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Positive und negative Koordination in Verhandlungssystemen

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Policy-Analyse

Part of the book series: Politische Vierteljahresschrift ((PVS,volume 24))

Zusammenfassung

Ein Charakteristikum der modernen Welt ist die zunehmend turbulente Interdependenz von Ereignissen und Entscheidungen. Ihre Antriebskräfte sind der wissenschaftlich-technische Fortschritt und der Zwang ökonomischer Konkurrenz. Ihre Begleiterscheinungen sind die immer raschere Innovation, die immer weiter differenzierte Arbeitsteilung und die immer vollständigere Mobilität von Kapital, Waren, Informationen und Personen. Zu ihren Folgeproblemen gehört die globale Umweltzerstörung ebenso wie die immer schnellere Entwertung vorhandener ökonomischer Kapazitäten, vorhandener Wissensbestände und kultureller Orientierungen und dementsprechend die Verarmung und Entwurzelung derer, die in den Turbulenzen der modernen Welt nicht mitschwimmen können.

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Authors
  1. Fritz W. Scharpf
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Fakultät für Soziologie, Universität Bielefeld, Postfach 100131, 33501, Bielefeld, Deutschland

    Adrienne Héritier

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© 1993 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

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Scharpf, F.W. (1993). Positive und negative Koordination in Verhandlungssystemen. In: Héritier, A. (eds) Policy-Analyse. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vol 24. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-01473-7_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-01473-7_3

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-531-12470-4

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