contract are also in charge of evaluating it. The effect of this is to gloss over the problems that they, in particular those in political positions, have faced.
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Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Dr. Graciela Schneier-Madanes for the interest shown by the Groupe De Recherche (GDR) in local water policies and the “Cahiers de Droit” team from Laval University for their constructive criticism during the summary on river contracts made for the “Cahiers de Droit.” Thanks lastly to Christine Simoens from Sogreah Consultants (Artelia); David Bailey, SETS; Frédéric Lasserre, professor in Quebec; Jean-Paul Haghe, lecturer in Rouen; and Guy Pustelnik, EPTB delegate-general, for their assistance in the field.
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Brun, A. (2014). France’s Water Policy: The Interest and Limits of River Contracts. In: Schneier-Madanes, G. (eds) Globalized Water. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7323-3_10
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