Abstract
In this paper, we introduce an experimental approach to the design, analysis and implementation of market mechanisms based on double auction. We define a formal market model that specifies the market policies in a double auction market. Based on this model, we introduce a set of criteria for the evaluation of market mechanisms. We design and implement a set of market policies and test them with different experimental settings. The results of experiments provide us a better understanding of the interrelationship among market policies and also show that an experimental approach can greatly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of market mechanism design.
This research was partially supported by the Australian Research Council through Discovery Project DP0988750 and UWS Research Grants Scheme. Also, the work presented in this article is supported by the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche in the framework of the ForTrust (http://www.irit.fr/ForTrust/) project (ANR-06-SETI-006). We thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.
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Furuhata, M., Perrussel, L., Thévenin, JM., Zhang, D. (2009). Experimental Market Mechanism Design for Double Auction. In: Nicholson, A., Li, X. (eds) AI 2009: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. AI 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5866. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10439-8_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10439-8_1
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