Abstract
Following Edmund Husserl’s distinction between formal and material ontology, social ontology can be defined as that material ontology focusing upon the species of social objects and its essential properties. Husserl himself never developed a scheme for social ontology in extenso, the main promoters of this discipline being the philosophers of the Munich/Göttingen phenomenological circles. Their theories converge on an antireductionist and essentialist approach: there are social objects, and these objects instantiate essential properties. Interestingly, not all social objects can be described by recurring to this model of explanation, and indeed, only some specific types of social objects were considered within phenomenological researches. Some of the most important are social acts, social relations, and social groups. In fact, it is exactly the essentialist approach that makes the phenomenologist blind with respect to a huge class of (social) objects (such as restaurants, driving licenses, screwdrivers, and the Holy Roman Empire) that do not instantiate essential properties. The properties these objects exemplify serve to fulfill a social function, and this function contingently exists in connection to social groups. In the last part of the chapter, I hence suggest to improve the phenomenological approach by considering the species of social objects as divided into two distinct subspecies: social objects with an essence and social objects without essence, i.e., social artifacts.
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Notes
- 1.
We qualify such fictions as “cum fundamento in re” as it is possible to formulate epistemically objective statements about them. According to Searle, the fact that a particular physical object is, e.g. a screwdriver is not a part of the objective inventory of the world (i.e. it is not an objective feature of the world, but rather a subjective one): “[i]t is a screwdriver only because people use it as (or made it for the purpose of, or regard it as) a screwdriver”. Nonetheless we are able to make epistemically objective statements about it. In fact, “[…] it isn’t just my opinion or evaluation that it is a screwdriver. It is a matter of objectively ascertainable fact that it is a screwdriver” (for these quotations, cf. Searle 1995: 10).
- 2.
Husserl almost certainly borrowed the name and concept of Wissenschaftslehre from Bernard Bolzano (cf. Bolzano 1837/1969), not without impressing some profound modifications to it. In doing this, his reflections follow a millenary train of thought concerning scientificity (recently called the “classical model of science”, cf. Betti and De Jong 2010), whose first formulation can be traced back to the first of book of Aristotle’s Analytica Posteriora, which Bolzano (along with others) revitalised during the nineteenth century. According to this model of scientific rationality, some of the conditions that a set of propositions has to satisfy in order to be qualified as a science consist of (1) a strict delimitation of the objectual domain of the science in question and the identification of a class of (2) fundamental concepts and of (3) fundamental propositions (for an attempt at axiomatizing such ideal conditions, cf. Betti and De Jong 2010: 186). As we will see, the fact that Husserl himself clearly adopted this model is not without importance for the development of social ontology as a proper branch of ontology.
- 3.
“Formal ontology [formale ontologie]” is an expression with a clear Husserlian derivation (11901/1984: 228). Vice versa, “general theory of objects” is the English translation of the German term “allgemeine Gegenstandstheorie” preferred by Alexius Meinong (cf. 1904/1979). Even if the positions of both philosophers concerning ontology do not coincide, they share several parallelisms (cf. Meinong 1913–1914/1978: 293; Husserl 11913/1976: 23). Furthermore, since the objectual domain of formal logic is constituted by meanings, which are a particular kind of ideal objects, apophantic logic can be considered as a part of formal ontology (and Husserl himself is inclined to conceive it in this way, cf. Husserl 11913/1976: 23 and Schuhmann 2004: 65 n. 9).
- 4.
Husserl himself is conscious of the fact that the project of an ontology of nature is strictly related to the traditional idea of a rational science of nature, and, hence, his use of the Kantian notion of “natura formaliter spectata” (“formally regarded nature”, i.e. the whole of all formal/essential relations constituting nature as such) is not a fortuity (cf. Husserl 1996: 277, Kern 1964: 145). Regarding social ontology and in analogy with the notion of natura formaliter spectata, we can also introduce a concept for the sum of all formal/essential relations constituting society as such, i.e. the concept of a societas formaliter spectata (this concept, even if it does not play the same major role played by the previous one, can again be found in Kant, cf. Kant 1934: 447).
- 5.
The question whether point (ii) implies that social ontology specifically (and rational ontologies more in general) do not share any relation to empirical research is a problem per se. This question cannot be discussed here in details, but it has to be denied.
- 6.
Furthermore, as far as the locution “social ontology” itself is concerned, it is first used to refer to a philosophical discipline sui generis in the publications of a Polish law philosopher deeply inspired by Reinach, i.e. in the work of Czesław Znamierowski. Cf. Znamierowski 1921. On Znamierowski work, cf. Czepita 1987; Di Lucia 2003.
- 7.
In fact, the results of phenomenological description are “general” sentences, i.e. sentences concerning species (such as “the promise is a social act”, “red is a colour”), which for Husserl do not bear existential commitment. This is a point that he states very clearly in his Prolegomena: “Truths divide into individual and general truths [generelle Wahrheiten]. The former contain (whether explicitly or implicitly) assertions regarding the existence of individual singulars, whereas the latter are completely free from this […]” cf. Husserl 1900/1975: 234, Eng. tr. 146.
- 8.
It should come as no surprise that phenomenologists consider something like mental acts a particular kind of “object”, as the notion of object (Gegenstand) or objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) is widely used within phenomenology for everything which can be presented to the mind in a general sense (cf. Husserl 11901/1984: 45n., Meinong 1921/1978: 12).
- 9.
- 10.
The relevance of Reinach’s investigation, especially for the theory of contract, is worked out in detail by Schapp in the first volume of his Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht, cf. Schapp 1930: esp. 1–67.
- 11.
- 12.
In order to illustrate this reductionist strategy, let us have a look at how John L. Austin describes the “necessary conditions” for the constitution of performatives (or illocutions). One fundamental condition is the following: “There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances […]” (cf. Austin 1962: 14, my italics). Regarding the existence of an accepted conventional procedure, it seems that there is no way for Austin to separate the existence of the convention from its acceptance, since: “[o]ur formulation of this rule contains the two words ‘exist’ and ‘accepted’ but we may reasonably ask whether there can be any sense to ‘exist’ except ‘to be accepted’, and whether ‘be in (general) use’ should not be preferred to both. Hence we must not say ‘(1) exist, (2) be accepted’ at any rate” (Austin 1962: 26f). But, interestingly enough, Austin does not tackle the ontological aspect of conventions any further in his lectures: their existence seems simply to collapse with their psychological acceptance. The reason for this should be quite clear: if conventions have an existence, which is independent from the general acceptance of this or that social group, then what makes a convention a convention, i.e., exactly its dependence on the general acceptance of this or that social group, disappears and the “convention” should be treated as a mind-independent entity or, in other words, as a social object.
- 13.
This point does not imply that some token of the types described above request human intentionality to come into existence. But this dependence is a de facto dependence and not a de iure. Recall Reinach’s quotation: if angels and devils accomplish promises, then claims and obligations would hold for angels and devils. Hence, the existence of claims and obligations is not bound to human (or angels’ resp. devils’) intentionality, but to the essential nexus between these items and promising as such (regardless as who de facto realises the promise).
- 14.
This somehow sharpened assertion has to be moderated if we bring into consideration authors working in a phenomenological mood, but still outside the realist framework that we have put at the centre of the present reconstruction. The later reflection of Schapp on the so-called Wozu-Dinge (“what-for-things”, cf. Schapp 1953/2004: 11–18), or even Heidegger’s description of Zuhandenheit (cf. Heidegger 1927/1993: §§16–17) can be used as counterexamples to that statement.
- 15.
In this sense, they can be called denominationes mere extrinsecae in contrast to the substantial ones or denominationes intrinsecae (cf. Brentano 1933: 122).
- 16.
Regarding the ontological foundation of cultural studies and the relation between history and social objects, I allow myself to refer to my Salice (2009a) where this issue is examined with regard to the thinking of the Italian philosopher and politician Antonio Gramsci.
- 17.
For the expression “abstract artefacts” (used within the context of a fictionalist theory) (cf. Thomasson 1999).
- 18.
- 19.
For an account of this notion within phenomenology (cf. Salice 2009b).
- 20.
For the sake of simplicity, in what follows I designate states of affairs with that-clauses (“that my VW is a car”) instead of the more common gerundive nominals (“the being-a-car of my VW”).
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Salice, A. (2013). Social Ontology as Embedded in the Tradition of Phenomenological Realism. In: Schmitz, M., Kobow, B., Schmid, H. (eds) The Background of Social Reality. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5600-7_13
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