Abstract
The Automated Negotiation Agents Competition (ANAC-10) was held and our agent won the tournament. Our agent estimates the alternatives the opponent will offer based on the history of the opponent’s offers. In addition, our agent tries to compromise to the estimated maximum utility of the opponent by the end of the negotiation. Also, we modify the basic strategy to not exceed the limit of compromise when the opponent is uncooperative. We can adjust the speed of compromise depending on the negotiation. We introduce the new ratio(t) to control our agent’s actions at the final phase. With this improvement, our agents try to reach agreement when the opponent’s proposal is closer to our estimated maximum values. The main reason our agent outperforms the others is its ability to reach a last-minute agreement as often as possible.
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Kawaguchi, S., Fujita, K., Ito, T. (2011). Compromising Strategy Based on Estimated Maximum Utility for Automated Negotiation Agents Competition (ANAC-10). In: Mehrotra, K.G., Mohan, C.K., Oh, J.C., Varshney, P.K., Ali, M. (eds) Modern Approaches in Applied Intelligence. IEA/AIE 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6704. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21827-9_51
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21827-9_51
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