Abstract
Mackie's argument for the error theory is described. Four ways of responding to Mackie's argument – the Instrumental Approach, the Universalization Approach, the Reasons Approach, and the Constitutivist Approach – are outlined and evaluated. It emerges that though the Constitutivist Approach offers the most promising response to Mackie's argument, it is difficult to say whether that response is adequate or not.
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Acknowledgments
An earlier draft of this chapter was given at the Symposium on Moral Rationalism at the annual Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference held in Melbourne in 2008. I am grateful for helpful comments made by my co-symposiasts – Charles Pigden and Francois and Laura Schroeter – and by members of the audience, especially Daniel Cohen, Simon Keller, Norva Lo, and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. I am also especially grateful for written comments I received from Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin. Though they saved me from many errors, I fear that all too many remain. Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous referee who suggested that I fix my tortured prose.
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Smith, M. (2010). Beyond the Error Theory. In: Joyce, R., Kirchin, S. (eds) A World Without Values. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 114. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_8
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