Skip to main content

Exploring China’s Rise as Knowledge Power

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Power in the 21st Century

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

Abstract

The rise of China is a dominant theme in international politics. While factors such as demographics, geography or the skyrocketing Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have received persistent attention from researchers, this article points to a different and neglected aspect of China’s ascent: knowledge und technology. I argue that a truly comprehensive understanding of how China could (again) become a hub of world politics requires an historical exploration of the Chinese position within the global political economy of knowledge. Few authors have emphasized China’s blossoming technical and scientific capacities as a critical source of its growing influence (but see Lampton 2008). Their arguments strongly resonate with quantitative indices, which demonstrate the accelerating strengthening of China’s output of publications, basic research capacities, and scientific networks (Royal Society 2011). Recent research also points to the possibility that a number of emerging economies, including China, are transforming into genuine commercial innovation hubs (Altenburg et al. 2008; Ernst 2011; CGS-Forschungsgruppe Wissensmacht 2011). Already, the concern with “the race to the top” in research and technology permeates policy discourses all around the world. Due to the advent of the global “knowledge economy” (OECD 2010; cf. Moldaschl and Stehr 2010), the importance of innovativeness is poised to increase only further.

Thanks for support and precious comments to all members of the CGS-Forschungsgruppe Wissensmacht, Peer Schouten, Ruth Knoblich, Jared Sonnicksen, and the editors. All remaining errors are my own.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Due to space constraints this chapter cannot provide a comprehensive overview. For an excellent review see Fritsch (2011).

  2. 2.

    This chapter built on concepts from IPE and thus remains a limited contribution to the ongoing conceptualization work. Constructivist and post-structuralist perspectives on knowledge and technology (see for instance Haas 1992; Litfin 1994; Mayer 2012; Miller 2007) are deliberately excluded from the analysis and will subsequently be dealt with elsewhere.

  3. 3.

    Kennedy (1987) additionally points to the financial underpinning that might hamper a hegemon’s ability to preserve his innovation leadership and technological advantage over his rivals.

  4. 4.

    Archibugi’s (2010) conclusion that the current IPR are in the interest of a small number of multinational enterprises, yet not necessarily conducive for the national economies as a whole, corresponds with earlier assertions that the accelerating development of technologies is a “prime cause of the shift in the state-market balance of power” (Strange 1996: 7). The balance of the global knowledge structures appears to increasingly tilt towards the big corporations at the expense of states. For others patents and copyrights are unnecessary for innovation to happen at all. See Boldrin and Levine (2008).

  5. 5.

    For a discussion of the renaissance of Schumpeter’s ideas see Freeman (2003).

  6. 6.

    Robert Jervis (1989) among others has argued that the “nuclear revolution” did alter statecraft and war fundamentally because of the mutual vulnerability it has created. See also Frühling and O’Neil in Chap. 5 of this volume.

  7. 7.

    Once established, however, these industries become huge players that are inclined to slow down developments and sustain the existing structures.

  8. 8.

    The crucial difference between my argument and the literature on “varieties of capitalism” is that the latter contrasts diverging innovation processes assuming the differences being caused by differing structures of national cultures and institutions. See Hall and Soskice (2001) and Allen (2004).

  9. 9.

    This reductionist definition of “knowledge” certainly will not meet the consent of many scholars, but it resembles an umbrella concept for pragmatic use rather than a concise and exhaustive terminology.

  10. 10.

    Joseph Needham’s work shows that for millennia Imperial China had been the world’s technological leader and many Chinese innovations in agriculture, defense, navigation, transport and power precede their European ‘rediscovery’ for centuries (Needham 1982).

  11. 11.

    For a detailed account of the success and flaws of technology import and absorption policies in the 1980s see Shi (1998).

  12. 12.

    Breznitz and Murphree (2011) illustrate this aspect in their study of the Chinese IT industry.

  13. 13.

    The Bureau of Export Administration (1998: V) openly states that “[t]he transfer of advanced US technology is the price of market access in China for US high-tech companies.”

  14. 14.

    Data derived from the WIPO under http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/.

  15. 15.

    For the restrictive US policy with respect to space technology see Guo (2006).

  16. 16.

    For a critical analysis of the “Chineseness” of Chinese companies see Pan (2009).

  17. 17.

    Chinese enterprises have acted perfectly rational because their strategy responds to the generally uncertain climate in China that prohibits risky long-term investments in innovation because laws for intellectual properties are absent, unclear, or loosely enforced (Breznitz and Murphree 2011: 13ff).

  18. 18.

    The cooperation between universities and start-up firms, which is among the main engines of growth and innovation in the US, does not work fully efficient without clear and effective IPR either.

  19. 19.

    The People’s Liberation Armey’s military technology usually is one or two decades behind its competitors (Cheung 2011). For the case of maritime technology see Kirchberger in this volume.

  20. 20.

    The defense sector suffering from prolonged export bans from Europe, Japan, and the U.S. is the critical exemption in this regard.

  21. 21.

    Chinese Internet firms possible could be among the first to change this pattern. See Economist (2011).

  22. 22.

    A mixed NKS combines state and commercial funding of research and innovation, market dynamics and strategic national innovation policies. With respect to technology transfer dominant powers will rely on both regulation of IPR and secrecy. The diffusion of critical dual-use items could for instance be object to export restrictions.

References

  • Adams, J., King, C., & Ma, N. (2009). Global research report China. Research and collaboration in the new geography of science. Leeds: Thompson Reuters.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ali, M., Aleem, M., & Park, K. (2011). A spiral process model of technological innovation in a developing country: The case of Samsung. African Journal of Business Management, 5(7), 2874–2889.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, M. (2004). The varieties of capitalism paradigm: Not enough variety? Socio-Economic Review, 2(1), 87–108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Altenburg, T., Schmitz, H., & Stamm, A. A. (2008). Breakthrough? China’s and India’s transition from production to innovation. World Development, 36(2), 325–344.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Archibugi, D., & Michie, J. (Eds.). (1997). Technology, globalisation and economic performance. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baark, E. (2007). Knowledge and innovation in China: Historical legacies and emerging institutions. Asia Pacific Business Review, 13(3), 337–356.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boldrin, M., & Levine, D. (2008). Against intellectual monopoly. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bosworth, D., & Yang, D. (2000). Intellectual property law, technology flow and licensing opportunities in the People’s Republic of China. International Business Review, 9, 453–477.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Breznitz, D., & Murphree, M. (2011). The run of the red queen: Government, innovation, globalization, and economic growth in China. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buzan, B. (1987). An introduction to strategic studies: Military technology and international relations. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • CGS-Forschungsgruppe Wissensmacht. (2011). Sind die BRIC-Staaten aufsteigende Wissensmächte? Herausforderungen für die deutsche Wissenspolitik. Januar 2011, http://www.cgs-bonn.de/pdf/DP-3_BRIC_Wissensmacht_Final.pdf.

  • Chang, H.-J. (2002). Kicking away the ladder. Development strategy in historical perspective. London: Anthem Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chen, D., & Li-Hua, R. (2011). Modes of technological leapfrogging: Five case studies from China. Journal of Engineering and Technology Management, 28(1–2), 93–108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cheung, T. M. (2011). The Chinese defense economy’s long March from imitation to innovation. Journal of Strategic Studies, 34(3), 325–354.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chu, W.-W. (2011). How the Chinese government promoted a global automobile industry. Industrial and Corporate Change, 20, 1–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Conroy, R. (1986). China’s technology import policy. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 15, 19–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Crefeld, M. (1989). Technology and war: From 2000 B.C. to the present. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • van Crefeld, M. (1999). The rise and decline of the State. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Demchak, C. C., & Dombrowski, P. (2011). Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 5(1), 32–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Der Derian, J. (2009). Virtuous war: Mapping the military- industrial-media-entertainment network. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diamond, A. M., Jr. (2006). Schumpeter’s creative destruction: A review of the evidence. Journal of Private Enterprise, 22(1), 120–146.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dicken, P. (2007). Global shift. Mapping the changing contours of the world economy (5th ed.). Los Angeles/London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dickson, D. (1988). The new politics of science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Divine, R. A. (1993). The Sputnik challenge. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evers, H.-D., Menkhoff, T., & Wah, C. Y. (Eds.). (2010). Governing and managing knowledge in Asia (2nd ed.). Singapore/London: World Scientific Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ernst, D. (2009). A new geography of knowledge in the electronics industry? Asia’s role in Global innovation networks (Policy studies, Vol. 54). Honolulu: East–west Center.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ernst, D. (2008). Can Chinese IT firms develop innovative capabilities within global knowledge networks? In M. G. Hancock, H. S. Rowen, & W. F. Miller (Eds.), Greater China’s quest for innovation (pp. 107–216). Stanford, CA/Washington, DC: Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center/Brookings Institution Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ernst, D. (2011). China’s innovation policy is a wake-up call for America. In Asia Pacific Issues, No. 100. http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/api100.pdf. Accessed on 10 December 2011

  • Fagerberg, J., & Srholec, M. (2008). National innovation systems, capabilities and economic development. Research Policy, 37(9), 1417–1435.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fan, P. (2011). Innovation, globalization, and catch-up of latecomers: Cases of Chinese telecom firms. Environment and Planning A, 43(4), 830–849.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feigenbaum, E. A. (1999). Who’s behind China’s high-technology ‘Revolution’? How bomb makers remade Beijing’s priorities, policies, and institutions. International Security, 24(1), 95–126. Summer 1999.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fischer, M. (1982). Tensions from technology in Marx’s communist society. Journal of Value Inquiry, 16, 117–129.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Freeman, C. (2003). A Schumpeterian renaissance? (SPRU electronic working paper series, Vol. 102). Brighton: University of Sussex.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fritsch, S. (2011). Technology and global affairs. International Studies Perspectives, 12(1), 27–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fu, X., & Gong, Y. (2011). Indigenous and foreign innovation efforts and drivers of technological upgrading: Evidence from China. World Development, 39(7), 1213–1225.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gereffi, G., Wadhwa, V., Rissing, B., & Ong, R. (2008). Getting the numbers right: International engineering education in the United States, China, and India. Journal of Engineering Education, 1, 13–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gerschenkron, A. (1962). Economic backwardness in historical perspective, a book of essays. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilboy, J. G. (2004). The myth behind China’s miracle. Foreign Affairs, 83(4), 33–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gilpin, R. (1981). War and change in international politics (p. 54). Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Guan, J. C., et al. (2006). Technology transfer and innovation performance: Evidence from Chinese firms. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 73, 666–678.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guo, X. (2006). Blockade on China or the United States? U.S. regulatory policies on space technology exports to China. WSI China Security, 2(1), 73–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gupta, A. K., & Wang, H. (2011). China as an innovation center? Not so fast. Wall Street Journal, 28 July 2011.http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903591104576469670146238648.html.

  • Haas, E. B. (1975). Is there a Hole in the whole? Knowledge, technology, interdependence, and the construction of international regimes. International Organization, 29(3), 827–876.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haas, P. M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hobsbawm, E. J. (1987). The Age of Empire 1875–1914. London: Weidenfels and Nicolson.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hornidge, A.-K. (2006). Singapore: The knowledge-hub in the straits of Malacca (ZEF working paper series, Vol. 14). Bonn: Center for Development Research, University of Bonn.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ikenson, D. J. (2011). U.S. leaders learning the wrong lessons from China’s rise. China-U.S. Focus, 15 March 2011. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12882.

  • Jasanoff, S. (Ed.). (2004). States of knowledge. The co-production of science and social order. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jervis, R. (1989). The meaning of the nuclear revolution: Statecraft and the prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Juma, C., Fang, K., Honca, D., Huete-Perez, J., Konde, V., Lee, S. H., Arenas, J., Ivinson, A., Robinson, H., & Singh, S. (2001). Global governance of technology: Meeting the needs of developing countries. International Journal of Technology Management, 22(7/8), 629–655.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy, P. (1987). Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S., Jr. (1998). Power and interdependence in the information age. Foreign Affairs, 77(5), 81–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kindleberger, C. P. (1988). The international economic order: Essays on financial crisis and international public goods. New York: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lampton, D. M. (2008). The three faces of Chinese power: Might, money, and minds. Berkeley: UC Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Law, John. (1987). Technology and heterogeneous engineering: The case of Portuguese expansion. In W. E. Bijker et al. (Eds.), The social construction of technological systems. New directions in the sociology and history of technology (pp. 111–134). London/Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, J. I. (2007). Technology acquisition and innovation in the developing world: Wind Turbine development in China and India. Studies in Comparative International Development, 42, 208–232.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Li, X. (2008). Patent counts as indicators of the geography of innovation activities: Problems and perspectives. Research Papers 18. South Centre. http://www.southcentre.org/ARCHIVES/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=1221. Accessed on 10 December 2011

  • Litfin, K. T. (1994). Ozone discoures. Science and politics in global environmental cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Long, W. J. (1991). Economic incentives and international cooperation: Technology transfer to the People’s Republic of China, 1978–86. Journal of Peace Research, 28(2), 175–189.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lord Sainsbury of Turville. (2007). The race to the top. A review of government’s science and innovation policies. HM Treasury. http://www.rsc.org/images/sainsbury_review051007_tcm18-103116.pdf. Accessed 10 Jan 2011.

  • Lubman, S. (2011). Changes to China’s ‘indigenous innovation’ policy: Don’t get too excited. The Wall Street Journal, 22 July 2011. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/07/22/changes-to-chinas-indigenous-innovation-policy-dont-get-too-excited/.

  • Luan, C., & Zhang, T. (2011). Innovation in China: A patentometric perspective (1985–2009). Journal of Knowledge-based Innovation in China, 3(3), 184–197.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • May, C. (2009). The global political economy of intellectual property rights. The new enclosures (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayer, M. (2012). Chaotic climate change and security. International Political Sociology (forthcoming).

    Google Scholar 

  • McBride, W. (1997). The unstable dynamics of a strategic technology: Disarmament, unemployment, and the interwar battleship. Technology and Culture, 38(2), 386–423.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McDonald, K., Bosshard, P., & Brewer, N. (2009). Exporting dams: China’s hydropower industry goes global. Journal of environmental management, 90(Suppl. 3), 294–302.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mertha, A. (2005). The politics of piracy: Intellectual property in contemporary China. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, C. A. (2007). Democratisation, international knowledge institutions, and global governance. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 20(2), 325–357.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moldaschl, M., & Stehr, N. (Eds.). (2010). Wissensökonomie und Innovation. Beiträge zur Ökonomie der Wissensgesellschaft. Marburg: Metropolis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morishima, M. (1982). Why has Japan ‘succeeded’? Western technology and the Japanese ethos. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mowery, D. C. (1992). The U.S. national innovation system: Origins and prospects. Research Policy, 21, 125–144.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Naugthon, B. (1988). The third front: Defence industrialization in the Chinese interior. China Quarterly, 115, 351–386.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Naughton, B. (2011). China’s economic policy today: The new state activism. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 52(3), 313–329.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Needham, J. (1982). Science in traditional China. Boston: Harvard University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nye, J. S., Jr., & Owens, W. (1996). America’s information edge. Foreign Affairs, 75(2), 20–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • OECD. (2010). OECD science, technology and industry outlook. Paris: OECD Publishing.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • O’Mara, M. P. (2004). Cities of knowledge: Cold war science and the search for the next Silicon Valley. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paarlberg, R. L. (2004). Knowledge as power: Science, military dominance and U.S. security. International Security, 29(1), 122–151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pan, C. (2009). What is Chinese about Chinese businesses? Locating the ‘rise of China’ in global production networks. Journal of Contemporary China, 18, 7–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosenau, J. N. (1990). Turbulence in world politics: A theory of change and continuity. Princeton: Princeton University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenberg, N., Landau, R., & Mowery, D. (Eds.). (1992). Technology and the wealth of nations. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Royal Society. (2011). Knowledge, networks and nations. London: Royal Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruggie, J. G. (1975). International responses to technology: Concepts and trends. International Organization, 29(3), 557–583.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Russell, A. (1997). Technologyas knowledge. Generic technology and change in the global political economy. In M. Talalay, C. Farrands, & R. Tooze (Eds.), Technology, culture and competitiveness. Change and the world political economy (pp. 41–57). London/New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schouten, P. (2011). Theory Talk #40: Kenneth Waltz – The Physiocrat of International Politics. Theory Talks, http://www.theory-talks.org/2011/06/theory-talk-40.html (04-06-2011)

  • Segal, A. (2010). China’s innovation wall. Beijing’s push for homegrown technology. Foreign Affairs, 28 Sep 2010. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66753/adam-segal/chinas-innovation-wall.

  • Shi, Y. (1998). Chinese firms and technology in the Reform Era. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter, J. A. (1926). Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter, J. A. (1947). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. New York: Harper.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shobert, B. A. (2011). Fly China, risk included, Asiatimes, 29 April 2011. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/MD29Cb01.html.

  • Singer, P. W. (2009). Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the 21st century. New York: Penguin Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Singleton, R. (2008). Knowledge and technology: The basis of wealth and power by Ross Singleton. In D. N. Balaam & M. Veseth (Eds.), Introduction to international political economy (4th ed.). Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smil, V. (2010). Prime movers of globalization: The history and impact of diesel engines and gas turbines. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spence, J. (2001). Chinas Weg in die Moderne. München: DTV.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strange, S. (1987). The persistent myth of lost hegemony. International Organization, 41(4), 551–574.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Strange, S. (1988). States and markets – An introduction to international political economy. London: Pinter Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strange, S. (1989). Towards a theory of transnational empire. In E.-O. Czempiel & J. N. Rosenau (Eds.), Global changes and theoretical challenge. Lexington: Lexington Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strange, S. (1996). The retreat of the state. The diffusion of power in the world economy. Cambridge, NY: Cambrige University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sun, Y. (2002). China’s national innovation system in transition. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 43(6), 476–492.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sun, Y., von Zedtwitz, M., & Simon, D. F. (2007). Globalization of R&D and China: An introduction. Asia Pacific Business Review, 13(3), 311–319.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suttmeier, R. P., Yao, X., Tan, A. Z. (2004). China’s post-WTO technology policy: Standards, software, and the changing nature of techno-nationalism. NBR Reports (May 2004).

    Google Scholar 

  • Tang, M., & Hussler, C. (2011). Betting on indigenous innovation or relying on FDI: The Chinese strategy for catching-up. Technology in Society, 33, 23–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taplin, R., & Nowak, A. Z. (Eds.). (2010). Intellectual property, innovation and management in emerging economies. Oxon: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • The Bureau of Export Administration (1998) US Commercial Technology Transfer to the People's Republic of China. Washington

    Google Scholar 

  • The Economist. (2011). An internet with Chinese characteristics. The Economist, 30 July 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/21524821.

  • de la Tour, A., Glachant, M., & Meniere, Y. (2011). Innovation and international technology transfer: The case of the Chinese photovoltaic industry. Energy Policy, 39, 761–770.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • U.S. Congress, & Office of Technology Assessment. (1987). Technology transfer to China. OTA-ISC-340. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wechsler, A. (2011). Intellectual property law in the People’s Republic of China: A powerful economic tool for innovation and development. China-EU Law Journal. doi: 10.1007/s12689-011-0001-x. http://www.springerlink.com/content/8810u786670m3472/fulltext.pdf. Accessed on 10 December 2011

  • Weiss, C. (2005). Science, technology and international relations. Technology in Society, 27, 295–313.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Westad, O. A. (Ed.). (1998). Brothers in arms: The rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilsdon, J., & Keeley, J. (2007). China: The next science superpower? London: Demos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wissen, M. (2003). TRIPs, TRIPs-plus und WIPO. Konflikte um die Eigentumsrechte an genetischen Ressourcen. In Christoph Görg: Postfordistische Naturverhältnisse. Konflikte um genetische Ressourcen und die Internationalisierung des Staates (pp. 128–155). Münster: Verlag Westfälisches Dampfboot.

    Google Scholar 

  • White House. (2011). Transcript: Obama’s State of the Union address. http://www.npr.org/2011/01/26/133224933/transcript-obamas-state-of-union-address. Accessed on 10 December 2011

  • WIPO. (2010). World intellectual property indicators. Geneva: WIPO.

    Google Scholar 

  • Xing, Y. (2011a). China’s exports in information communication technology and its impact on Asian countries. Economic Change and Restructuring, 44, 135–147.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Xing, Y. (2011). China’s high-tech exports: Myth and reality. GRIPS discussion paper 11–05 (June 2011).

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang, B., Zhang, J., & Yao, F. (2006). Technology transfer from the Soviet union to the People’s Republic of China 1949–1966. Comparative Technology Transfer and Society, 4(2), 105–167.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhang, S. G. (2001). Economic cold war: America’s embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zweig, D., Changgui, C., & Rosen, S. (2004). Globalization and transnational human capital: Overseas and returnee scholars to China. The China Quarterly, 179, 735–757.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Mayer, M. (2012). Exploring China’s Rise as Knowledge Power. In: Fels, E., Kremer, JF., Kronenberg, K. (eds) Power in the 21st Century. Global Power Shift. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25082-8_15

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics