Abstract
In recent years, the growth of public bureaucracy was one of the topics receiving most attention within political economy. Many theories have been developed dealing with the relationship of public bureaucracy with the political sector, in particular the models of Niskanen (1971, 1975) and Migué, Bélanger (1974), studying the behavior of individual bureaus vis à vis parliament.
We are grateful for comments made on a preliminary version of the paper which was discussed by the first author at the Diessen Conference, at the Public Finance Seminar at Columbia University and at the Research Seminar at the University of Basel. Thanks are due especially to Peter Bernholz, James M. Buchanan, Gebhard Kirchgaessner, Klaus Mackscheidt, Richard Musgrave, William A. Niskanen, Alan Peacock, Edmund E. Phelps, Werner W. Pommerehne, Karl-Ernst Schenk, Friedrich Schneider, Gordon Tullock, William Vickrey and Charles Wolf, Jr.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Blankart, Ch. B. (1975), „Zur ökonomischen Theorie der Bürokratie“, Public Finance, 30, pp. 166–185.
Buchanan, J. M. (1977), “Why Does Government Grow?” in: Th. E. Borcherding (ed.), Budgets and Bureaucrats. The Sources of Government Growth, Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 3–18.
Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1977), “The Expanding Public Sector. Wagner Squared”, Public Choice, 31, pp. 147–150.
Courant, P. N., E. M. Gramlich and D. L. Rubinfeld (1979), “Public Employee Market Power and the Level of Government Spending”, American Economic Review, 69, pp. 806–817.
Downs, A. (1967), Inside Bureaucracy, Boston: Little, Brown und Co.
Feige, E. L. (1979), “How Big is the Irregular Economy?” Challenge, 22, (Nov./Dec.), pp. 5–13.
Frey, B. S. (1978a), Modern Political Economy, Oxford: Martin Robertson und Co.
Frey, B. S. (1978b), “Politico-Economic Models and Cycles”, Journal of Public Economics, 9, pp. 203–220.
Frey, B. S. (1981), „Wie groß ist die Schattenwirtschaft?“, Wirtschaft und Recht 33, Heft 3/4, pp. 143–152.
Gutmann, P. M. (1977), “The Subterranean Economy”, Financial Analysts Journal, 33, (Nov./Dec.), pp. 26–27 and p. 34.
Migué, J.- L. and G. Bélanger (1974), “Toward a General Theory of Managerial Discretion”, Public Choice, 17, pp. 27–43.
Mueller, D. C. (1979), Public Choice, Cambridge — London — New York: Cambridge University Press.
Niskanen, W. A. (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine Atherton.
Niskanen, W. A. (1975), “Bureaucrats and Politicians”, The Journal of Law and Economics, 18, pp. 617–643.
Orzechowski, W. (1977), “Economic Models of Bureaucracy: Survey, Extensions and Evidence”, in: Th. E. Borcherding (ed.), Budgets and Bureaucrats. The Sources of Government Growth, Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 229–259.
Pommerehne, W. W. (1978), “Institutional Approaches to Public Expenditure. Empirical Evidence from Swiss Municipalities”, Journal of Public Economics, 9, pp. 255–280.
Romer, Th. and H. Rosenthal (1979), “The Elusive Median Voter”, Journal of Public Economics, 12, pp. 143–170.
Roppel, U. (1979), Ökonomische Theorie der Bürokratie, Freiburg im Breisgau: Haufe.
Schmölders, G. (1980), “Der Beitrag der,Schattenwirtschaft’ ”, in: E. Küng (ed.) Wandlungen in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Festschrift für Walter Adolf Jöhr, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), pp. 371–379.
Tabb, W. K. (1980), “Government Regulations: Two Sides to the Story”, Challenge, 23 (Nov./Dec.), pp. 40–48.
Tullock, G. (1965), The Politics of Bureaucracy, Washington D. C.: Public Affairs Press.
Tullock, G. (1974), “Dynamic Hypothesis on Bureaucracy”, Public Choice, 19, pp. 127–131.
North, D. C. and R. P. Thomas (1973), The Rise of the Western World. A New Economic History, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
North, D. C. and R. P. Thomas (1977), “The First Economic Revolution”, Economic History Review, 30, pp. 229–241.
Schenk, K.-E. (1980), Towards a Positive Theory of Economic Systems. The Institutional Choice Approach,Forschungsbericht Nr. 25 des Instituts für Außenhandel und Überseewirtschaft der Universität Hamburg, Hamburg.
Schenk, K.-E. (1981), Märkte, Hierarchien und Wettbewerb. Elemente einer Theorie der Wirtschaftsordnung, München: Verlag Franz Vahlen.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1983 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Frey, B.S., Weck, H. (1983). Bureaucracy and the Shadow Economy: A Macro-Approach. In: Hanusch, H. (eds) Anatomy of Government Deficiencies. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-21610-1_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-21610-1_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-21612-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-21610-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive