Intellectual Beatitude in the Averroist Tradition: The Case of Agostino Nifo

Spruit, Leen

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5240-5_7

Leen Spruit Ph.D.^3,4

Part of the book series: International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées ((ARCH,volume 211))

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Abstract

In De anima, III, text 36 (431b 17–19), Aristotle suggested that incorporeal beings could be viewed as objects of thought. Arabic philosophers, and particularly Averroes, interpreted this passage in terms of intellectual beatitude, maintaining that the ultimate goal of human life consisted in knowing the separate substances by joining those intelligences. From the second half of the thirteenth century on, the idea of intellectual beatitude spread rapidly in the Latin West. The first Renaissance author to formulate an extensive and explicit defence of this Averroistic view was probably Agostino Nifo (c. 1473–1538/1545). This chapter provides a close reading of the way Averroes interpreted the above-mentioned passage followed by a brief analysis of its echoes in the Latin West. Finally, Nifo’s doctrine of intellectual beatitude as outlined in book VI of his De intellectu (1503) is examined.

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Notes

1.
Aristotle, De anima, III.7, 431b 17–19.
2.
However, an interesting case is that of Thomas Aquinas, who in his comment on IV Sent. accepts the Arabic teachings on knowing the separate substances as a model for the knowledge of God face-to-face. See below note 29.
3.
For a discussion of intellectual happiness in commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, see Georg Wieland, ‘The Perfection of Man: On the Cause, Mutability, and Permanence of Human Happiness in 13th Century Commentaries on the Ethica nicomachea (EN)’, in Il commento filosofico nell’Occidente latino (secoli XIII–XV), eds Gianfranco Fioravanti, Claudio Leonardi and Stefano Perfetti (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001), pp. 359–377.
4.
The term is also used for the relationship between individual human beings and the material intellect, and for that between the material intellect and the intentions of the imagination. See Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge, MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), III, t/c 4–5, pp. 383–413. Besides continuatio and coniunctio Averroes also used the term adeptio, which al-Fārābī used in the context of an emanationist view of reality (which Averroes rejected), as a synonym of the two other terms. See Jean-Baptiste Brenet, ‘Perfection de la philosophie ou philosophe parfait? Jean de Jandun lecteur d’Averroès’, Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales, 68 (2001), pp. 310–348 (313–314, note 12).
5.
Other treatments are in an appendix later added to the Madrid manuscript of Averroes’s early Epitome on De anima, and in another early work which survives only in Hebrew. For the problem of conjunction in Islamic philosophy and further references, see Deborah H. Black, ‘Conjunction and the Identity of Knower and Known in Averroes’, American Catholic Philosophical Society, 73 (1999), pp. 161–184 (161, note 2, 164–166, and 180–181, note 47). See also Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 321–340; Alfred L. Ivry, ‘Averroes on Intellection and Conjunction’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 86 (1966), pp. 76–85.
6.
Aristotle, Opera cum Averrois commentariis, 12 vols (Venice: Giunta, 1562 [first edition 1550–1552]; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1962), VIII, I, cap. 1: ‘Sed hoc non demonstrat res abstractas intelligere esse impossibile nobis, sicut inspicere solem est impossibile vespertilioni, quia si ita esset, otiose egisset natura.’
7.
This work which survives under the name of Averroes is in fact a compilation based on two letters on the conjunction with the agent intellect; it puts forth a doctrine inspired by the work of Al-Farabi. Both letters survive in Hebrew and were translated in Latin at the end of the thirteenth century in Italy. It was rediscovered by Alessandro Achillini, who published a revised version, later used by Nifo while preparing his own edition. For a thorough analysis of the origin and versions of this work, see Averroes, La béatitude de l’âme, eds and trans. Marc Geoffroy and Carlos Steel (Paris: Vrin, 2001).
8.
Averroes, Commentarium magnum, pp. 480–481.
9.
See Bernardo Bazàn, ‘L’authenticité du De intellectu attribué à Alexandre d’Aphrodise’, Revue philosophique de Louvain, 71 (1973), pp. 468–487.
10.
Averroes, Commentarium magnum, pp. 481–484.
11.
Elsewhere in his Long Commentary, Averroes criticised al-Fārābī for not admitting the knowledge of separate substances. See Averroes, Commentarium magnum, p. 433.
12.
Averroes cites his On the Conjunction of the Intellect with Man; for an edition of the Arabic text, see Ibn Bājja, Opera metaphysica, ed. Majid Fakhri (Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, 1968), pp. 155–173.
13.
Averroes, Commentarium magnum, pp. 484–486.
14.
Ibid., pp. 486–490.
15.
Ibid., pp. 490–493.
16.
Ibid., pp. 493–495.
17.
Ibid., pp. 496–497.
18.
Ibid., pp. 497–500.
19.
Ibid., pp. 485 and 489.
20.
Black, ‘Conjunction and the Identity of Knower and Known in Averroes’, p. 182.
21.
Averroes, Commentarium magnum, p. 501. For further discussion of the texts and issues analysed in this section, see Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, eds Richard C. Taylor and Thérèse-Anne Druart (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), in particular pp. lxix–lxxvi.
22.
Recently, a controversy has sparked over how to interpret the conjunction among medievalist scholars, in particular Luca Bianchi and Alain de Libera. For a discussion, see Maria Bettetini, ‘Introduzione: La fecilità nel Medioevo’, in La felicità nel Medioevo, eds Maria Bettetini and Francesco D. Paparella (Louvain-la-Neuve: Féderation Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2005), pp. VIII–X.
23.
Boethius of Dacia, De summo bono, in Boethius of Dacia, Opuscula, ed. Niels J. Green-Pedersen (Copenhagen: Gad, 1976), pp. 369–377.
24.
Albertus Magnus, De anima, ed. Clemens Stroick, in Opera omnia, 40 vols, eds Bernhard Geyer et al. (Münster: Aschendorff, 1951-), vol. VII.1, tract. 3, cap. 6, p. 215.
25.
Albert keeps some distance from Averroes, but only insofar as his position seems not to be supported by Aristotle’s texts. Cf. Albertus Magnus, De anima, tract. 3, cap. 11, p. 221. For a discussion, see Carlos Steel, ‘Medieval Philosophy: An Impossible Project? Thomas Aquinas and the “Averroistic” Ideal of Happiness’, in Was ist Philosophie in Mittelalter?, eds Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1998), pp. 152–174 (159).
26.
Albertus Magnus, De anima, tract. 3, cap. 12, pp. 224–225: ‘Et ideo etiam in dubium venit, sicut supra diximus, utrum intellectus, secundum quod est in nobis coniunctus imaginationi et sensui, posset aliquid separatum intelligere; intellectus enim post mortem constat, quod intelligit separata. Et nos diximus in illa quaestione, quod nobis videbatur, quoniam nobis videtur, quod in hac vita continuatur cum agente formaliter, et tunc per agentem intelligit separata, quia aliter felicitas contemplativa non attingeretur ab homine in hac vita; et hoc est contra omnes Peripateticos, qui dicunt, quod fiducia contemplantium est ut formam attingere intellectum agentem. Est enim, sicut supra diximus, triplex status nostri intellectus, scilicet in potentia et in profectione potentiae ad actum et in adeptione. In potentia autem existens nullo modo attingit agentem sicut formam, sed dum proficit, tunc movetur ad coniunctionem cum adepto, et tunc, quantum habet de intellectis, tantum est coniunctus, et quantum caret eis, tantum est non coniunctus. Habitis autem omnibus intelligibilibus in toto est coniunctus et tunc vocatur adeptus. Et sic sunt differentiae intellectus nostri quattuor: Quorum primus est possibilis vocatus intellectus, secundus autem universaliter agens et tertius speculativus et quartus adeptus. Accessus autem ex naturae aptitudine ad adeptum vocatur subtilitas, et expeditus usus adepti in actu vocatur sollertia; subtilitas autem causatur ex splendore intelligentiae super possibilem ex natura; sollertia autem est bona dispositio velociter inveniendi multas causas.’ Cf. Super Ethica, in Opera, XIV.2, pp. 774–75.
27.
See Agostino Nifo, De intellectu, ed. Leen Spruit (Leiden: Brill, 2011), ‘Introduction’, pp. 18–24.
28.
See Agostino Nifo, De intellectu libri sex. Eiusdem de demonibus libri tres (Venice: Girolamo Scoto, 1554), book VI, ch. 12; for a discussion, see Carlos Steel, ‘Siger of Brabant versus Thomas Aquinas on the Possibility of Knowing the Separate Substances’, in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts, eds Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr., and Andreas Speer (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2001), pp. 211–232.
29.
Thomas Aquinas, In IV. Sent., dist. 49, q. 2, a. 1. For discussion, see Jan-Baptiste Brenet, ‘S’unir à l’intellect, voir Dieu: Averroès et la doctrine de la jonction au cœur du Thomisme’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 21 (2011), pp. 215–247.
30.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, III, chs. 26–45, in particular chs. 41–45. See also Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, eds Marie-Raymond Cathala and Raimondo M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1964), lectio 1, n. 285. For Aquinas on highest happiness in this life, cf. In Eth. Nic., X, lectio 13; cf. I, lectio 10.
31.
Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, II, lectio 1, n. 286, p. 82. For additional arguments from other works and for discussion of Thomas’s position, see Steel, ‘Medieval Philosophy: An Impossible Project?’, pp. 159–160.
32.
See theses 40, 154, 157, and 176.
33.
See Thomas Wilton, Quaestio disputata de anima intellectiva, ed. Władysław Senko, in Studia Mediewistyczne, 5 (1964), pp. 5–190 (86–87).
34.
John Duns Scotus, Questiones super Metaphysicam, II, q. 3: ‘Utrum substantiae immateriales possint intelligi a nobis secundum suas qualitates pro hoc statu?,’ in Opera omnia, a Patribus Franciscanis de observantia accurate recognita, 26 vols (Paris: Louis Vivès, 1891–1895; repr. Westmead, Franborough, and Hants: Gregg International Publishers, 1969), VII, pp. 110–115.
35.
Radulphus Brito, Quaestiones in Aristotelis librum tertium De anima, in Winfried Fauser, Der Kommentar des Radulphus Brito zur Buch III De anima (Münster: Aschendorff, 1973), pp. 276–292.
36.
Ferrandus Hyspanus, De specie intelligibili, ed. Zdzisław Kuksewicz, Medioevo, 3 (1997), pp. 187–235 (225). See Steel, ‘Medieval Philosophy: An Impossible Project?’, pp. 168–169.
37.
For discussion, see Steel, ‘Medieval Philosophy: An Impossible Project?’, pp. 161–167; Steel, ‘Siger of Brabant versus Thomas Aquinas’, pp. 226–227.
38.
See Iacobus de Pistorio, Quaestio de felicitate, ed. Irene Zavattero, in La felicità nel medioevo, pp. 395–409.
39.
Some scholars argue that also Siger opposed Thomas in some of his ‘lost’ works, referred to by Agostino Nifo and reconstructed by Bruno Nardi. For discussion of this issue, see below and the introduction to my edition of Nifo’s De intellectu, pp. 18–20.
40.
Among the recent studies on Jandun, in particular as to his relation with Averroes, see Brenet, ‘Perfection de la philosophie ou philosophe parfait?’ and id., Transferts du sujet: La noétique d’Averroès selon Jean de Jandun (Paris: Vrin, 2003), pp. 371–432, for the view of intellectual beatitude.
41.
See John of Jandun, Super libros de anima subtilissimae quaestiones (Venice: Heirs of Girolamo Scoto, 1587; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966), col. 419.
42.
Jandun, Super libros De anima, cols 420–424.
43.
John of Jandun, In duodecim libros metaphysicae (Veice: Girolamo Scoto, 1553; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966), fol. 22^v.
44.
Jandun, In duodecim libros Metaphysicae, fols 24^rv, 25^v: ‘Dicendum quod de Deo potest haberi duplex cognitio, una complexa alia simplex et intuitiva. Modo verum est de cognitione Dei complexa qua cognoscitur quod Deus est actus purus et substantia simpliciter, et sic de aliis, illa procedit ab habitu sapientiae. Sed cognitio simplex intuitiva qua cognoscitur Deus et alia principia abstracta quo ad quidditatem eius, illa bene habetur per adeptionem intellectus agentis, et sic intellexit Commentator.’ Cf. Jandun, Super libros De anima, III, q. 36, cols 421–24. For the problematic aspects of individual beatitude, see Brenet, ‘Perfection de la philosophie ou philosophe parfait?’, pp. 344–348.
45.
For discussion of Jandun’s view of intelligible species, see Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis from Perception to Knowledge, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1994–1995), I, pp. 328–337.
46.
Cf. Jandun, Super libros De anima, III, q. 36, cols 416, 418–420.
47.
Jandun, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicae, I, q. 1, fols ^ra-2^ra; cf. XII, q. 4, fol. 130^ra. For discussion, see Edward P. Mahoney, ‘John of Jandun and Agostino Nifo on Human Felicity’, in L’homme et son univers au Moyen Âge, ed. Christian Wenin (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1986), pp. 465–477 (467–468).
48.
For this compilation, see note 7 above.
49.
Nifo, De intellectu, VI, chs. 2–8, fols 53^v–54^v.
50.
Ibid., chs. 9–13, fols 54^v–55^r.
51.
Ibid., chs. 14–15, fols 55^rv.
52.
Ibid., chs. 16–17, fols 55^v–56^r.
53.
It is worth remembering here that Ibn Bājja died when Averroes was only ten years old and that everything known of Ibn Bājja for the Latins came from the Long Commentary on De anima by Averroes.
54.
Ibid., chs. 18–21, fols 56^r–57^r.
55.
Ibid., chs. 25–26, fols 57^v–58^r.
56.
Ibid., chs. 27–28, fols 58^r–58^v.
57.
Ibid., ch. 28, fols 58^rv.
58.
Ibid., chs. 29–39, fols 58^v–61^r.
59.
Ibid., ch. 39, fol. 60^v.
60.
Ibid., chs. 40–42, fols 61^rv.
61.
Ibid., ch. 45, fol. 62^v. Recall, that Nifo interprets Averroes through the doctrine found in the pseudo-Averroes, De beatitudine animae.
62.
Ibid., chs. 46–47, fol. 63^r.
63.
Ibid., ch. 48, fols 63^rv.
64.
Ibid., chs 49–51, fols 63^rv.
65.
Ibid., ch. 54, fol. 64^r.
66.
Ibid., ch. 55, fol. 64^r.
67.
Ibid., ch. 56, fol. 64^v.
68.
Ibid., ch. 57, fols 64^v–65^r.
69.
Ibid., ch. 58, fol. 65^r.
70.
Ibid., ch. 59, fol. 65^r.
71.
Ibid., ch. 60, fols 65^rv.
72.
Ibid., ch. 61, fol. 65^v. The ascent of the human intellect through the hierarchy of intelligences which are ordered according to the order of the planets to which they are related is borrowed from Averroes, De animae beatitudine; cf. infra.
73.
Nifo, De intellectu, VI, ch. 62, fols 65^v–66^r.
74.
Nifo argues that first another issue needs to be examined, namely the soul’s operations and the happiness after death. After having discussed several doubts, he concludes that, given its immortality, it cannot be denied that the soul develops some activity after death. Nifo, De intellectu, VI, ch. 63–64. Doubts are solved in ch. 71.
75.
Nifo, De intellectu, VI, ch. 65, fol. 66^v. See ibid., II, ch. 17, fol. 21^v: ‘Sed rationalis anima in sui operatione nobilissima, scilicet in speculatione summa primi entis, quae est possibilis ei ac naturalissima, in qua summe quiescit, impeditur a corpore.’
76.
Ibid., ch. 66, fol. 67^rv.
77.
Ibid., chs. 67–68, fols 67^v–68^r.
78.
This phrase suggests that at least some Peripatetic philosophers regarded women as intellectually inferior to men.
79.
Ibid., chs 69–70, fols 68^rv. See ibid., I, ch. 14, fol. 8^r: ‘Videtur ergo Plato dictum Mosis sic exponere quod Deus substantias omnes spiritales creavit, ut animas, et eas posuit in stellis tanquam semina et exordia animalium humanorum.’
80.
Agostino Nifo, In Averrois de animae beatitudine (Venice: Heirs of Ottaviano Scoto, 1508), fol. 2^v.
81.
Nifo, In Averrois de animae beatitudine, fol. 19^v. Probably, Nifo, De intellectu, VI, cap. 70, fol. 68^v.
82.
Ibid., fol. 20^rb.
83.
Ibid., fol. 22^rb.
84.
Ibid., fols 23^va–25^va.
85.
Ibid., fol. 25^va.
86.
See Averroes, Commentarium magnum, pp. 496–497: the notions of form and matter in the intellectual realm indicate a proportion or disposition.
87.
Nifo, De intellectu, VI, chs 34, 40, 42, 43–44, fols 59^v–60^r, 61^rv, 61^v–62^r.
88.
Ibid., IV, ch. 24, fols 48^v–49^r.

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Centre for the History of Philosophy and Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen-Midden, The Netherlands
Leen Spruit Ph.D.
Sapienza University in Rome, Piazzale Aldo Moro, 500185, Rome, Italy
Leen Spruit Ph.D.

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Anna Akasoy
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Guido Giglioni

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Spruit, L. (2013). Intellectual Beatitude in the Averroist Tradition: The Case of Agostino Nifo. In: Akasoy, A., Giglioni, G. (eds) Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 211. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5240-5_7

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