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Hugo Grotius in the Contemporary Memory of International Law: Secularism, Liberalism, and the Politics of Restatement and Denial

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New Approaches to International Law

Abstract

The specter of Hugo Grotius remains an important reference point within the conceptual vocabulary of international law. In this paper, I provide a brief analysis of how Grotius’ legacy functions within the rhetoric of international legal texts via lessons from the ‘New Approaches to International Law’ tradition (e.g., David Kennedy, TWAIL), as well as other heterodoxical sources that found a place within international legal scholarship through advances by the ‘critical studies’ movement more generally (e.g., Alain Badiou, Judith Bulter). In particular, the paper critically takes up the rhetoric of Grotius in relation to two mainstream claims: first, that modern international law is ‘secular’, and second, that international law, in relation to this turn to a secular orientation, is committed to some cosmopolitan ethic of ‘tolerance’. Offering alternative readings of Grotius in light of these claims, I conclude the paper with some brief suggestions about how we might participate in a new tradition of remembering Hugo Grotius.

I am deeply grateful to the generosity, encouragement, and thoughts of first and foremost Peter Fitzpatrick and Mark Janis, as well as Jason Beckett, Jose Maria Beneyto, Bill Bowring, Stephen Chan, Justo Corti, Matthew Craven, Catriona Drew, Florian Hoffmann, David Kennedy, Rob Knox, Boris Mamlyuk, Susan Marks, Anne-Charlotte Martineau, Ugo Mattei, Scott Newton, Reut Paz, Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, Akbar Rasulov, and Joseph Singer. I also wish to express my thanks to the Institute for Global Law and Policy (IGLP), the International University College, Turin (IUC), the Centre for the study of Colonialism, Empire and International Law (CCEIL), the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights (ECI), the Institute for the study of Political Economy and Law (IPEL), the editorial staff at Emory International Law Review (where an earlier but similar version of this paper was published in 2011), and my colleagues at Durham Law School and Mississippi College School of Law. The views expressed in this article are, of course, solely my own.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the 1870s, international jurists entered into heated contests over who deserved the right to be claimed the ‘father’ of international law. For instance, a group of jurists, including T. Asser, T. Holland, G. Macinni, and T. Twiss, drafted a resolution and formed a committee to erect a national monument in honor of A. Gentili. Pilgrimages were made to Gentili’s hometown, and the Italian government officially requested the U.K. for his remains (the grave, however, was unable to be located). Others, such as A.J. Levy objected, arguing that Grotius should have the honor of having his statue erected first. An English committee was formed in 1875 to add their weight, with Prince Leopold sitting as the honorary president (Phillimore carrying out the actual presidential duties). See der Molen 1937, 63.

  2. 2.

    In the nineteenth century, Grotius was primarily remembered for a theory of human sociability whereby cosmopolitan society stood in for the ‘state of nature’. In the twentieth century, Grotius is often recalled as a narrative devise to capture what is seen as the historical shift from the insulated hierarchical authority of the Church and Emperor to a rapidly expanding international system of formally equal sovereign states based on normative rules of general agreement.

  3. 3.

    Without playing into any post-modern angst, it is productive, I think, to keep in mind David Kennedy’s injunction that the very act of analyzing the past (not to mention casting judgment) is to do violence to the doctrinal and theoretical content of earlier scholarship, and can often misguide us to think that our vision is somehow more sophisticated and less contradictory. See Kennedy 1986, 98.

  4. 4.

    See e.g., Baumgold 1993, 9; see also Kunz 1961, 951–52 (stating that “[t]he Protestant Grotius, who wrote the first treatise on international law, was still strongly influenced by the traditional natural law, but he secularized it by stating that natural law would be valid even if there were no God. This secularization profoundly changed the character of natural law… the Catholic natural law is … discovered by man’s recta ratio—a term stemming from the Stoics… [yet] necessarily presupposes the Christian faith in the Creator… with Grotius this right reason becomes the basis of natural law”); Nussbaum 1947, 105 (claiming that “Grotius made an important step toward the emancipation of international law from theology by his famous pronouncement [about] the law of nature”); Nussbaum 1943, 466 (stating that Grotius “claimed in earnest that the law of nations and international law derived there from could subsist without a divine foundation”); and Pound 1925, 686 (arguing that Grotius, along with other Protestant jurists, helped severe theology from jurisprudential thought).

  5. 5.

    See Grotius 1925, para II.

  6. 6.

    See George 1999, 605 (providing a useful overview of the various positions and issues without falling into more traditional misreadings of Grotius, and situating Grotius within a larger return of interest in international legal history and religion); see also Kennedy 1986, 79; Schneewind 1998, 66–81.

  7. 7.

    Among Grotius’ religious work, include the tragedies, The Exile of Adam (1601) and The Passion of Christ (1608), his Commentaries on the Old Testament (1644) and New Testament (1641–50), and his Christian apologetics, On the Satisfaction of Christ against Faustus Socinus (1617) and The Truth of the Christian Religion (1627)..

  8. 8.

    See Grotius 1925, para II. In fact, this mode of argument did not originate with Grotius, but was a common technique for earlier Catholic jurists. For instance, in making his case for the theologian as the authoritative final word of the law of nature, Suarez writes, “that even if God did not exist, or if He did not make use of reason, or if He did not judge of things correctly, nevertheless, if the same dictates of right reason dwelt within man, constantly assuring him, for example, that lying is evil, those dictates would still have the same legal character which they actually possess because they would constitute a law pointing out that evil exists intrinsically in the object.” See Schneewind 1998, 60 (quoting Francisco Suarez’s 1612 On Law and On God the Lawgiver).

  9. 9.

    This is a common implicit and explicit theme taken up by a great number of authors. See e.g., Cassirer 1946, 172; see also Koskenniemi 2005, 95–108; Schneewind 1998, 65–81; Tuck 1999, 78–108.

  10. 10.

    See Tuck, 1999, 78–108. Others have also adopted more cynical readings of Grotius, arguing that his reasoning was not founded on any ideological, intellectual, or ethical basis, but more directly, to serve his own material and political interests. See e.g., Schwarzenberger 1990, 301–312.

  11. 11.

    For a useful, but concise overview of Grotius’ religious tenets, see Schneewind 1998, 65–81.

  12. 12.

    The humanist, or ‘oratorical’, tradition ‘drew most extensively on the literary and rhetorical writings of the ancient world’, and, in a skeptical register, commonly employed the rhetorical technique of ‘leaving the reader rather unclear about where the author stood’. See Tuck 1999, 16–17 (referencing Seigel’s 1968, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism: The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, Petrarch to Valla). See generally Tuck 1977.

  13. 13.

    See generally Grewe 2005; see also Kennedy 1986, 79.

  14. 14.

    See e.g., Janis 2004, 121–126; see generally Stompf 2006.

  15. 15.

    For instance, Erasmus is remembered as a passionate advocate for peace, but in fact espoused a militant antipathy to non-Christians. “France alone remains not infected with heretics, with Bohemian schismatics, with Jews, with half-Jewish marranos, and untouched by the contagion of Turkish neighbours.” See Tuck 1999, 30 (quoting from Vol. 4 of Erasmus’ Collected Works). In relation to a war against the Turks, Erasmus adopts a Machiavellian tone, “[I]f war… is not wholly avoidable, that kind would be a lesser evil than the present unholy conflicts and clashes between Christians. If mutual love does not bind them together, a common enemy will surely unite them after a fashion, and there will be a sort of a common purpose, even if true harmony is lacking.” Ibid.

  16. 16.

    See Tuck 1999, 33 (quoting from Andrea Alciato’s 1571 Paradoxorum Juris Civilis Libros).

  17. 17.

    See Koskenniemi, 2005, 103–104.

  18. 18.

    See e.g., Wight 2005, 29–62 (covering a number of seminal themes in Grotius’ work, and describing Grotius’ conception of an inner and outer conception of political identity: the outer circle that which embraces all humanity under natural law, and an inner circle of the corpus Christianorum bound by laws of Christ, and at least in part defined in their unity against Turkish populations). Though not typically brought together, Grotius’ understanding and strategy of political identity seems to bear a close relationship to Carl Schmitt, another figure who has become a trendy academic figure of study over the past two decades. See e.g., Schmitt 2005; see also Schmitt 2003.

  19. 19.

    See Grotius 1925, para II, 20.40.

  20. 20.

    See generally Clausewitz 1989.

  21. 21.

    See generally Kennedy 2006; see also Berman 2004, 1.

  22. 22.

    ‘Grotius’ most important contribution to modern theory was his theory of rights… Instead of being something… a person has… [t]he concept becomes subjectivized, centered on the person…’. See Haakonssen 1985, 240; see generally Tuck 1977.

  23. 23.

    See Witte Jr. 2002, 95; see generally Berman 2003.

  24. 24.

    At least as early as Norman Anonymous and John de Salisbury, various more critical theological traditions within Catholicism (and in early Protestant with the writings of authors like Johann Oldendorp who would provide detailed lists of instances where the citizen’s conscience might require disobedience of civil authorities) emphasized the role of the citizen in both political and religious life. See generally O’Donovan and O’Donovan 1999; see also Berman 1983, 1–3. In the dominant historical and legal literature, the rise of the individual is conveniently located somewhere in the fifteenth or sixteenth century, helping us to mark the transition into the modern era of some emancipated existence (whether that is articulated on the formal horizontal equality of sovereign states or the subjectivity of personal experience that undermines any objective normative order). When scholars do talk about the pre-modern era, the concepts of the individual and community are said to be largely non-existent, either suppressed beneath an imperial-religious logic or simply not yet even within the imaginative framework to be grasped in the first place. However, what we in fact witness in the pre-modern period is not only an awareness of both individual and social components of political life, but a militancy that feels shockingly radical to standard liberal democratic notions of civil society, at least since the aftermath of the French and American Revolutions. While individuals were to submit to the authority of their leaders, even when they strongly disagreed, they also had the divine obligation to excommunicate their leadership, body, and/or soul, under a variety of conditions. Emphasizing seventeenth century notions of social contract (e.g., Locke, organic political theory) or placing absolute sovereign authority in the nation state (e.g., Bodin, Hobbes) potentially robs the vitality and agency given to people in older, more radical traditions of individualism and social consciousness.

  25. 25.

    See Witte 2002, 98 (citing Luther, and referencing Paul Althaus’ 1966 The Theology of Martin Luther). In some respects, this seems to anticipate later jurists in the nineteenth century who claimed their work as part of an organic heritage of the dead, the living, and future generations.

  26. 26.

    This all looks increasingly familiar to our own contemporary period: sober, disciplined production and an attitude of civility that makes possible a life of commerce and acquisition now replace the aristocratic celebration of undisciplined ease and the warrior ethos of seeking personal glory. For studies that circle around this theme in relation to capitalism and religion, see generally Goodchild 2002; see also Hilton 1991; Piggin 1985 (arguing that missionaries played a significant role in the Enlightenment confidence in human reason and the ethical value of efficiency and usefulness); Tawney 1926 (tracing the rise of capitalism back to the medieval era); Taylor 1989, 211–247; Weber 1905; Wright 1988.

  27. 27.

    See Kennedy 1986, 79.

  28. 28.

    For Luther, God is ‘hidden’ in the earthy kingdom and only appears to humanity through the ‘masks’ of human reason and will, the rule of law and its political officers, and in the conscientious work of believers. The civil law, therefore, not only expresses the natural limitations and needs of humanity, but also serves, in the words of St. Paul, as “our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ”, teaching and coercing us both to civil and spiritual morality. See Witte 2002, 92–175 (discussing these ideas in the teachings of Luther, Melanchthon, Eisermann, and Oldendrop).

  29. 29.

    Melanchthon was perhaps the leading jurist of the Reformation, drafting the chief declaration of Lutheran theology, the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, and a co-author of the Scmalkaldic Articles, along with writing dozens of instruction books and biblical commentaries. For a discussion of Melanchthon’s legal theory, see Berman 2003, 77–87, 405–411; see also Witte 2002, 121–141.

  30. 30.

    Reut Paz’s study of early twentieth century and interwar Jewish-German jurists provides an interesting discussion of the idea of international law as a ‘ladder’ between humanity and God, drawing persuasively upon a mix of Jewish religious thought, philosophy, and socio-historical archival materials—and more generally, innovative in its focus on the relationship between Judaism and modern international law. See generally Paz 2008.

  31. 31.

    See Koskenniemi 2005, at 71–157 (encoding a series of linear movements, from the ancient to the modern, from belief to rationality, from objectivity to subjectivity, from hierarchical to democratic/plural models of authority, and so on). For an emphasis on a similar set of founding positions, see also Grewe 2005, 20–29, 143, 170, 291 (noting the importance of the balance of power, formal equality and religious tolerance in de-centering the authority of the Pope and Emperor); Schmitt 2005, at 140–154 (focusing on the ‘detheologization of public life” in response to “creedal civil wars” through a horizontal organization of formally equal territorial European states intent to maintain a balance of power).

  32. 32.

    See Lauterpacht 1946, 24–25. Resurrecting the Grotian tradition of Hersh Lauterpacht, Martti Koskenniemi has characterized it as “a morality of attitude … of seriousness… a morality of tolerance and of personal and professional virtue… a morality of scales, controlled by the attempt to balance right with duty and freedom with reason… a morality of control and self control, for which the greatest desire is the end of desire… [taking] for granted the intrinsic rationality of a morality of sweet reasonableness, the non-metaphysical doctrine of the golden middle.” See Koskenniemi 1997, 215; see also Jeffery 2006, 223–250 Hersh Lauterpacht, the Realist Challenge and the Grotian Tradition in twentieth century International Relations, 12 European Journal of International Relations 223–250 (2006).

  33. 33.

    See Nussbaum 1947, 105–112.

  34. 34.

    See Janis 2004, 121–126.

  35. 35.

    See Schneewind 1998, 73 (quoting Grotius).

  36. 36.

    See Tuck 1999, 94 (quoting Grotius).

  37. 37.

    See generally O’Donovan 1999; see also Tuck 1999, 78–108.

  38. 38.

    See Tuck 1999, 105 (Grotius’ 1627 The Truth of the Christian Religion). “If there by any waste or barren Land within our Dominions, that also is to be given to strangers, at their Request, or may be lawfully possessed by them, because whatever remains uncultivated, is not to be esteemed a Property, only so far as concerns Jurisdiction, which always continues the Right of the ancient People.” See Grotius 1925, II.2.17.

  39. 39.

    See Tuck 1999, at 94.

  40. 40.

    Ibid. at 89 (quoting Grotius).

  41. 41.

    See Grotius 1925, 173–181.

  42. 42.

    Ibid. at 20–21.

  43. 43.

    Ibid. at 212–213.

  44. 44.

    Ibid. at 100–101, 241.

  45. 45.

    Ibid. at 235, 238–240.

  46. 46.

    In contemporary global governance, this theme is addressed by authors across a wide spectrum of academic disciplines, from international relations scholars (e.g., Elizabeth Hurd), to social anthropologists (e.g., Talal Asad) and philosophers (e.g., Alain Badiou). See e.g., Hurd 2007; see also Asad 2003; Badiou 2007. Institutions within American foreign policy have also started to recognize this as an imminent strategic concern—what goes by the coinage, the ‘God Gap’. See Waters 2010..

  47. 47.

    See Weeramantry 1998a, 1515–1520. Both Weeramantry and Berman situate their conversation of international law in the tradition of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars.

  48. 48.

    Ibid. at 1515–1520.

  49. 49.

    Ibid. at 1569.

  50. 50.

    See Koskenniemi 1997, 215. Koskenniemi’s resuscitation of a Victorian reading of the Grotian tradition seems to self-consciously situate itself as the heir to the eclectic British jurist, Thomas Baty. ‘We are slipping into some state of anarchic practice… The task of any modern prophet of International Law… should seek to repeat for our age the achievement of Grotius… [though it is] immeasurably harder than his… The modern Grotius can find no… irrecusable authorities to which to appeal… There is no vision. The world lies in twilight. International law… rests on the world’s common convictions… If that twilight is not to deepened into dusk and darkness some unifying principle must be found… Shall we be wrong in saying that Sweetness, Beauty and Honour make as wide an appeal to the common mind as anything else today?’ See Baty 1954, 9–1515. Baty cites the reader interested in following this theme to the work of his alter-ego, Irene Clyde, who wrote extensively on Victorian manners (e.g., the unseemliness of not only nudity or scant dress, but even sex of any persuasion) and the importance of a feminine ideal for personal and political governance. See generally Clyde 1934.

  51. 51.

    TWAIL scholars, as well as their counterparts in the field of international relations, have followed upon the postcolonial literary tradition to bring the issue of cultural antagonism and ongoing forms of colonialism/imperialism to the forefront of international legal theory. See e.g., Anghie and Chimni 2003, 77; see also Anghie et al. 2003; Craven 2008; Fidler 2003, 29; Fitzpatrick and Darian-Smith 1999; Gathii 2000, 263; Keene 2002; Mickelson 2008, 355; Mutua 2000, 31; Wilde 2008. At the same time, however, the genre is plagued by ambivalence toward the nature of its critique and the way forward—in particular, whether the issue is inclusion/exclusion from the current global order, or instead, some more fundamental structural critique. Here, post-development studies have for the most part remained neglected int the literature, though post-development itself has failed to offer an alternative proposal. See e.g., Sachs 1999 (frequently criticized itself for not offering a programmatic/systemic alternative vision of global order). In relation to TWAIL, these tendencies are perhaps in part due to an over-reliance on European versus non-European antagonisms rather than looking at how the idea of Europe itself has historically always covered over deep ‘internal’ hegemonic rivalries and competing ideological visions. But see Harvey 1972, 1–13.

  52. 52.

    See generally Skouteris 2010.

  53. 53.

    See Berman 1989–1990, 1521 (juxtaposing a ‘critical genealogist’ voice to the standard progress narrative expounded by the ‘renewer/restater’).

  54. 54.

    See e.g., Laclau 1996; see also Koskenniemi 2001, Chap. 6; Koskenniemi 2005.

  55. 55.

    See Fitzpatrick 1992, 13. For Fitzpatrick, a founding figure in the British Critical Legal Studies movement, the effort to bring out these sublimated traumas are political acts of “internal decolonization” against the “white mythology” of mainstream international law. Ibid. at x, 13. There is, however, both a contemporary and historical challenge to this aspiration. See Danchin 2008 (arguing persuasively that liberalism is founded on illiberal historical core of genocide and expulsion in the creation of sovereign nation-states); see also Orford 2007, 353 (pointing out more or less often in her work generally how the violence often decried in poor, or non-Western countries, is often the very sort of violence that European nation-states found instrumental in their formations).

  56. 56.

    See Butler et al. 2000; Butler 2003, Butler 2005, 25–27, 95–100; Freud 1990 (discussing the ‘death instinct’); Lacan 1993)(introducing the idea of the ‘forced choice’); Zizek 2001, 103–105.

  57. 57.

    I am grateful for the many conversation on the topic with Akbar Rasulov, and his useful guidance in understanding these ideas—what he has called, the ‘Feuerbach effect’.

  58. 58.

    See e.g., Thompson 1963; see also Zinn 1980.

  59. 59.

    See e.g., Allen 1994; Hobsbawm 1962. In contrast to these texts, the dominant trend in historical literature—both legal and otherwise—is to stress the relatively peaceful, at least ‘stable’ character of the early to middle nineteenth century, which contributes to a pacified version about the coming together of the Western European system—a sort of ‘mythic’ Europe that distances any critiques of endemic, or systemic violence at the core of the European state-order.

  60. 60.

    See e.g., Anaya 2000; Spicer (1962).

  61. 61.

    See e.g., Hochchild 1998.

  62. 62.

    See e.g., Oren 2007.

  63. 63.

    “Sovereignty emerged out of the colonial encounter… Colonialism was central to the constitution of international law in that many of the basic doctrines of international law… were forged out of the attempt to create a legal system that could account for relations between the European and non-European worlds in the colonial confrontation… these origins create a set of structures that continuously repeat themselves.” See Anghie 2005, 2–3; see also Berman 1989–1990, 1521–1554.

  64. 64.

    Drawing upon Edouard Glissant’s writings about Caribbean history, Berman argues for a “fierce, even brutal honesty, refusing all redemptive consolations”, which rejects all “heroic”, “foundational” myths in favor of a “naked self-examination”. “Can international law, written by history’s victors,” he asks, “muster the courage to look frankly, painfully, at the horrors of its own past?” See Berman 1989–1990, 1554.

  65. 65.

    See Nathaniel Berman, The Alchemy of Empire, or Of Power and Primitivism, inaugural lecture for the Centre for the study of Colonialism, Empire and International Law (CCEIL) at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) transcribed recording of the lecture on file with author, and any errors solely my fault.

  66. 66.

    See Kennedy 2001, 463–497.

  67. 67.

    Symbolic violence is particularly apt in the context of law, which may be itself in some respects the concrete objectification of our anxieties—what the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer called, a “metamorphosis of fear”. Unlike Spencer’s law of nervous discharge where we enjoy release from a sudden explosion of physical reaction, this metamorphosis into law may actually defer, and thereby intensify, our anxieties. Thus, the Goethe-like tendency to retreat into law to establish order—the “tendency to turn into an image…everything that delight[s] or trouble[s]” us—does not rectify our conceptions to the external world but actually incarnates, and heightens through repetition, our instincts of fear. See Cassirer 1946, 46–48.

  68. 68.

    The term itself, symbolic violence, was coined by Pierre Bourdieu, the late French sociologist and theorist, to denote how impositions of systems of symbolism and meaning (e.g., culture) upon groups and classes would be accepted as legitimate. Bourdieu was particularly interested in the role of ‘pedagogic action’ in the French university system, which he believed functioned to perpetuate the advantages of privileged class relationships through inculcating students into processes of self-limitation and self-censorship. See Bourdieu 1990; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 65–259; Jenkins 1992; Shusterman 1999.

  69. 69.

    Diachronic refers to the historically constituted, or developed, nature of meaning and interpretation. Synchronic denotes meaning produced by a system at any given point in time. See Eagleton 1996, 96–97. For many authors, these two approaches go hand in hand. See e.g., Bakhtin 1997. For a legal discussion of the synchronic play of structuralists, and how it may be engaged in legal analysis, see Kennedy 1985–1986, 248–266 (also providing an extensive list of relevant materials for further research)..

  70. 70.

    This idea is indebted to the notion of the American philosopher and cultural/feminist theorist, Judith Butler’s idea of ‘performativity’. See Bulter 1990. In her 1993 book, Bodies That Matter, Judith Butler links the idea of performativity to the idea of ‘iterability’ in the work of French literary theorist and philosopher, Jacques Derrida. “Performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability, a regularized and constrained repetition of norms,” writes Butler. “[T]his repetition… constitutes the temporal condition for the subject … [and] implies that performance is not a single act… but ritualized production, a ritual reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death controlling and compelling the shape of the production, but not… determining it fully in advance. See Butler 1993, 95; see also Derrida 1988.

  71. 71.

    See Schlag 2002, 1047. Schlag takes care to distance himself from an understanding of aesthetics as “the appreciation of art and beauty” to offer four ‘aesthetic’ models which account for the various ways American lawyers perceive and arrive at outcomes in law, which he believes acts as a formal enterprise whereby ‘ethical dreams and political ambitions … do their work’. Ibid. at 1050–52.

  72. 72.

    See generally Bloom 1973; see also Bloom 1975.

  73. 73.

    See Weeramantry 1998a, 1515–1520.

  74. 74.

    See generally Kennedy 2006 (drawing out an ethical appeal for a partisan courage to face the ‘dark sides’ of progressive struggle as the very basis of personal and political freedom); see also Badiou 2003; Toscano 2006.

  75. 75.

    Ibid.

  76. 76.

    See Kennedy 1986, 5–7.

  77. 77.

    This politics of deferral seems to me less constructed on a sentiment of humility but resignation, and which tacitly accepts the ‘false necessity’ about the nature and outcomes of global governance. See Unger 2004; see also Meillassoux 2008. Arguing against Kantian subjectivity, Meillassoux argues provocatively for us to accept arbitrariness as the sole and necessary absolute of existence—what he terms, a ‘radical contingency’. ‘We are no longer upholding a variant of the principle of sufficient reason… but rather the absolute truth of a principle of unreason. There is no reason for anything to be or to remain the way it is; everything must, without reason, be able not to be and/or be able to be other than it is.’ Ibid. at 48–49, 60. For an experiment to bring Meillassoux’s argument into legal human rights theory, see Bowring 2008, Chap. 5; but see Marks 2009.

  78. 78.

    See generally Badiou 2003; see also Badiou 2009.

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Haskell, J.D. (2012). Hugo Grotius in the Contemporary Memory of International Law: Secularism, Liberalism, and the Politics of Restatement and Denial. In: Beneyto, J., Kennedy, D. (eds) New Approaches to International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-879-8_5

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