Abstract
Security API analysis typically only considers a subset of an API’s functions, with results bounded by the number of function calls. Furthermore, attacks involving partial leakage of sensitive information are usually not covered.
Type-based static analysis has the potential to alleviate these shortcomings. To that end, we present a type system for secure information flow based upon the one of Volpano, Smith and Irvine [1], extended with types for cryptographic keys and ciphertext similar to those in Sumii and Pierce [2]. In contrast to some other type systems, the encryption and decryption of keys does not require special treatment.
We show that a well-typed sequence of commands is non-interferent, based upon a definition of indistinguishability where, in certain circumstances, the adversary can distinguish between ciphertexts that correspond to encrypted public data.
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Keighren, G., Aspinall, D., Steel, G. (2009). Towards a Type System for Security APIs. In: Degano, P., Viganò, L. (eds) Foundations and Applications of Security Analysis. ARSPA-WITS 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5511. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03459-6_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03459-6_12
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