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Avatamsaka Game Structure and Experiment on the Web

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Evolutionary Controversies in Economics

Abstract

Avatamsaka is a well known Mahayana Buddhist Sutra. A Japanese professor, working in the field of Buddhist philosophy, skillfully illustrated the situation of heaven and hell in terms of the Avatamsaka (Kamata 1988 pp. 167–168). Suppose that two people sit down at a table, across from each other. They are bound with rope so that one arm only is free, and are then each given a very long spoon. This spoon is so long that they cannot feed themselves with it. There is enough food for both of them on the table. If they cooperate and feed each other, they will both be happy. This is defined as heaven. However, if the first is kind enough to provide the second with a meal, but the second does not feel cooperative, then only the second gains. This must give rise to a feeling of hate in the first. This situation denotes hell. The gain structure does not only depend on an altruistic willingness to cooperate. On an individual level, there is no difference between cooperation and refusal, and the same is true for risk taking. A situation of expected maximization of utility gives infinite equilibria. Our interest is to find a way to heaven from the other possible situations. This chapters is concerned with how an actual player would react in such experiments.

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© 2001 Springer Japan

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Aruka, Y. (2001). Avatamsaka Game Structure and Experiment on the Web. In: Aruka, Y. (eds) Evolutionary Controversies in Economics. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-67903-5_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-67903-5_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Tokyo

  • Print ISBN: 978-4-431-67994-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-4-431-67903-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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