Abstract
This paper offers an analysis of our ordinary concepts of presuming and presumption and of their corresponding everyday practices. Scholars encounter ‘presumption’ in several contexts: the lexicon of the law, as a term of art in studies of argumentation and rhetoric, and occasionally in philosophical discussions. In addition to these technical ideas of presumption, as ordinary persons we share plain senses for these terms, and we commonly engage in practices which can truthfully be reported using ‘presuming’ and ‘presumption’ in their everyday meaning. This essay concerns the commonsense concepts which ordinary language attaches to these terms.
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Kauffeld, F.J. (2003). The Ordinary Practice of Presuming and Presumption with Special Attention to Veracity and the Burden of Proof. In: Van Eemeren, F.H., Blair, J.A., Willard, C.A., Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (eds) Anyone Who Has a View. Argumentation Library, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1078-8_11
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