Abstract
We study the price of anarchy and the structure of equilibria in network creation games. A network creation game (first defined and studied by Fabrikant et al. [4]) is played by n players {1,2,...,n}, each identified with a vertex of a graph (network), where the strategy of player i, i = 1,...,n, is to build some edges adjacent to i. The cost of building an edge is α> 0, a fixed parameter of the game. The goal of every player is to minimize its creation cost plus its usage cost. The creation cost of player i is α times the number of built edges. In the SumGame (the original variant of Fabrikant et al. [4]) the usage cost of player i is the sum of distances from i to every node of the resulting graph. In the MaxGame (variant defined and studied by Demaine et al. [3]) the usage cost is the eccentricity of i in the resulting graph of the game. In this paper we improve previously known bounds on the price of anarchy of the game (of both variants) for various ranges of α, and give new insights into the structure of equilibria for various values of α. The two main results of the paper show that for α > 273·n all equilibria in SumGame are trees and thus the price of anarchy is constant, and that for α> 129 all equilibria in MaxGame are trees and the price of anarchy is constant. For SumGame this (almost) answers one of the basic open problems in the field – is price of anarchy of the network creation game constant for all values of α? – in an affirmative way, up to a tiny range of α.
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Mihalák, M., Schlegel, J.C.: The price of anarchy in network creation games is (mostly) constant. Tech. Rep. 675, Institute of Theoretical Computer Science, ETH Zurich (July 2010), http://www.inf.ethz.ch/research/disstechreps/techreports/
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Mihalák, M., Schlegel, J.C. (2010). The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant. In: Kontogiannis, S., Koutsoupias, E., Spirakis, P.G. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6386. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_24
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