Introduction

Abstract

Over the past two decades, evolutionary game theory has become a powerful unifying force to analyze evolutionary processes that are driven by individual selection pressures. It is now the accepted theoretical explanation of such diverse biological phenomena as the prevalence of equal male/female sex ratios in diploid species and the evolution of ritualistic fighting behaviors in many animal species (Maynard Smith 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988). A random check of current research publications in (theoretical) biology shows both the growing breadth and depth of evolutionary game theory’s influence. American Naturalist in 1991 published articles that extend the theory of evolutionary games (Christiansen 1991); its range of biological applications (Motro 1991); and its consistency with empirical data (Petersen 1991). Even more convincing for me is that the majority of articles in these volumes contain some form of strategic reasoning (e.g. the analysis of individual behavioral alternatives in a given biological system).