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Leakage-Resilient Storage

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Security and Cryptography for Networks (SCN 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6280))

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Abstract

We study a problem of secure data storage on hardware that may leak information. We introduce a new primitive, that we call leakage-resilient storage (LRS), which is an (unkeyed) scheme for encoding messages, and can be viewed as a generalization of the All-Or-Nothing Transform (AONT, Rivest 1997). The standard definition of AONT requires that it should be hard to reconstruct a message m if not all the bits of its encoding Encode(m) are known. LRS is defined more generally, with respect to a class Γ of functions. The security definition of LRS requires that it should be hard to reconstruct m even if some values g 1(Encode(m)),..., g t (Encode(m)) are known (where g 1,...,g t  ∈ Γ), as long as the total length of g 1(Encode(m)),...,g t (Encode(m)) is smaller than some parameter c.

We construct an LRS scheme that is secure with respect to Γ being a set of functions that can depend only on some restricted part of the memory. More precisely: we assume that the memory is divided in 2 parts, and the functions in Γ can be just applied to one of these parts. We also construct a scheme that is secure if the cardinality of Γ is restricted (but still it can be exponential in the length of the encoding). This construction implies security in the case when the set Γ consists of functions that are computable by Boolean circuits of a small size.

We also discuss the connection between the problem of constructing leakage-resilient storage and a theory of the compressibility of NP-instances.

The European Research Council has provided financial support under the EuropeanCommunity’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement no CNTM-207908.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, via Salaria 113, 00198, Rome, Italy

    Francesco Davì & Stefan Dziembowski

  2. INFOCOM Department, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, via Eudossiana 18, 00186, Rome, Italy

    Daniele Venturi

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  1. Francesco Davì
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  2. Stefan Dziembowski
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  3. Daniele Venturi
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. AT&T Labs Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA

    Juan A. Garay

  2. Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni, Università di Salerno, via Ponte don Melillo, 84084, Fisciano, (SA), Italy

    Roberto De Prisco

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Davì, F., Dziembowski, S., Venturi, D. (2010). Leakage-Resilient Storage. In: Garay, J.A., De Prisco, R. (eds) Security and Cryptography for Networks. SCN 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6280. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15317-4_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15317-4_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-15316-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-15317-4

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