Abstract
We study the effect of combining selfishness and altruism in atomic congestion games. We allow players to be partially altruistic and partially selfish and determine the impact of this behavior on the overall system performance. Surprisingly, our results indicate that, in general, by allowing players to be (even partially) altruistic, the overall system performance deteriorates. Instead, for the class of symmetric load balancing games, a balance between selfish and altruistic behavior improves system performance to optimality.
This work is partially supported by the European Union under IST FET Integrated Project FP6-015964 AEOLUS and Cost Action IC0602 ”Algorithmic Decision Theory”, and by a ”Caratheodory” basic research grant from the University of Patras.
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Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, C., Kanellopoulos, P., Kyropoulou, M., Papaioannou, E. (2010). The Impact of Altruism on the Efficiency of Atomic Congestion Games. In: Wirsing, M., Hofmann, M., Rauschmayer, A. (eds) Trustworthly Global Computing. TGC 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6084. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15640-3_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15640-3_12
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