Skip to main content

The Impact of Forcing Preference Rankings When Indifference Exists

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Collective Decision Making

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library C ((TDLC,volume 43))

Abstract

It is definitely possible that situations might exist in which some voters in a three candidate election could be completely indifferent between some of the available candidates. Several complications can then arise during the implementation of many voting rules in the presence of such voter indifference. One possible option that can be used to avoid these types of complications is to require that all voters must arbitrarily break any such indifference ties on candidates, in order to report a complete and transitive preference ranking on the candidates. The current study investigates some possible election outcomes that can result from the use of this forced ranking option, and it is found that there are situations in which this option will have a surprisingly large probability of producing some very negative results in elections.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Cheng, M. C. (1969). The orthant probability of four Gaussian variables. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 40, 152–161.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • de Condorcet, M. (1785). An essay on the application of probability theory to plurality decision making: An election between three candidates. In F. Sommerlad & I. McLean (Eds.), The political theory of Condorcet (pp. 69–80). University of Oxford Working Paper.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fishburn, P. C., & Gehrlein, W. V. (1980). The paradox of voting: Effects of individual indifference and intransitivity. Journal of Public Economics, 14, 83–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gehrlein, W. V., & Fishburn, P. C. (1978). Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and positional voting rules. Social Science Research, 7, 272–283.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gehrlein, W. V., & Valognes, F. (2001). Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference. Social Choice and Welfare, 18, 193–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guilbaud, G. T. (1952). Les theories de l’intérêt general et le probleme logique de l’agregation. Economie Appliquée, 5, 501–584.

    Google Scholar 

  • Inada, K. (1964). A note on simple majority decision rule. Econometrica, 32, 525–531.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Plackett, R. L. (1954). A reduction formula for normal multivariate integrals. Biometrika, 41, 351–360.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sommerlad, F., & McLean, I. (1989). The political theory of Condorcet. University of Oxford Working Paper.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to William V. Gehrlein .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Gehrlein, W.V. (2010). The Impact of Forcing Preference Rankings When Indifference Exists. In: Van Deemen, A., Rusinowska, A. (eds) Collective Decision Making. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 43. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6_2

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02864-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-02865-6

  • eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics