The Problem of Personality in the Social World

Schutz, Alfred

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-1518-9_12

Alfred Schutz³

Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 206))

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The Problem of Personality in the Social World

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Notes

1.
The general editors of the Werkausgabe are Richard Grathoff, Hans-Georg Soeffner and Ilja Srubar, and is to be published in 9 volumes (12 half-volumes). The edition was to be completed in 2008.
2.
In this text Schutz follows the general “architecture” of all of his writings by beginning with the “solitary self,” or with the description of phenomena from the perspective of the single person in order to proceed to sociality. He is well aware that even the “world of the solitary self ” is already constituted and structured intersubjectively. This conscious abstraction of his egological formulation is explicitly stated by Schutz in the Introduction to the manuscript on “The Problem of Personality” of 1937: “Accordingly, we have to carry out painstaking investigations of the world of the solitary self, of its nature, of the problems comprised under the heading of personality, and of the forms of self-consciousness. <Those investigations have to carried out, moreover, > before we can enter into further and difficult questions about which modifications and consequences arise such that the conception of a solitary self is only an arbitrary abstraction, that the self in the world always presupposes being with others and that these other alter egos are human beings like me whose self in its being in the world shows a world that is natural like mine and in principle of the same constitution as my own self.” (22/7126). Cf. also the references to the problem in the present draft, pp. 14/7083 and 15/7084 as well as in the first version of 1937, p. 82/7173. See also the corresponding indications in the published essay, “On Multiple Realities,” Collected Papers, Volume I, Edited and Introduced, by Maurice Natanson, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, pp. 208 f. [(hereinafter CP I)] as well as the observation of Schutz in his letter to Aron Gurwitsch of 20 April, 1952; [see Philosophers In Exile. The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch 1939–1959. Edited by Richard Grathoff. Translated by J. Claude Evans. Foreword by Maurice Natanson (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 175 ff.]
3.
The consequences for a “universal theory of relevance” resulting from the treatment of problems of personality are more fully suggested by Schutz in his manuscripts from 1947 and 1951 such as the posthumously published Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, edited, annotated, and with an Introduction by Richard M. Zaner, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. This work was reprinted in Collected Papers V. Schutz had already emphasized the necessity for developing a theory of relevance at the end of Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie, 1931. (English translation with an Introduction by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert, The Phenomenology of the Social World, 1967), §50.
4.
Departing from our editorial principles of chronological order, these pages are placed here as a better “table of contents.” Schutz had placed them at the end of his phase of work in 1936. We retain his page numbering.
5.
By “world of working” Schutz denotes the daily world in which we work and operate, into which we are geared, and for which we are pragmatically geared to bring about changes and effects, and in which we affectively deal with others in social action. Thus in addition to a narrower meaning distinguishing it from the surrounding world, “world of working” has a very broad meaning of a sort that makes it difficult to find a single equivalent in English. It also has the connotation of a world in which things and events happen “naturally” as well. And, as Helmut Wagner once noted, in his later writings in English, Schutz himself simply used the term, “world of working,” to comprise this very broad meaning and to express the etymological proximity of “wirken” and “werken.” See, for instance, “On Multiple Realities,” CP I, pp. 211 f.}.
6.
The beginning of the idea for an Introduction that follows was developed in a first version in the continuation of this manuscript in the summer of 1937; cf. below, pp. 1/703-29/7133.
7.
The divisions among arrangements of catchwords and references in sections B), C), and D) of the Table of Contents are added by the editors. In the original manuscript they are numbered consecutively.
8.
In this connection, see Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus (1913/16), in Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 2, edited by Maria Scheler/Manfred Frings, Bern/München, 1980, especially pp. 469ff, 477ff; {English translation by Manfred Frings and Roger L. Funk, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973, Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values, pp. 459 ff., 467 ff.;} Soren Kierkegaard, Die Krankheit zum tode. Eine christlich-psychologische Entwicklung zur Erbauung und Envekkung van Anti-Climacus (1849), Gesammelte Werke, edited by Emanuel Hirsch, Gutersloh: Mohn, 1992, espc. Part II, A, Chapter 1 (The Sickness Unto Death, translated by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941); Plato, Phaedrus, 72e ft.; Spinoza, Ethica ordine geometico demonstrata (1677); Leibniz, Monadologie (1714); Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/87), especially B 131 if.; (English translation by Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1953, pp. 153ff).; Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, Part I, §§l-3;( edited and translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970, pp. 93 ff.); Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (1913), Husserliana III/l; (English translation by Fred Kersten, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (1931), Husserliana I, §§8 ff., 30 ff., 55; (English translation by Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, I960); Henri Bergson, Essai sur les données inmédiates de la conscience (1889), Chapter 2; (Authorized translation by F.L. Pogson, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960 [1910], Time and Free Will, pp. 75 ff.); Cf. below, p. 21/7124.
9.
For the general discussion of the anthropological literature up to the middle 1930s, see especially the following: Max Scheler, Die Idee des Menschen (1914) and Die Stellung des Menschen im Cosmos (1928) (English translation with an Introduction, by Hans Meyerhoff, New York: The Noonday Press, 1961); Helmut Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie (1928) as well as Macht und menschliche Natur (1931); Otto Schwarz, Medizinische Anthropologie (1929); Karl Löwith, Die Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen (1928); Joachim Wach, Typen religioser Anthropologie (1932); Albert Huth, Abrifl der pädagogischen Anthropologie (1932); Paul Ludwig Landsberg, Einfuhrung in die philosophische Anthropologie (1934); Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Das neue Bild des Menschen und die anthropologische Aufgabe (1934); Georg Kuhlmann, Theologische Anthropologie (1935).
10.
Added from the Table of Contents; see above, p. 11/7061.
11.
For Leopold von Wiese’s so-called theory of relations of working of, see especially System der Allgemeinen Soziologie (1924–28), Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,³ 1955, as well as Werner Sombart, Die Drei Nationalökonomien. Geschichte und System der Lehre von der Wirtschaft, Miinchen/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1930.
12.
In this connection, see Scheler, Formalismus, pp.494 ff., 505 ff. {English translation, pp. 485f,495 f.}
13.
See Hermann Schmitz, Die Gotik im deutschen Kunst- und Geistesleben, Berlin: Verlag fur Kunstwissenschaft, 1921; Heinrich G. Lempertz, Wesen der Gotik, Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1926. For J.S. Bach’s son, Carl Philipp Emanuel, see the latter’s Versuch itber die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen, published in two parts, Berlin 1753 or 1762, later Leipzig: Schwickert,³ 1780 or 1797. For the discussion of the problem of style in art, see Max Dvorak, Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei, Berlin: Oldenbourg 1908; (English translation with Notes and Bibliography by Randolph I. Klawiter. Preface by Karl Maria Swoboda. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967); and the same author’s Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte, München: Piper, 1924. This last volume is in Schutz’s private library. “Style” turned out to be one of the great themes in the 1920’s; cf. especially Carl E. Osthans, Grundzüge der Stilentwicklung, Hagen: Folkwang, 1919.
14.
The reference is to Henri Bergson, Durée et Simultaneité. A Propos de la theorie d’Einstein. 4th ed., Paris, Librairie Fe1ix Alcan, 1929. The 4th edition is basically the same as the 2nd edition which differs from the first by containing the three appendices added to the second, and which are reproduced in the fourth edition. Schutz’s reference is to the first appendix, “The Journey in the Projectile” (see English translation by Leon Jacobson, The Library of Liberal Arts (Bobbs-Merrill Co) Indianapolis, 1965, pp. 163–172, pp. 174 f.) Bergson’s paradox of the separation and reuniting of Peter and Paul contains the physical refutation of the theory of relativity in terms of what is called “The Clock Paradox,” and the problem of “asymmetrical aging.” Do we age together simultaneously, the “same,” or assymmetrically? See also Schutz’s reference in “Don Quijote and the Problem of Reality,” CP II, p. 139.
15.
See Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie (1936), in Husserliana, Bd VI, hg. Walter Biemel, Den Haag: Nijhoff² 1962, §§1-27; (English translation by David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.) Husserl gave several lectures at the Deutschen und der Tschechischen Universität in Prague in middle of November, 1935. With their friend Felix Kaufmann, Use and Alfred Schutz attended these lectures. See Karl Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik. Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, pp. 468 ff.
16.
Addition based on the Table of Contents, above, 11/7061.
17.
For the texts of Leibniz referred to by Schutz, see Leibniz, Philosophsche Werke, edited by Ernst Cassirer (Hamburg: Meiner, 1903 [1966]), Vol I. Chapter VIII, pp. 84–93; Vol. II, Chapter XXII, pp. 74–78.
18.
In this connection, see Scheler, Formalismus, pp. 548 ff.(English translation, pp. 533 ff.)
19.
The text in parentheses is in square brackets in the original mss, after which Schutz refers to Leibniz, op. cit., Vol II, Chapter XX, pp. 48–62. (The German editors cite the full text referred to by Schutz, and which is omitted here.)
20.
In the original Schutz uses the neologism, “Panentheismus.”
21.
For Spinoza, see Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata (1677); for Pierre Bayle, see his essay “Averroes” and “Spinoza” in his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1695/97). (English translation of the entry on Spinoza in Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary. Selections. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes by Richard H. Popkin. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965, pp. 288–338.) Spinoza, Bayle, and Averroes are mentioned in the text of Leibniz, be. cit., “Betrachtungen über die Lehre von einem einigen, allumfassenden Geistes,” pp. 48 ff., especially p. 60, note 322.
22.
See Averroes (Averrois Cordubensis, 1126–1198), Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros (1562); edited by F. Stuart Grawford in Corpus Commentarium Averrois in Aristotelem, Vol. VI, Cambridge/Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1953, especially pp. 409ff, 576.
23.
In the original, ditto marks for the same expression.
24.
Cf. Bergson’s distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous time in Time and Free Will, pp. 95ff, 109 ff.
25.
See below, p. 12/7080, where Schutz speaks of the “general positing of action.”
26.
See Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allegemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie [1912] Neu herausgegeben von Karl Schuhmann. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, §§87-96. {Hereinafter, Ideen, I.}
27.
Added on the basis of the table of contents; see above, p. II./7061.
28.
See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/87), B. 627. Kant of course speaks of “Talern.”
29.
Presumably Schutz borrowed this concept from William James; see James, The Principles of Psychology (1890), Vol. II, Chapter XXVI. Schutz had already referred to James’ category in Sinnhafte Aufbau (§11). The concept also arises in Bergson; cf. Matière et Memoire [Matter and Memory, Authorized translation by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (1908) New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959, p. 180.] See also Max Scheler, “Die Formen des Wissens und the Bildung” (1929); in Schutz’s copy of this essay the concept is emphatically underlined. See also the continuation in the 1937 manuscript, below pp. 69/7160-73/7164, as well as the distinction between inner deed (thinking) and external deed (working) in Sinnhqften Aufbau, §§8 ff., and the corresponding development by Thomas Luckmann in Schutz/Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt II, Frankfurt am Main: Ausgabe Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984, Chapter V. This latter work has been translated as Structures of the Life-World, vol. 2, translated by David Parent and Richard Zaner (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1983).
30.
In contrast to the manuscripts of the 1920’s, here the difference between self and alter ego results not only from the essential non-identity of two durees, but also from the experience of belongingness of acts to me.
31.
In this connection see Schutz’s early allusion to the “symbolic function of the acting self,” i.e., to the conception of the symbolic relation and its meaning-constituting aspects, in “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur” (1927), pp. 25 ff., 46ff, 129 ff. (Life Forms and Meaning Structure, translated, Introduced and Annotated by Helmut Wagner, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982; after 1982; reprinted in Alfred Schutz, Literature and Literary Relationships (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), pp. 33ff. 52ff., 125ff..) The pagination of the original manuscript is found in the margins of the English translation. Henceforth, the German edition will be referenced, with the pagination of the original manuscript.
32.
Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. 11/7061.
33.
In the original this insertion is enclosed by vertical lines.
34.
Schutz first introduced the concept of essentially actual experiencings in Sinnhaften Aufbau, §7.
35.
Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. II./7061.
36.
See Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, authorized translation by Arthur Mitchell, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911, pp. 137 ff.
37.
Here Schutz puns on Leibniz’s image of “veins in marble; see the subsequent note to 11/7079 below. The cartographical concept of “isohypses” or “hypsographical contour lines of relevance.” Isohypsen is introduced by Schutz in his published work for the first time in “The Stranger,” in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, Volume II, Edited and Introduced by Arvid Brodersen, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, p. 93. The expression, “pole of the self,” is Husserl’s in the heading of Cartesianische Meditationen, §31: “Das Ich als identischer Pol der Erlbenisse.”
38.
This reference is a further indication of the meaning Schutz ascribed to his Leibniz studies begun shortly after finishing the Sinnhafte Aufbau. In this connection also see the example within the frame of the continuation of work on this manuscript in the Summer of 1937, below p. 47/7138.
39.
Addition on the basis of the Table of Contents, above p. II./7061. This section of the first chapter was developed in a first draft in the following Summer of 1937.
40.
See Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen, §§50ff
41.
In the original the subdivisions 1) and 2) are grouped together with a bracket in the left margin of the page under the concept of “space constitution.” In that connection see Sinnhafte Aufbau, §20, 114, note 1 with the reference to Cartesianische Meditationen, pp. 151 f. Also see the letter of Aron Gurwitsch to Schutz of 27 July, 1950 (Correspondence, pp. 116 ff.)
42.
In this connection see Schutz’s earlier study, “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur,” pp. 19 ft, 88 ff., 113 ff., as well as Husserl, op. cit., especially §53.
43.
For points 4) and 5), see Schutz, “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur,” pp. 114 f.
44.
A first attempt at dealing with this topic within the framework of Schutz’s phenomenology is by Schutz’s student, Maurice Natanson, “Philosophische Grundfragen der Psychiatrie I. Philosophic und Psychiatric,” Psychiatric der Gegenwart. Forschung und Praxis, Vol. 1/2, 1963, pp. 903–925.
45.
Cf. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, §§49 ff.
46.
The letter to Landsberg was not found among Schutz’s papers by the editors. There is, however, a stenographic draft of a letter to Landsberg by Schutz dated 24 May, 1936 (pp. 13361–13362). Schutz’s private library contains a copy of Landsberg’s Einführung in die philosophische Anthropologie of 1934 (1960) and the French translation of Die Erfahrung desTodes f l936 (Essai sur l‘experience de la mort (1936)). [See Paul-Louis Landsberg, “The Experience of Death,” in Essays in Phenomenology. Edited by Maurice Natanson, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 193–232.} For Landsberg, see Eduard Zwierlein, Die Idee einer philosophischen Anthropologie bei Paul Ludwig Landsberg, Wtirzburg: Konighausen & Neumann, 1989. Paul Ludwig Landsberg (Bern, 3 December 1901–2 April, 1944) was arrested by the Gestapo in France in February, 1943, and died in the concentration camp at Oranienburg in 1944. See Herbert Mitgang, The New Yorker, 2 August, 1982, pp. 51Iff. for an account of the death of Landsberg and his family by the Nazis.]
47.
Addition on the basis of the table of contents, p. II./7061.
48.
See the analysis of this example of “empathy” in Max Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie (1913), in Gesammelte Werke Bd. 7, edited by Manfred S. Frings, Bern/München: Francke, 1973, especially pp. 29 ff. (English translation, The Nature of Sympathy, translated by Peter Heath, with a General Introduction to Max Scheler’s Work by W. Stark. Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1970, pp. 18 f.). See Johann von Goethe, Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe, edited by Erich Trunz, Bd. I: Gedichte und Epen I, München: Beck 1981, p. 386: “Der Brautigen.” Schutz’s recourse to Scheler’s argument is of particular significance here because he accepts intentional acts the “fulfillment” of which necessarily requires the existence of others. As a result Schutz clearly deviates from Husserl’s interpretation of the problem of intersubjectivity. See Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen, §§43–50.
49.
See Schutz’s later essay, “Making Music Together,”(1951), Collected Papers, Vol. II, pp. 159–178; (and the posthumously published “Fragments Toward a Phenomenology of Music” (1944), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, Edited by Helmut Wagner and George Psathas, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, Appendix, pp. 243–275.)
50.
Addition from the Table of Contents, p. II./7061.
51.
The reference to Descartes cannot be directly traced in his work; but for a thematizing of bodily movement see Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), Meditation VI; Passions de I’Ame (1649), art. 46; and Principia philosophiae (1644), Part II. It is possible that Schutz’s note is related to the succinct exposition of the Cartesian position and its critique in part to Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 189 f.
52.
Teilpersonalitäten, Teilpersonen, and similar locutions, are borrowed from Scheler, Formalismus, pp. 523 ff. (English translation, pp. 519 ff.). The English edition translates the locutions as “individual personalities,” “individual persons,” i.e., as individuations of a collective person. Thus we speak of the American personality, or the Hispanic personality, etc. Schutz, however, seems to depart from Scheler in this respect, although not inconsistent with Scheler, because he has in mind the “specific index” of the me ipsum, i.e., the solitary self with which he begins articulated into partial persons or selves such as my different persons or selves as parent, as businessman, as neighbor, etc. See above, pp. l/7065 f. In Schutz’s case it would appear misleading to speak of the individual personalities of the individual or individual me ipsum. Thus we translate the locutions as “partial personalities, “partial person.” The me ipsum itself, the individual me myself, is then a collective whole of “personalities,” past and present, each with its partial content (Teilinhalt), belonging to a collective whole in Scheler’s sense.
53.
In the original the indented passage is set off by double vertical lines. Schutz refers here to Max Weber’s conception of the ideal type, as developed in Weber’s “Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher and sozialpolitischer Erkenntis” (1904) (in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, edited by Johannes Winckelmann, Tübingen: Mohr, 1988, pp. 146–214). (English translation in Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Translated and Edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, Glencoe, 111: The Free Press, 1949, pp. 50–112). In the reference to Leibniz’s letter to Arnauld with the catchword, “Adam-problem,” Leibniz deals with his thesis “that the individual concept of each person once and for all includes all that the individual will ever encounter.”
54.
Leibniz, “Bemerkungen zum allgemeinen Teil der Kartesischen Prinzipien” (1692). Schutz paraphrases Leibniz’s statement in Article 7 where Leibniz says that “Man kann somit die primitiven Tatsachenwahrheiten passend auf folgende zwei zurückfuhren: ‘ich denke’ und ‘Mannigfaches wird von mir gedacht.’ Hieraus folgt nich nur, [dass]ich existiere, sondern auch, dass ich auf mannigfache Art bestimmt bin.”[“We can reduce the primitively true facts to the following two: ‘I think’ and a ‘manifold of things are thought by me.’ As a result it follows not only that I exist but that I am defined in a manifold way.”]
55.
See Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, §74.
56.
See below, pp. 7/7075 and 9/7077. Presumably Schutz refers here to Scheler, Formalismus, pp. 548 ff. (English translation, pp. 530 ff.)
57.
See Scheler’s concept of person as bearer of a member of a personality <e.g., of a race, nation, religion,> Formalismus, pp. 548 ff. (English translation, pp. 530 ff.)
58.
See below, pp. 7/7075 ff., following the thematic catalogue to Chapter Two, B and below, p. H./7061 the corresponding concluding outline of the contents of the manuscript of 1936, Chapter Two, B.
59.
See below, pp. 1 l/7079ff following the thematic catalogue to Chapter Two, C, as well as the corresponding concluding outline for Chapter Two C, in the the 1936 manuscript, above, p. III./7062.
60.
See Felix Kaufmann, Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften (Vienna: Springer 1936), pp. 191f,306.
61.
Following the thematic catalog to Chapter Two, D and E, below, pp. 21/7090 ff. as well as the corresponding outline to Chapter Two, D and E of the 1936 manuscript, above, p. III./7062.
62.
In this connection, see Scheler, Formalismus, pp. 511, 548, 552. (English translation, pp. 506, 530 ff.)
63.
See Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 130 f., 180.
64.
For the whole section, see Bergson, Matter and Memory, Chapter III, as well as L’Énergie spirituelle (1919)(English translation, Mind-Energy, by H. Wildon Carr, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920). See in addition pp. 15/7084ff, below as well as Schutz’s later development in his essay “On Multiple Realities,” CP I, pp. 226 ff. For the reference presumably to Simmel’s formulation, “transcendence in immanence,” see below, fn, 71.
65.
Addition on the basis of the table of contents, above, p. II./7061.
66.
Here there is a further development of Schutz’s basic thesis in Sinnhaften Aufbau that the constituting of meaning and actuality are essentially tied to the problem of temporality, that “the problem of meaning is a problem of time,” p. 9; (English translation, p. 11). In this section Schutz develops the concepts of time as intersection of subjective and world time which, in part, he discusses in the continuation of the manuscript of 1937 (see below, pp. 43/7134 ff.). These analyses concerning the temporal stratification of social actuality will become relevant for Schutz in his later works—for, among others, the analysis of communication as temporal event—and continue into his American years. The conception of pragmatic temporality and the tempora of the self are here the most elaborated parts in his work; cf. Sinnhafter Aufbau, §7, and the additions in Schutz/Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt, I, Chapter II, section B, 4; translated as Structures of the Life-World by Richard Zaner and Tristram Engelhardt (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
67.
In the continuation in the 1937 manuscript Schutz develops the following sketch into a first draft; see below, pp. 43/7134-67/7158.
68.
According to the concluding Table of Contents of the work on the manuscript in 1936 (above, p. II./7061), Schutz refers here to the section, “The Role of the Body.”
69.
For Plato, see Parmenides 155e–157b; for Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, Chapter 3 as well as Either/Or for the “leap” as the “moment of resolve;” and Philosophical Fragments, Chapters 1 and 4.
70.
Schutz is referring to the circumstance that, when grown up, only with great effort are we able recognize our own bodies in our childhood photos.
71.
In the original the indented passage is set off by vertical lines.
72.
See Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread; for the concept of “thrownness,” see Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, §§29, 31, 38, 58, 68b; for Plato see Meno, 8ldff., and Phaedrus, 74df.
73.
The indented reference is set off in the original by vertical lines. See Freud, Das Unbewusste, in Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 3 (Frankfurt/M: Fischer 1975), pp. 125–162. In Sinnhafte Aufbau Schutz refers in addition to Moritz Geiger, “Fragment über den Begriff des Unbewussten und die psychische Realität,” Jahrbuch fur Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung, 4, 1921, pp. 1–136.
74.
See Goethe, Gedichte und Epen, I, “Urwortes, p. 359: “Urworte. Orphische: Daimon, Dãmon, Z, 1–4. “Wie an dem Tag, der dich der Welt verliehen. / Die sonne stand zum Grüße der Planeten./Bist alsobald und fort und fort gediehen. /Nach dem Gesetz, wonach du angetreten.”
75.
Addition based on the table of contents, above p. II./7061.
76.
For the concept of “fundamental dread,” see Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, §§40, 68b; for “carpe diem,” see Horace, Odes (I, 11, 8). The attitude of “ataraxia” as a goal of life is at the center of the Stoic philosophy of Epicurus and Democritus.
77.
Added from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062. Schutz undertook a first draft of this section in the continuation of this manuscript in the summer of 1937. See below, pp. 68/7159-74/7165).
78.
Schutz’s references are to the French edition of Nouveaux essais, Paris, Flammarion. The references to Book I are erroneous.
79.
See Descartes, Principia philosophiae, §§30 ff., 41 ff.
80.
See Leibniz, Discours de Metaphysique (1686), §33, as well as Nouveaux essais, I, 2, §21; I, 2, §20.
81.
In dealing with the pragmatic constitution of reality on the basis of the experience of resistance Schutz takes up an old pragmatic motive; see especially Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 151 ff. ; George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of Act (1938), edited by Charles W. Morris, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972, Chapter III: “The Nature of Scientific Knowledge;” Max Scheler’s study of “Erkenntnis und Arbeit,” in Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 8: Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (1926), edited by Maria Scheler, Bern/ München: Francke, 1980, pp. 363 ff. (in connection with Dilthey). But also see Leibniz, Nouveau essais, 11/4, §§ 1 ff.
82.
For the metaphor of the marble, see Leibniz, Nouveaux essais, “Preface,” I, 1, §25; for the image of “preinscribed lines,” see Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 103 f. This image of preinscribed lines was used by Schutz since the time of his manuscript, “Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur;” also see below, pp. 14/7083 f., as well as the elaboration of 1937, p. 73/7164.
83.
Schutz probably refers to Max Scheler’s observation in Formalismus, pp. 157 ff. (English translation, pp. 135 ff.), as well as pp. 381 f., 386 ff. (English translation, pp. 370 ff.).
84.
Added from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.
85.
The reference is to Schutz’s French edition of Nouveaux essais, 11.21, no doubt to §63.
86.
See Husserl, Ideen, I, §§27 f. For the structural elements of time and space for the life-world, see Schutz/Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt, I, Chapter II, Part B.
87.
At issue here is the so-called psychophysical problem, thus the question of how the psychic (the soul) operates on the physical (the body), and conversely. So-called science by Gustav Theodor Fechner (Elemente der Psychophysik, Leipzig 1860, 1907, 1964) and developed by Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig (Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie, Leipzig: Engelmann, 1874, 1908/11). See the contemporary literature familiar to Schutz, Ernst Mach, Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis der Physischen zum Psychischen (1900); Karl Jaspers, Allgemeine Psychopathologie (1913); Robert Reininger, Das psychophysische Problem (1916), A. Wenzel, Das Leib-Seele-Problem im Lichte der neueren Theorien der physischen und seelischen Wirklichkeit (1933). Likewise see Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen, §§44 f., 50 ff., 56.
88.
See above, p. 1/7065, where Schutz speaks of the “general positing of my acting self.”
89.
See Husserl, Ideen, I, §§31 f.; Cartesianische Meditationen, §§11, 15; Krisis, §§17 f.
90.
This is the first version of the epoché which is the specific epoché of “bracketing doubt” in the mundane, relative natural attitude; see the first draft in elaboration of 1937, below pp. 76/7 167 f.., as well as in “On Multiple Realities,” CP I, p. 229.
91.
For the reference to Kierkegaard, see Repetition.
92.
The reference is to Max Scheler, “Erkenntnis und Arbeit,” loc. cit., pp. 359 ff.
93.
See Leibniz, Nouveaux essais, II, 21, §§9 and 72, as well as Essais de Théodicée, I, §§59,65, and III, §§290, 301.
94.
See Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp. 89 ff.
95.
The references are, again, to Schutz’s French edition of Nouveaux essais. For the whole development of the relation of Bergson and Leibniz, see Schutz, “Choosing Among Projects of Action,” CP II, pp. 85 ff. Cf. Leibniz’s theory of choice in acting (NE, pp. 130, 136 f., 138, 143 f., 147, 148, 152, 158 as well as 165 f.) with Bergson’s theory of choice in Données inmèdiates de la conscience (“Decisions fall like ripe fruit”).
96.
Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III/7062. In the continuation of this manuscript in the summer of 1937, Schutz developed a first draft of this section. See below, pp. 75/7166-87/7178.
97.
Here, for the first time, Schutz introduces the concept of the “world of working” [Wirkwelt]. For exposition of the world of working as the core of the life-world, see “On Multiple Realities” as well as the relevant passages in “Symbol, Reality and Society.” Both of these essays are reprinted in Collected Papers 1.
98.
Schutz develops a first draft of this section in the continuation of this manuscript in the Summer of 1937, below, pp. 88/7179-118/7210. For the examples of modifications into the worlds of phantasy, dream, and science, Schutz investigates the different cognitive styles central to the constitution of “multiple realities.” See the development of modifications of the world of working in “On Multiple Realities.” The present section lays the groundwork for this analysis of the modifications of the worlds of phantasy, dream, and scientific theory.
99.
From the table of contents, above, p. III./7062.
100.
See Leibniz, Nouveau essais, II, 1, §15; II, 21, §§72f; II, 22, §§10 f.; also Théodicée, §§290 ff., 323, 403.
101.
In this connection, see the development of 1937, below, pp. 71/7162f, as well as the systematization of this typology of acting in Schutz/Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt, II, C.
102.
Here Schutz follows Husserl and Scheler for whom, even in different contexts, phantasy is a capacity of consciousness to be able to adopt different attitudes to a posited object; for Husserl see Ideen, I, §§97f; for Scheler, “Erkenntnis und Arbeit,” pp. 313 ff., 343 ff.
103.
Conditio potestativus, the condition of having power or authority, a condition within the power or authority of the self in the world of phantasy. The word, “potestativeness,” is not in the OED.
104.
See Leibniz, Principes de la Nature et de la Grace fondes en Raison, §13; and Monadologie, §§22 ff.
105.
An allusion to the definition of the concept of truth by Aquinas; see Quaestiones disputatae de veritatae, Quaestio XVI, Art V, 2.
106.
Schutz has Inkompatibilitäten, but we believe he means Inkompossibilitäten, and have accordingly so translated it.
107.
The reference cannot be identified.
108.
See Freud, Das Unbewusste, loc. cit.; and Das Ich und das Es, in Gesammelte Schriften. Studienausgabe, Vol. Ill, Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1969, pp. 282 ff.
109.
Schutz returns to this image in “On Multiple Realities,” CP I, pp 236f; in this connection, see also his “Don Quijote and the Problem of Reality,” CP II, pp. 139 f.
110.
See the material on the theme of ‘Witz” (Wit, Jokes) in Schutz’s Nachlass, microfilm 5, Division XLVI, no. 7036–7053.
111.
See Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams.
112.
For this image, see Leibniz, Monadology, §7.
113.
See above, p. 12/7080.
114.
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 12, 1172a. The idea that even science is an intersubjective system of knowledge within the life-world is formulated explicitly by Schutz for the first time in the present manuscript. See the almost identical concluding paragraph in “On Multiple Realities.” It is possible that Schutz adopted the formulation here from Husserl’s letter of 3 May, 1932. There Husserl thanks Schutz for the copy of Sinnhafte Aufbau Schutz sent him, and invites Schutz to visit him in Freiburg: “Kommen Sie also, ich werde mich fur Sie frei machen. Es soll ein schö’nes symphilosophein werden.” See Husserliana Briefwechsel, Vol. Ill, p. 483.
115.
For earlier formulations of this problem, to which Schutz has recourse, see especially Kant’s distinction between the “self as subject of thinking” and “the self as object of perception,” in Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798), I, §7.
116.
See Augustine, Soliloquia, II, 1. The reference to Leibniz is to Nouveaux essais, IV, 2, §1, note 304, which cites the relevant passage in Augustine. Schutz had already cited this reference to Augustine (though mistakenly to the Confessiones) in his manuscript, “Lebensformung und Sinnstruktur,” pp. 93 f.
117.
The references to Nouveaux essais are, again, to the French edition used by Schutz.
118.
Among the works to which Schutz may be referring are Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/87); Fichte, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794); Schelling, Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797), and System der transzendentalen Idealismus (1800); Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807).
119.
Husserl, Cartesianishe Meditationen, Meditations IV, V.
120.
Schutz refers here directly to Simmel’s typification [Typik] of the “male gender” in its “dual relationship” as the “continuous reaching over and beyond itself [bestandigen “Ober-sich-selbst-Hinausgreifen”]. See Simmel, “Das Relative und das Absolute im Geschlechter-Problem,” in Philosophische Kultur: Gesammelte Essais (1911), reprinted in Simmel, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 14: Hauptprobleme der Philosophie: Philosophische Kultur, edited by Rüdiger, Kramme/Otthein Rammstedt, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1966, pp. 219 ff. More particularly, Schutz refers to a formulation found only in the first edition of this volume (Leipzig: Werner Klinkhardt, 1911). There, at the conclusion of the exposition of the “indifference” of women to “proving <an argument>” [“gegen das Beweisen”], Simmel says that “the one refusal shows the immanent, the other the transcendent, formation of the female gender. Very schematically, and contrasting the object with the male gender as such most emphatically, we may formulate <the dual formation> by saying that its immanence is its transcendence.” The editors are indebted to Angela Rammstedt for this reference. See as well Scheler, Formalismus, pp. 155 ff., 287 ff. (English translation, pp. 135 ff., 275 f.), and for Freud, Das Ich und das Es. Last but not least we find the concept of “immanental transcendence” in Husserl, Cartesianishe Meditationen.
121.
Here Schutz interprets Heidegger’s analyses neither as fundamental ontology, nor as existential philosophy. Instead he interprets Heidegger in philosophical-anthropological terms, i.e., as a contribution to the investigation into the structures and constitutive relationships of the conditio humana.
122.
Kierkegaard distinguishes the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages of human existence in Either/Or, and again in Stages on Life’s Way. In the case of Jaspers, Schutz is referring to his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (1919), Berlin: Springer,³ 1925.
123.
The references are to Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 105 ff.; Creative Evolution, pp. 106 ff..; and for Bergson’s general concept of reality, Matter and Memory, pp. 56ff, 144 ff..; to Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, and to Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (e.g., §§29, 38 ff., 57 f., 63 ff.).
124.
An allusion to Nietzche’s saying in the Preface to The Genealogy of Morals, translated by Francis Golffing, Doubleday Anchor Book: Garden City, New York, 1956, p. 149, that “we remain strangers to ourselves, we do not understand ourselves, we must mistake ourselves; for us the axiom, ‘we are each of us farthest from ourselves, we are no “knowers” of ourselves,’ will hold for all eternity.”
125.
For Nietzsche’s observations on Epicurus, see Human, All Too Human, II.
126.
See Leibniz, Nouveaux essais; Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 133, 174 f.
127.
See Plato, Meno 8ldff; Phaedo, 74dff.
128.
Leibniz, Nouveaux essais, I, 2, §§1-10; 1,3, §§18 f.
129.
For Heidegger, see Sein und Zeit, §§29 f., 40; for Scheler, see Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, pp. 29 ff. {English translation, pp. 14 ff.}; for Schiller, see Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung (1795), in Werke. Nationalausgabe, Bd XX: Philosophische Schriften, Erster Teil, edited by Benno von Wiese/Helmut Koopmann. Weimar: Böhlau, 1962, pp. 413–503.
130.
For Goethe, see Gedichte und Epen, I, loc. cit., pp. 359 f.
131.
For Leibniz, see Theodicy, loc. cit.; for Bergson, Matter and Memory, loc. cit.; for Fechner, see Elemente der Psychophysik, loc. cit.. The concept of the vital sphere refers to Scheler’s distinction between the vital and spritual spheres and their respective values; see Scheler, Formalismus, pp. 123 ff.(English translation, pp. 103 ff.); and Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, pp. 83 ff. (English translation, pp. 72 ff.).
132.
For Kierkegaard’s discussion of the sensual-eroticism in terms of the figure of Don Juan, see Either/Or; the reference to Diotima is to Plato, Symposium (201dff., 206bff); for Schopenhauer, see Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Vol. II, Chapter 44. In this connection, see also Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, pp. 120 f. (English translation, pp. 113 ff.).
133.
See Leibniz, Nouveau essais, II, 27, §§lff.; Discours de Metaphysique, §9.
134.
A reference to the mechanism of typification and self-typification used by Schutz in Sinnhafte Aufbau to describe the constitution of stocks of knowledge in common.
135.
The theoretical part about the process of anonymity has two sources in Schutz: the one source is Bergson’s thesis of the person as the inauthentic cinematographic gestalt of the self in Time and Free Will, pp. 128 f. the other is Scheler’s development of the difference between the intimate and the social person in Formalismus, pp. 548 ff. (English translation, pp. 544 f.); and Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Chapter C.
136.
See Sinnhafte Aufbau, §§36 ff., especially §38.
137.
Addition from Table of Contents, p. III./7062.
138.
The reference, again, is to Schutz’s edition of the Nouveaux Essais; cf. IV, 7, §8.
139.
This issue here, consequently, concerns the problem of the “intrinsic” relevance by virtue of the pragma in contradistinction to the type of relevance “imposed.” The unity of both constitutes the social person for Schutz. Cf. Schutz, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, reprinted in Collected Papers 5.
140.
Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.
141.
Schutz’s reference library contains a copy of Jean Gaspard Fé1ix Ravaisson-Mollien, De l’habitude (1838), Paris: Alcan, 1933.
142.
Added from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.
143.
See especially Goethe, Faust, Act II: Laboratorium, lines 6885 ff.; Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, Chapter 6.
144.
Thomas Mann, Buddenbrooks. Verfall einer Familie (1922), Part 10, Chapter 5; Kierkegaard, Repetition. Schutz refers here to accelerating hope of Constantine Constantius to engage a higher power through the reading of the Book of Job so as to bring about a change in order that the relation to the beloved might still succeed.
145.
Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Religion and Morality (1932); Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (1930); Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (1901).
146.
Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre (“Was aber ist deine Pflicht? Die Forderung des Tages.”) There is an identical formulation in Maximen und Reflexionen, no. 1088.
147.
The allusion is to Kant’s Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics Which Will Be Able to Come Forth as Science.
148.
Shakespeare, Hamlet, ii, 2.
149.
Schutz refers to the category of “eccentricity” central to the philosophical anthropology of Helmut Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie (1928). (For an elaboration of Schutz’s thought in terms of Plessner’s category of becoming, see Fred Kersten, Galileo and the “Invention” of Opera, pp. 14 ff.).
150.
Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.
151.
Schutz may be referring to the work of Otto Schwarz, Sexualpathologie, Wien/Leipzig/Bern: Wiedmann, 1935. A copy of this volume is found in Schutz’s private library, bearing a dedication from the year 1935 so that Schutz may have been familiar with the book at the time of writing this manuscript.
152.
See Augustine, Confessions, Book IX; Pascal, Pensées; Kierkegaard, Fear And Trembling, Part IV; Philosophical Fragments and Stages on Life’s Way; Strindberg, Son of a Servant, Inferno, To Damascus.
153.
With respect to books in his private library, Schutz no doubt studied the analysis of “limit situations” as found in Karl Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, Chapter III; cf. also Philosophie Vol. 2, Chapter 7.
154.
For Walter Rathenau, Zur Mechanik des Geistes (1913), Berlin: Fischer¹⁸, 1921; Carl Ludwig Schleich, Van der Seele. Essays (1910), Berlin: Fischer,¹⁴ 1922, especially the essay about “Schlaf und Traum,” as well as Das Problem des Todes, Berlin: Rowohlt, 1921; for Albert Schweizer, two volumes are found in Schutz’s private library: Verfall und Wiederaufbau der Kultur. Kulturphilosophie. Erster Teil, Mtlnchen: Beck, 1923, and Aus meinem Leben und Denken, Leipzig: Meiner, 1932 (now in Gesammelte Werke in funf Bänden, edited by Rudolfs Grabs, München: Beck, 1974, in volumes 2 and 1 respectively).
155.
Addition from the Table of Contents, above, p. III./7062.

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Alfred Schutz

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Schutz, A. (2013). The Problem of Personality in the Social World. In: Barber, M. (eds) Collected Papers VI. Literary Reality and Relationships. Phaenomenologica, vol 206. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1518-9_12

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