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Impracticality of Efficient PVSS in Real Life Security Standard (Poster)

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6812))

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Abstract

This paper presents ongoing work toward employment of RSA encryption in PVSS. Two PVSS schemes are shown to be efficient only when very small RSA public keys like 3 are employed to encrypt the shares. However, too small RSA public keys like 3 are insecure in the PVSS schemes as they cannot apply padding to the encrypted messages. When practical larger RSA public keys are employed, the two PVSS schemes have to process extremely large integers and become intolerably inefficient.

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Peng, K. (2011). Impracticality of Efficient PVSS in Real Life Security Standard (Poster). In: Parampalli, U., Hawkes, P. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6812. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22497-3_34

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22497-3_34

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-22496-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-22497-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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