Abstract
The Lisbon Treaty’s reforms of the constitutional basis of the common commercial policy fundamentally changed the institutional balance in this policy area. One of the most important shifts as far as democratic legitimacy is concerned is the greater role of the European Parliament (EP). The increased significance of the parliament has even been called the most important change in the Lisbon Treaty. The present contribution examines the new responsibilities and functions of the EP in detail, with the central question being whether and to what extent these reforms have led to an improvement in the democratic legitimacy of the common commercial policy and a reduction in the democracy deficit. The shift in institutional balance when it comes to common commercial policy may be interesting in its own right from an interdisciplinary social science perspective. However, the results of the EU reform process reached by the Lisbon Treaty, must be primarily assessed according to whether they have contributed towards an improvement in the transparency, efficiency and democratic legitimation of the Union. These aims which were set down by the European Council in the Laeken Declaration are the “raison d’être” of the Lisbon Treaty.
This chapter is an updated version of my chapter in: Bungenberg and Herrmann (eds.), Die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union nach Lissabon, 2011, which partly built on my remarks during a consultation hearing of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade on 1 December 2010.
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Notes
- 1.
Woolcock, The potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union External Trade Policy, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (Sieps), European Policy Analysis 8-2008. Available at: http://www.sieps.se, page 5; Equally postive is Brok, Die neue Macht des Europäischen Parlaments nach “Lissabon” in Bereichen der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik, Integration 33 (2010) 3, p. 209.
- 2.
European Council, Declaration of Laeken on the future of the European Union from 15th December 2001, on the internet: http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/lknde.pdf.
- 3.
Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, 1690, Book II, Chapter XII, para. 146-147.
- 4.
See e.g. the Federal Constitutional, 2 BvE 5/07 (Military deployment at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm), BVerfGE 126, 55-77.
- 5.
Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 1/03, (AWACS deployment), NJW 2008, 2018 (2021) = BVerfGE 121, 135; cf. also Fastenrath, Kompetenzverteilung im Bereich der auswärtigen Gewalt, 1986, p. 24 et seq.
- 6.
Petersmann, National Constitutions, Foreign Trade Policy and European Community Law, EJIL 3 (1992) 1, p. 1 et seq.
- 7.
Krajewski Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law, Journal of World Trade 35 (2001) 1, p. 167 et seq.
- 8.
Treviranus, Außenpolitik im demokratischen Rechtsstaat, 1966, page 36 et seq.
- 9.
Tomuschat/Schmidt (eds.), Der Verfassungsstaat im Geflecht der internationalen Beziehungen, VVDStRL 36 (1978), page 28; Zampetti, Democratic legitimacy in the World Trade Organization: the justice dimension, Journal of World Trade 37 (2003) 1, 105 (105).
- 10.
Howse, How to Begin to Think About the “Democratic Deficit” at the WTO, in: Griller (ed.), International Economic Governance and Non-economic concerns, 2003, page 79 et seq. (84).
- 11.
On this see “Evaluation from the perspective of democracy theory” below.
- 12.
Herrmann/Michl, Grundzüge des europäischen Außenwirtschaftsrechts, ZEuS 11 (2008) 1, page 81 et seq. (93).
- 13.
Between 1999 and 2004 foreign trade came under the remit of the Committee for Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy.
- 14.
I am grateful to Dr. Andreas Maurer from the Secretariat of the Committee on International Trade for his comments on this point.
- 15.
Tietje, Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht (2009) 83, page 12.
- 16.
Müller-Ibold, Art. 207 TFEU, in: Lenz/Borchardt (ed.), EU-Verträge: Kommentar nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 5th Edition, 2010, paragraph.
- 17.
Regulation (EC) No. 116/2009 of the Council from 18th December 2008 on the export of goods of cultural heritage.
- 18.
Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 of the Council from 27th June 2005 concerning the trading of certain goods which could be used to carry out the death penalty, for torture, or other gruesome, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
- 19.
On this see the suggestion of the Commission for a regulation defining the general rules and principles according to which the Member States control the of exercising of implementing powers by the Commission, KOM(2010) 83 finally and the corresponding report of the European Parliament from 6.12.2010, A7-0355/2010 (Rapporteur József Szájer).
- 20.
The consent of the European Parliament to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation occurred on this basis.
- 21.
Woolcock, The potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union External Trade Policy, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (Sieps), European Policy Analysis 8-2008. Available at: http://www.sieps.se, page 5; Brok, Die neue Macht des Europäischen Parlaments nach “Lissabon” in Bereichen der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik, Integration 33 (2010) 3, p. 209 (217).
- 22.
Letter from de Gucht, Member of the European Commission, to Professor Vital Moreira, MEP, from 26th October 2010.
- 23.
Framework agreement on the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Commission, paragraph 23 et seq, OJ 2010, L 304/47.
- 24.
Woolcock, The potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union External Trade Policy, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (Sieps), European Policy Analysis 8-2008. Available at: http://www.sieps.se, page 5.
- 25.
Working groups of the Trade Policy Committee exist for the areas of steel, textiles and other industry sectors, services and investments and mutual recognition. See Council of the European Union, List of Council preparatory bodies, 12319/10, 20th July 2010, page 3.
- 26.
Tietje, Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht (2009) 83, p. 12, considers this limitation to be practically irrelevant as the Parliament would gain “significant” rights of approval. However, whether this assessment turns out to be correct remains to be seen.
- 27.
The Federal Constitutional Court refers to this as well in its Lisbon judgment, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfG, NJW 2009, 2267 (2290), paragraph 373 = BVerfGE 123, 267.
- 28.
Wouters/Coppens/De Meester, External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty, in: Griller/Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty – EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty?, 2008, p. 143 et seq. (185).
- 29.
Tomuschat, Art. 300 EC Treaty Rn. 40, in: von der Groeben/Schwarze (eds.), Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag, 6th Edition, 2003 with examples.
- 30.
Similarly Brok, Die neue Macht des Europäischen Parlaments nach “Lissabon” in Bereichen der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik, Integration 33 (2010) 3, p. 209 (218).
- 31.
On the role of the US congress see Shaffer, Parliamentary Oversight of WTO-Rule Making, JIEL 7 (2004) 3, page 629 et seq (635 et seq). See also the contributions in Jackson/Sykes (eds.), Implementing the Uruguay Round, 1997.
- 32.
European Commission, Overview of FTA and Other Negotiations, 25 July 2012, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf.
- 33.
For an overview of the agreement see The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in practice, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/october/tradoc_148303.pdf.
- 34.
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council for the implementation of the bilateral protection clause in the free trade agreement between the EU and Korea (KOM(2010) 0049 – C7-0025/2010 – 2010/0032(COD)), First reading of the Parliament on 7th September 2010, P7_TA(2010)0301.
- 35.
Bilateral safeguard clause in the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, OJ 2011, C 188 E/93.
- 36.
European Commission, Overview of FTA and Other Negotiations, 25 July 2012, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf.
- 37.
Draft Recommendation on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the Trade Agreement between the European Union and Colombia and Peru (COM(2011)0569 – C7-0000/2012 – 2011/0249(NLE)).
- 38.
See Brok, Die neue Macht des Europäischen Parlaments nach “Lissabon” in Bereichen der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik, Integration 33 (2010) 3, p. 209 (221).
- 39.
Resolution of the European Parliament from 8th May 2008 on commercial and economic relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (2007/2265(INI)), Abl. 2009, C 271 E/38.
- 40.
European Commission, Overview of FTA and Other Negotiations, 25 July 2012, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf.
- 41.
Committee on International Trade, Minutes, Meeting of 1 and 2 December 2010, Agenda Item 30, INTA_PV(2010)1201_1.
- 42.
Brok, Die neue Macht des Europäischen Parlaments nach “Lissabon” in Bereichen der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik, Integration 33 (2010) 3, p. 209 /219 et seq.) obviously sees this differently, treating democratic control and transparency as the same.
- 43.
Insofar as Brok, Die neue Macht des Europäischen Parlaments nach “Lissabon” in Bereichen der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik, Integration 33 (2010) 3, p. 209 (218), maintains that the Bundestag never possessed comparable rights, this is only correct in respect of the right to information pursuant to Art. 207 (3) TFEU and for the period of time since the common commercial policy falls exclusively within the responsibility of the EC/EU.
- 44.
BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., BVerfG, NJW 2009, 2267 (2290), paragraph 374 = BVerfGE 123, 267. Cf. also Krajewski, External trade law and the Constitution Treaty: towards a federal and more democratic common commercial policy? CML Rev. 42 (2005) 1, page 91 et seq (126) and Bungenberg, Außenbeziehungen und Außenhandelspolitik, EuR 2009 Supplement 1, page 195 fet seq (211).
- 45.
However Woolcock, The potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union External Trade Policy, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (Sieps), European Policy Analysis 8-2008, available at: http://www.sieps.se, page 5, states “On paper this looks like a loss of parliamentary control”.
- 46.
The Federal Constitutional Court attributes considerable importance to this right to information. BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., NJW 2009, 2267 (2290), paragraph 375 = BVerfGE 123, 267, does not, however, comment on the practical-political effects of this right.
- 47.
ECJ, Opinion 1/75, Local Costs, [1975] ECR, 1355.
- 48.
Against this background it is also surprising that the Federal Court of Justice has dealt with the common commercial policy at all, this was an area in which the Bundestag and the Federal Council has comparatively little influence in any case.
- 49.
On this see “Reporting in accordance with Art. 207 (3) TFEU” above.
- 50.
On parliamentary rights of participaton from a comparative law perspective, see Abbott/Riesenfeld (eds.), Parliamentary Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties: A Comparative Study, 1994.
- 51.
In the diagram 1993/1994 is taken as a turning point because the Maastricht Treaty granted the European Parliament a right of approval for certain agreements, and because with the extension of multilateral commercial policy to the areas of services and intellectual property upon completion of the Uruguay Round central areas of commercial policy fell within the shared competence enabling Member States to ratify multilateral and regional trade agreements which covered services and intellectual property.
- 52.
Similarly Brok, Die neue Macht des Europäischen Parlaments nach “Lissabon” in Bereichen der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik, Integration 33 (2010) 3, p. 209 (211).
- 53.
On this see the contribution by Vedder, Linkage of the Common Commercial Policy to the General Objectives for the Union’s external Action, in this volume. See also Krajewski, The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy: coherent and democratic?, in: Biondi/Eeckhout/Ripley (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon, 2012, p. 292-311.
- 54.
Similarly Bungenberg, Außenbeziehungen und Außenhandelspolitik, EuR 2009 Supplement 1, page 195 fet seq (213).
- 55.
Committee of International Trade, draft of a report on the social responsibility of companies in international commercial agreements (2009/2201(INI)), 14.9.2010, Rapporteur: Harlem Désir, as well as a draft of a report on human rights, social and environmental norms in international commercial agreements (2009/2219(INI)), Rapporteur: Tokia Saïfi, 9.9.2010.
- 56.
Press release No. 20100621IPR76426 from 23.6.2010, “Green light from Trade Committee for safeguard clause in EU-South Korea trade accord”.
- 57.
Brok, Die neue Macht des Europäischen Parlaments nach “Lissabon” in Bereichen der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik, Integration 33 (2010) 3, p. 209 (221).
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to the chairman of the committee, Prof. Vito Moreira, MEP and Dr. Andreas Maurer from the Secretariat of the committee for the invitation and for providing me with relevant committee documents. I would also like to acknowledge the help of Francis Henry in translating this essay.
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Krajewski, M. (2013). New Functions and New Powers for the European Parliament: Assessing the Changes of the Common Commercial Policy from the Perspective of Democratic Legitimacy. In: Bungenberg, M., Herrmann, C. (eds) Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34255-4_5
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