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Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is a New Approach Warranted?

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Corporate Criminal Liability

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 9))

Abstract

In the United States, under both federal and state law, corporations as well as individuals may be held criminally liable for wrongful acts. This doctrine of corporate criminal liability, based upon the civil law system’s doctrine of respondeat superior, is created by courts through the common law. This chapter studies the current US practice of the principle in a historical context. The US Department of Justice’s role in charging corporations is examined, with special reference to deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, as stated in pertinent cases. The paper also discusses the current reform proposals, including congressional initiatives. Although the strict application of the respondeat superior principle to corporate behavior in a criminal context is at present entrenched in the US legal system, the paper concludes with a recommendation that the Model Penal Code approach – including the “due diligence” standard – be adopted. Under that approach no liability would attach if “the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense” used due diligence to prevent the commission of the wrongdoing Under this recommendation, the respondeat superior standard would be applied only when a legislative purpose to impose such liaiblity “plainly appears.”

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Beale 2007, 1504 et seq. The United States Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Manual includes a detailed list of the offenses for which criminal liability can be imposed under federal law: USSC 2009. Those crimes that can only be committed by a natural person are, of course, excluded from the reach of corporate criminal liability.

  2. 2.

    Beale 1995, 979, 997 et seq.

  3. 3.

    USDOJ 2009c.

  4. 4.

    USDOJ 2009a.

  5. 5.

    USDOJ, Office of Consumer Litigation 2009.

  6. 6.

    USDOJ 2008.

  7. 7.

    Beale 2007, see above n. 1.

  8. 8.

    Executive Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002), amended by Executive Order No. 13,286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,619 (February 28, 2003) (hereafter Executive Order 2002).

  9. 9.

    Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002); Egan 2005, 305 (discussing the act’s general rules).

  10. 10.

    Browning 2006.

  11. 11.

    This doctrine holds “an employer or principal liable for the employee’s or agent’s wrongful acts conducted within the scope of the employment or agency”: Black’s Law Dictionary 2004. In an 1892 case, Lake Shore & Michigan SR Co. v. Prentice, 147 US 109, 110 (1892), the US Supreme Court said, “A corporation is doubtless liable, like an individual, to make compensation for any tort committed by an agent in the course of his employment, although the act is done wantonly and recklessly, or against the express orders of the principal.”

  12. 12.

    United States v. One Parcel of Land, 965 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992) holding that if the agent was “acting as authorized and motivated at least in part by an intent to benefit the corporation”, the agent’s knowledge and culpability is imputable to the corporation, citing US v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241–242 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Zero v. United States, 459 US 991 (1982).

  13. 13.

    Fischel/Sykes 1996, 320.

  14. 14.

    Parker 1996, 381; Baker 2004, 350.

  15. 15.

    Weissmann/Ziegler/McLoughlin/McFadden 2008, 1.

  16. 16.

    Weissmann/Ziegler/McLoughlin/McFadden 2008, 16.

  17. 17.

    Weissmann/Ziegler/McLoughlin/McFadden 2008, 20.

  18. 18.

    Brickey 1982, 406, suggests that the theory of these cases is that “since the corporation had the power to abate the nuisance, there could be no question that it had a duty to exercise that power.”

  19. 19.

    Case of Langforth Bridge, 79 ER 919 (KB 1635), cited in Brickey, 1982, 401.

  20. 20.

    Brickey 1982, 402 et seq.

  21. 21.

    State v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41, 43 (1841) not extending corporate criminal liability to acts of misfeasance because a corporation “can neither commit a crime or misdemeanor by any positive or affirmative act, or incite others to do so, as a corporation.”

  22. 22.

    Weissmann/Ziegler/McLoughlin/McFadden 2008, 14 et seq.

  23. 23.

    NY Central & Hudson River RR Co. v. United States, 212 US 481 (1909).

  24. 24.

    Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1945).

  25. 25.

    NY Central & Hudson River RR Co. v. United States, 212 US 481, 493 (1909).

  26. 26.

    The Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 57-103, Ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903), specifically provided that in “construing and enforcing the provisions of this section, the act, omission, or failure of any officer, agent, or other person acting for or employed by any common carrier, acting within the scope of his employment shall, in every case, be also deemed to be the act, omission, or failure of such carrier, as well as that of the person.”

  27. 27.

    NY Central & Hudson River RR Co. v. United States, 212 US 481, 496 (1909).

  28. 28.

    NY Central & Hudson River RR Co. v. United States, 212 US 481, 495 (1909).

  29. 29.

    NY Central & Hudson River RR Co. v. United States, 212 US 481, 494 (1909).

  30. 30.

    212 US 494.

  31. 31.

    US v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 343 (3rd Cir. 1948); US v. George F. Fish Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1946) (per curiam).

  32. 32.

    1 USC 1.

  33. 33.

    United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 US 121, 126 (1958).

  34. 34.

    United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1195 n. 7 (8th Cir. 1983), citing United States v. DeMauro, 581 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1978), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Raether, 82 F.3d 192 (8th Cir. 1996). United States v. Jorgenson, 144 F.3d 550, 560 (1998).

  35. 35.

    United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Zero v. United States, 459 US 991 (1982).

  36. 36.

    United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241 et seq. (1st Cir. 1982). United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) stating that an agent acts within the scope of employment if “the agent is performing acts of the kind which he is authorized to perform, and those acts are motivated, at least in part, by an intent to benefit the corporation.”

  37. 37.

    United States v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985), quoting Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1945) (internal citation omitted).

  38. 38.

    United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 242 (1st Cir. 1982).

  39. 39.

    United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) rejecting the contention that the government must prove that “the corporation, presumably as represented by its upper level officers and managers, had an intent separate from that of its lower level employees to violate the… laws”; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962): “[T]he corporation may be criminally bound by the acts of subordinate, even menial, employees.”

  40. 40.

    United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 et seq. (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 US 1125 (1973). United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979): “[A] corporation may be liable for acts of its employees done contrary to express instructions and policies, but … the existence of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee in fact acted to benefit the corporation”; USDOJ, US Attorneys (1997), USAM, as revised and amended, <http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/index.html>, § 9-28.800.B. Comment 2008: “The existence of a corporate compliance program, even one that specifically prohibited the very conduct in question, does not absolve the corporation from criminal liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”

  41. 41.

    United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972).

  42. 42.

    US v. Ionia Mgmt. SA, 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009).

  43. 43.

    33 USC 1901.

  44. 44.

    US v. Ionia Mgmt. SA, 555 F.3d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 2009).

  45. 45.

    US v. Ionia Mgmt. SA, 555 F.3d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 2009).

  46. 46.

    US v. Ionia Mgmt. SA, 555 F.3d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 2009).

  47. 47.

    United States v. Bank of New Eng., 820 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).

  48. 48.

    United States v. Bank of New Eng., 820 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1987).

  49. 49.

    United States v. Bank of New Eng., 820 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1987).

  50. 50.

    United States v. Bank of New Eng., 820 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987).

  51. 51.

    United States v. Bank of New Eng., 820 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).

  52. 52.

    ALI (1962). The ALI had discussed its Tentative Draft No. 5 in 1956. A thorough and insightful analysis of the Code may be found in Brickey 1988, 593.

  53. 53.

    Section 2.07(1)(b) provides that a corporation is accountable if it fails to discharge specific duties imposed on corporations by law.

  54. 54.

    Section 2.07(5). But in cases of strict liability or if the defense is “plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense”, the corporation will be liable.

  55. 55.

    Section 2.07(1)(c). Brickey 1982, 593, studies the Model Penal Code’s practical application in the US.

  56. 56.

    USSC 2009.

  57. 57.

    USSC 2009, Introductory comment.

  58. 58.

    USSC 2009, Introductory comment.

  59. 59.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 1999.

  60. 60.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 1999, I.A-VI.B.

  61. 61.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 1999, VI.A, General Principles.

  62. 62.

    Zorno/Krakaur 2000, 147.

  63. 63.

    United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2004). The conviction was under the “corrupt persuasion” prong of § 18 USC 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B), which provides: “Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to… cause or induce any person to (A)… withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding; [or] (B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding… shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”

  64. 64.

    Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 US 696, 700 (2005), quoting United States v. Arthur Andersen, 374 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2004).

  65. 65.

    United States v. Arthur Andersen, 374 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2004).

  66. 66.

    Ainslie 2006, 107, provides an analysis of the Arthur Andersen saga.

  67. 67.

    Ainslie 2006, 108.

  68. 68.

    Ainslie notes that “the indictment, the conviction, and the consequent prohibition against appearing before the Securities and Exchange Commission were sufficient to kill the company…” Ainslie 2006, 109.

  69. 69.

    Executive Order 2002.

  70. 70.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2003.

  71. 71.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2003, Introduction.

  72. 72.

    USDOJ, US Attorneys 1997, Criminal Resource Manual, Title 9, § 163.

  73. 73.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2003, § VI.B.

  74. 74.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2003, § VI.B.

  75. 75.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2003, Introduction.

  76. 76.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2003, § VI.A.

  77. 77.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2003, § VI.A.

  78. 78.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2003, § VI.A.

  79. 79.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2003, § VI.A.

  80. 80.

    According to Ball/Boleia 2009, 246 et seq.; Bharara 2007, 73: “[C]orporate defendants, subject as they are to market pressures, may not be able to survive indictment, much less conviction and sentencing.”

  81. 81.

    Ball/Boleia 2009, 248.

  82. 82.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2006, Introduction.

  83. 83.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2006.

  84. 84.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2006, § VII.B.2.

  85. 85.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2006, § VII.B.2.

  86. 86.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2006, § VII.B.2.

  87. 87.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2006, § VII.B.2.

  88. 88.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2006, § VII.B.3, n. 3.

  89. 89.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2006, § VII.B.3, n. 3.

  90. 90.

    United States v. Stein, 435 F.Supp.2d 330 (SDNY 2006), aff’d 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).

  91. 91.

    United States v. Stein, 435 F.Supp.2d 330, 367 (SDNY 2006).

  92. 92.

    United States v. Stein, 495 F.Supp.2d 390 (SDNY 2007).

  93. 93.

    United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2nd Cir. 2008) (footnote in the text omitted).

  94. 94.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, Introduction.

  95. 95.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, Introduction.

  96. 96.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM, § 9-28.300.B.

  97. 97.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM, § 9-28.700.A.

  98. 98.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM, § 9-28.700.A.

  99. 99.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM, § 9-28.710.

  100. 100.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM, § 9-28.720.

  101. 101.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, n. 2.

  102. 102.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM § 9-28.720(a).

  103. 103.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM § 9-28.720(a).

  104. 104.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM § 9-28.720(a).

  105. 105.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM § 9-28.720(b).

  106. 106.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM § 9-28.730.

  107. 107.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM § 9-28.730.

  108. 108.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM § 9-28.760.

  109. 109.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM § 9-28.1300.

  110. 110.

    The latest version is S. 445: Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, introduced in the US Senate on February 13, 2009, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-445> (hereafter S. 445).

  111. 111.

    HR 3013: Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, introduced in the US House of Representatives on July 12, 2007 by Rep. Robert Scott (D-VA), <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-3013> (hereafter HR 3013).

  112. 112.

    HR 3013, § 2(8).

  113. 113.

    HR 3013, § 3, amending 18 USC, Ch. 201, by inserting § 3014(b)(1)(A).

  114. 114.

    S. 445, above n. 110, § 3, amending 18 USC Ch. 201, by inserting § 3014(b)(1)(B).

  115. 115.

    S. 445, above n. 110, § 3, amending 18 USC Ch. 201, by inserting § 3014(b)(1)(C).

  116. 116.

    S. 445, above n. 110, § 3, amending 18 USC Ch. 201, by inserting § 3014(b)(2)(A) and (B).

  117. 117.

    Coyle 2009.

  118. 118.

    Attorney General Eric Holder, quoted in Coyle 2009.

  119. 119.

    There is voluminous literature on such agreements. For illustrative purposes see Zierdt/Podgor 2008, 1; Spivack/Raman 2008, 159.

  120. 120.

    18 USC § 3161.

  121. 121.

    18 USC § 3161(h)(2).

  122. 122.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 1999, § VI.B.

  123. 123.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2003, § VI.B.

  124. 124.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2006, § VII.B.1.

  125. 125.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b; USAM § 9–28.1000.

  126. 126.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, USAM § 9–28.1000(A), General Principle.

  127. 127.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008, USAM § 9–28.1000(B), Comment.

  128. 128.

    Washington Legal Foundation 2008.

  129. 129.

    Washington Legal Foundation 2008, 6–2, Ch. 6, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements.

  130. 130.

    Finder/McConnell/Mitchell 2009, 15.

  131. 131.

    USDOJ 2005.

  132. 132.

    Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between BMS and the United States Attorney’s office for the District of New Jersey, June 13, 2005, <http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/deferredpros.pdf>.

  133. 133.

    USDOJ 2009b.

  134. 134.

    USDOJ 2009a.

  135. 135.

    On compliance programs: Finder/McConnell/Mitchell 2009, 16 et seq.; Podgor 2009.

  136. 136.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008b, incorporated in USAM § 9-16.325 (2008).

  137. 137.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008a.

  138. 138.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008a.

  139. 139.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008a.

  140. 140.

    USDOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General 2008a.

  141. 141.

    <thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc111/h1947_ih.xml>.

  142. 142.

    Weissmann/Ziegler/McLoughlin/McFadden 2008, 2.

  143. 143.

    Hasnas 2009.

  144. 144.

    Weissmann/Ziegler/McLoughlin/McFadden 2008, 2 et seq.; Khanna 1996, 1477, arguing that corporate criminal liability serves no valid legal purpose.

  145. 145.

    See above n. 39.

  146. 146.

    See above n. 40 and accompanying text.

  147. 147.

    See above nn. 47–51 and accompanying text.

  148. 148.

    Podgor 2007, 1538.

  149. 149.

    Henning 2009; Meeks 2006, 77.

  150. 150.

    Weissman/Newman 2007, 451. In US v. Ionia Mgmt. SA, 555 F.3d 303 (2nd Cir. 2009), discussed above nn. 42–46 and accompanying text, the court rejected this argument.

  151. 151.

    Rischel/Sykes 1996, 310; Hamdani/Klement 2008, 217.

  152. 152.

    Beale 2007, 1505 et seq.

  153. 153.

    USAM, see above n. 40, § 9-28.200.A, General Principle.

  154. 154.

    USAM, see above n. 40, § 9-28.200.B, Comment.

  155. 155.

    ALI 1962, § 2.07(1)(b).

  156. 156.

    ALI 1962, § 2.07(5).

  157. 157.

    ALI 1962, § 2.07(1)(c).

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Acknowldegement

I am deeply grateful to Ms. Joan Policastri, Foreign and International Law Librarian at the Sturm College of Law, for providing me with the needed research material.

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  1. University of Denver, Denver, CO, USA

    Ved P. Nanda (John Evans Distinguished University Professor, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director)

  2. International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Denver, CO, USA

    Ved P. Nanda (John Evans Distinguished University Professor, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director)

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Correspondence to Ved P. Nanda .

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    Mark Pieth

  2. , Faculty of Law, University of Basel, Peter Merian-Weg 8, Basel, 4002, Switzerland

    Radha Ivory

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Nanda, V.P. (2011). Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is a New Approach Warranted?. In: Pieth, M., Ivory, R. (eds) Corporate Criminal Liability. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0674-3_2

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