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Computationally Sound Symbolic Analysis of EAP-TNC Protocol

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Trusted Systems (INTRUST 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7222))

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Abstract

The Trusted Computing Group has proposed Trusted Network Connection (TNC) Architecture and a series of interface specifications, such as IF-T and IF-TNCCS, to solve the interoperability of network access control. In particular, IF-T describes the mapping of IF-TNCCS messages to a standard TNC Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method. It includes specification of the standard EAP method called EAP-TNC. Since EAP-TNC is important to encapsulate TNCCS messages so that they can be carried over tunneled EAP methods, this paper proposes a computationally sound symbolic analysis of EAP-TNC protocol to prove composable security property.

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Zhang, Z., Zhu, L., Wang, F., Liao, L., Guo, C., Wang, H. (2012). Computationally Sound Symbolic Analysis of EAP-TNC Protocol. In: Chen, L., Yung, M., Zhu, L. (eds) Trusted Systems. INTRUST 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7222. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32298-3_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32298-3_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-32297-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-32298-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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