Abstract
I explore a dispute among moral error theorists about how to deal with false moral judgments. The advice of the moral abolitionist is to stop making moral judgments, but the contrary advice of the moral fictionalist is to retain moral language and moral thinking. After clarifying the choice, I argue that moral abolitionism has much to recommend it. I discuss Mackie's defense of moral fictionalism as well as a recent version of the same position offered by Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, and Caroline West. Then I second some remarks Ian Hinckfuss made in his defense of moral abolitionism and his criticism of “the moral society.” One of the worst things about moral fictionalism is that it undermines our epistemology by promoting a culture of deception. To deal with this problem Richard Joyce offers a “non-assertive” version of moral fictionalism as perhaps the last option for an error theorist who hopes to avoid moral abolitionism. I discuss some of the problems facing that form of moral fictionalism, offer some further reasons for adopting moral abolitionism in our personal lives, and conclude with reasons for thinking that abolishing morality may be an essential step in achieving the goals well-meaning moralists and moral fictionalists have always cherished.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
[Editors' note: The present paper was first published in a special issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice that marked the 30-year anniversary of the publication of Mackie's 1977 book.]
- 2.
Blackburn could say this because, as a “quasi-realist,” he held that no mistake is involved in moral judgments.
- 3.
Mackie later adds that the notion of a right is “valuable and indeed vital.” (1977, p. 173).
- 4.
See what Blackburn has to say about “the holism of the mental” (1998).
- 5.
Joyce's reference is to Peter Singer's The Expanding Circle (1981, p. ix).
- 6.
References
Ayer, A. J. 1946. Language, truth and logic. 2nd ed. New York: Dover.
Blackburn, S. 1993. Errors and the phenomenology of value. In his Essays in quasi-realism, 149–165. New York: Oxford University Press.
Blackburn, S. 1998. Ruling passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hinckfuss, I. 1987. The moral society: Its structure and effects. Canberra: Australian National University.
Joyce, R. 2001. The myth of morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Joyce, R. 2006. The evolution of morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lycan, W. 1985. Moral facts and moral knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24: 79–94.
Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. London: Penguin.
Mackie, J. L. 1980. Hume's moral theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Nolan, D., G. Restall, and C. West. 2005. Moral fictionalism versus the rest. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: 307–330.
Singer, P. 1981. The expanding circle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Garner, R. (2010). Abolishing Morality. In: Joyce, R., Kirchin, S. (eds) A World Without Values. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 114. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_13
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-3338-3
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-3339-0
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)