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Evolutionarily Stable Communication and Pragmatics

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Language, Games, and Evolution

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 6207))

Abstract

In the past 20 or so years there has been much research interest in the evolution of cooperation in humans (Axelrod, 1995; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Milinski et al., 2002; West et al., 2006). The foundational problem addressed by this work is how cooperation can remain evolutionarily stable when individuals have incentives to freeride; that is, to take but not contribute from the public good (Hardin, 1968). There is an analogous problem associated with the evolution of communication: how can signalling remain evolutionarily stable when individuals have incentives to be dishonest? This gametheoretic question is the defining problem of animal signalling theory (Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003; Searcy & Nowicki, 2007). The main goals of this chapter are to explore the various possible solutions to this problem and to ask which most likely applies to human communication. In addition to this it will also, using insights from pragmatics, provide some insight as to the nature of the problem and hence clarify some of the relevant issues.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Language Evolution and Computation Research Unit School of Psychology, Philosophy and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, UK

    Thomas C. Scott-Phillips

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  1. Thomas C. Scott-Phillips
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Zentrum für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft, Schützenstr. 18, 10117, Berlin, Germany

    Anton Benz

  2. Department of Linguistics, University of Tuebingen, Wilhelmstrasse 19, 72074, Tuebingen, Germany

    Christian Ebert  & Gerhard Jäger  & 

  3. Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC), University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 141-147, 1012 GC, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Robert van Rooij

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Scott-Phillips, T.C. (2011). Evolutionarily Stable Communication and Pragmatics. In: Benz, A., Ebert, C., Jäger, G., van Rooij, R. (eds) Language, Games, and Evolution. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6207. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18006-4_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18006-4_6

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