Abstract
The intent of this chapter is to introduce side channel attacks as a significant threat for wireless sensor networks, since in such systems the individual sensor node can be accessed physically and analysed afterwards. Even though such attacks are known for some years, they have never been specifically considered before in the area of WSNs (Wireless Sensor Networks).
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Dyka, Z., Langendörfer, P. (2013). Improving the Security of Wireless Sensor Networks by Protecting the Sensor Nodes against Side Channel Attacks. In: Khan, S., Khan Pathan, AS. (eds) Wireless Networks and Security. Signals and Communication Technology. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36169-2_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36169-2_9
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