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To What Extent Is the Opposition Between Civil Law and Common Law Relevant for Law and Economics?

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Law and Economics in Europe

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 1))

Abstract

The distinction between common law and civil law has been used in the law and economic literature at epistemological, methodological and prescriptive levels. The present article will focus on the epistemological level. Is this divide relevant for assessing the relative value of law and economics in a legal system? It will be shown that this divide is largely irrelevant but that some characteristics of legal systems (instrumentality of law , autonomy of legal reasoning and freedom of judges) are relevant. This article will also advocate to distinguish between functions of law and economics and between agents involved in order to gain a better understanding of the role of law and economics in a legal system.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Marie Claire Ponthoreau, Droit(s) Constitutionnel(s) Comparé(s).

  2. 2.

    De Cruz, p. 36.

  3. 3.

    Jamin, p. 280.

  4. 4.

    Schäfer, pp. 194–97.

  5. 5.

    Mattei and Pardolesi, pp. 267–69.

  6. 6.

    Aristides Hatzis, The Anti-Theoretic Nature of Civil Law Contract Scholarship and the Need for an Economic Theory; Garoupa and Ulen, p. 1588.

  7. 7.

    Wolfgang Weigel, ‘Prospects for Law and Economics in Civil Law countries: Austria’; Christian Kirchner, ‘The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany’; for data concerning the reception of law and economics in Europe, see for example Oren Gazal-Ayal, ‘Economic Analysis of “Law and Economics”’; contra Ben Depoorter and Jef Demot, ‘The Cross-Atlantic Law and Economics Divide: A Dissent’.

  8. 8.

    Mattei, p. 77; this divide is also used by Dau-Schmitt and Brun, pp. 613–14, 617 and 619.

  9. 9.

    Posner , ‘Law and Economics’, p. 67.

  10. 10.

    Mattei, p. 17.

  11. 11.

    Posner , ‘Law and Economics’, p. 67.

  12. 12.

    Gazal-Ayal, pp. 806–809.

  13. 13.

    Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law; Bruno Deffains and Thierry Kirat, Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries.

  14. 14.

    Raphael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ and ‘Law and Finance’; see also Raphael La Porta, Florenico Lopez de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’.

  15. 15.

    La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, p. 286.

  16. 16.

    Siems, pp. 65–70.

  17. 17.

    Infra (Sect. 2.2.2) and Rudolf Schlesinger, ‘The Past and Future of Comparative Law’; Michaels, pp. 780–783; contra Pierre Legrand and Geoffrey Samuel, Introduction au Common Law; Pierre Legrand, Droit Comparé.

  18. 18.

    For some critics, see Ralph Michaels, ‘Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law’.

  19. 19.

    This remark is made for example by Jon Elster, Le Désintéressement: Traité Critique de l’Homme Economique tome 1. See also Ogus , pp. 384–385: “For this reason it may be preferable to refer to this type of analysis [positive law and economics] as ‘interpretive’ or ‘explanatory’.”

  20. 20.

    Indeed, a model is mostly a mathematical structure, that is a logical one that cannot say anything – by itself – about the world. It only gives analytical truths.

  21. 21.

    For more developments on this new distinction and the inadequacy of the old one, see Régis Lanneau, Les Fondements Epistémologiques du Mouvement Law & Economics.

  22. 22.

    Mattei, p. 88; see also p. 78.

  23. 23.

    LO 2009–403.

  24. 24.

    Schanze, p. 103.

  25. 25.

    Mattei, p. 78.

  26. 26.

    La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, p. 289.

  27. 27.

    For a short historical review, see Ponthoreau, pp. 130 et seq.

  28. 28.

    Mahoney, p. 505.

  29. 29.

    Montesquieu, book 11, chapter “Some Thoughts on Economic Reasoning in Appellate Courts and Legal Scholarship”.

  30. 30.

    Beccaria, chapter “Homo Economicus Versus Homo Iuridicus” .

  31. 31.

    Ibidem.

  32. 32.

    La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, p. 288.

  33. 33.

    Holmes, Common Law, p. 1.

  34. 34.

    Legrand and Samuel, p. 18.

  35. 35.

    De Cruz, p. 266.

  36. 36.

    Mahoney, p. 504.

  37. 37.

    Mattei, p. 78.

  38. 38.

    Mattei, p. 79.

  39. 39.

    Mattei, p. 79.

  40. 40.

    Which is linked to the debate about the autonomy of law, infra (Sect. 2.3.2).

  41. 41.

    For this interpretation of CBA, see Eric Posner and Matthew Alder, New Foundations of Cost Benefit Analysis.

  42. 42.

    Thomas Kuhn, La Structure des Révolutions Scientifiques.

  43. 43.

    See for example Peter De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World; Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics; Marie Claire Ponthoreau, Droit(s) Constitutionnel(s) Comparé(s); for a divergent view see Pierre Legrand and Geoffrey Samuel, Introduction au Common Law.

  44. 44.

    Schlesinger, p. 479.

  45. 45.

    Except regarding procedure, see Oscar Chase et~al., Civil Litigation in Comparative Context.

  46. 46.

    Mattei, p. 83.

  47. 47.

    Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis, Preliminary Address on the First Draft of the Civil Code.

  48. 48.

    Troper, La Théorie, pp. 9–11; see also Michel Troper, Le Droit et la Nécessité.

  49. 49.

    Calabresi , p. 1.

  50. 50.

    Holmes, ‘Codes’, p. 1.

  51. 51.

    Mattei, p. 78; contra Ramseyer, pp. 1470 et seqq.

  52. 52.

    See Sects. 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3.

  53. 53.

    One extreme view is developed by Sapir, p. 69, and more generally by “constructivists”.

  54. 54.

    Posner , Frontiers, p. 40.

  55. 55.

    Infra (Sect. 2.3.1).

  56. 56.

    Tamanaha, pp. 11–23.

  57. 57.

    Kornhauser, p. 31.

  58. 58.

    Tamanaha, p. 101; see also Posner , ‘Decline of Law’, p. 761.

  59. 59.

    Posner , ‘Decline of Law’, p. 763.

  60. 60.

    Kornhauser, p. 33.

  61. 61.

    Tamanaha, p. 118.

  62. 62.

    Bix, Jurisprudence, p. 190.

  63. 63.

    This view is developed by Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty; for example, to promote legal certainty.

  64. 64.

    Infra (Sect. 2.3.2).

  65. 65.

    See Kornhauser, pp. 39–45.

  66. 66.

    Tamanaha, p. 11.

  67. 67.

    Sunstein, p. 93.

  68. 68.

    Brian Bix, ‘Law as an autonomous discipline’.

  69. 69.

    Posner , ‘Decline of Law’, p. 762.

  70. 70.

    The concept of market power for example is different used in the realm of law and in the realm of economics, see for details Christophe Le Berre, Le Raisonnement Economique en Droit de la Concurrence; Lionel Zevounou, Le Concept de Concurrence en Droit.

  71. 71.

    Posner , ‘Decline of Law’, p. 767.

  72. 72.

    Infra (Sect. 2.3.3).

  73. 73.

    Holmes, ‘The Path’, pp. 469, 474.

  74. 74.

    Brandeis, p. 470.

  75. 75.

    Hand, p. 81.

  76. 76.

    Posner , ‘Legal Scholarship’, p. 1324.

  77. 77.

    Supra (Sect. 2.3.3).

  78. 78.

    see Rudolf Ihering, Law As a Mean to an End; Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory.

  79. 79.

    Backhaus, p. 1.

  80. 80.

    Supra (Sect. 2.3.3).

  81. 81.

    Régis Lanneau, Les Fondements Epistémologiques du Mouvement Law & Economics.

  82. 82.

    Cardozo, p. 129.

  83. 83.

    Posner , Theory, p. 26.

  84. 84.

    Posner , Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p. 6.

  85. 85.

    Posner , Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p. 71.

  86. 86.

    Posner , Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p. 82.

  87. 87.

    Cardozo, p. 129.

  88. 88.

    Posner , Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p. 71.

  89. 89.

    Posner , Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p. 64.

  90. 90.

    Especially emphasized by realists, Brian Leiter, ‘Legal Indeterminacy’.

  91. 91.

    Posner , Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, p. 3.

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  1. University of Paris West Nanterre La Défense, 200 Avenue de la République, 92001, Nanterre Cedex, France

    Régis Lanneau

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    Klaus Mathis

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Lanneau, R. (2014). To What Extent Is the Opposition Between Civil Law and Common Law Relevant for Law and Economics?. In: Mathis, K. (eds) Law and Economics in Europe. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7110-9_2

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