Abstract
The short history of e-voting has shown that projects are doomed to fail in the absence of trust among the electorate. The first binding Norwegian Internet elections are scheduled for fall 2011. Notably, transparency is taken as a guideline in the project. This article discusses transparency and other measures the Norwegians apply that are suited to establish profound trust, i.e. trust that grounds on the system’s technical features, rather than mere assertions. We show whether at all, how and to which degree these measures are implemented and point out room for enhancements. We also address general challenges of projects which try to reach a high level of transparency for others as lessons learned.
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Spycher, O., Volkamer, M., Koenig, R. (2012). Transparency and Technical Measures to Establish Trust in Norwegian Internet Voting. In: Kiayias, A., Lipmaa, H. (eds) E-Voting and Identity. Vote-ID 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7187. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_2
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