Abstract
We introduce new and general complexity theoretic hardness assumptions. These assumptions abstract out concrete properties of a random oracle and are significantly stronger than traditional cryptographic hardness assumptions; however, assuming their validity we can resolve a number of long-standing open problems in cryptography.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Barak, B.: Constant-round coin-tossing with a man in the middle or realizing the shared random string model. In: FOCS, pp. 345–355 (2002)
Bellare, M., Boldyreva, A., Palacio, A.: An uninstantiable random-oracle-model scheme for a hybrid-encryption problem. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 171–188. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Bellare, M., Impagliazzo, R., Naor, M.: Does parallel repetition lower the error in computationally sound protocols? In: FOCS, pp. 374–383 (1997)
Bellare, M., Namprempre, C., Pointcheval, D., Semanko, M.: The power of rsa inversion oracles and the security of chaum’s rsa-based blind signature scheme. In: Syverson, P.F. (ed.) FC 2001. LNCS, vol. 2339, pp. 319–338. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Bellare, M., Neven, G.: Transitive signatures based on factoring and rsa. In: Zheng, Y. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2501, pp. 397–414. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Bellare, M., Palacio, A.: Gq and schnorr identification schemes: Proofs of security against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks. In: Yung, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 162–177. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In: First ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Fairfax, pp. 62–73. ACM, New York (1993)
Blum, M.: How to prove a theorem so no one can claim it. In: Proc. of The International Congress of Mathematicians, pp. 1444–1451 (1986)
Blum, M., Micali, S.: How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo random bits. In: FOCS, pp. 112–117 (1982)
Boldyreva, A., Fischlin, M.: On the security of oaep. In: Lai, X., Chen, K. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2006. LNCS, vol. 4284, pp. 210–225. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Boneh, D.: The decision diffie-hellman problem. In: Buhler, J.P. (ed.) ANTS 1998. LNCS, vol. 1423, pp. 48–63. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Boneh, D., Franklin, M.K.: Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 213–229. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Canetti, R.: Towards realizing random oracles: Hash functions that hide all partial information. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 455–469. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Canetti, R., Goldreich, O., Halevi, S.: The random oracle methodology, revisited. J. ACM 51(4), 557–594 (2004)
Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: A practical public key cryptosystem provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. In: Krawczyk, H. (ed.) CRYPTO 1998. LNCS, vol. 1462, pp. 13–25. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Universal hash proofs and a paradigm for adaptive chosen ciphertext secure public-key encryption. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 45–64. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Dolev, D., Dwork, C., Naor, M.: Nonmalleable cryptography. SIAM J. Comput. 30(2), 391–437 (2000)
Feige, U., Shamir, A.: Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In: STOC, pp. 416–426 (1990)
Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2001), http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/frag.html
Goldreich, O., Krawczyk, H.: On the composition of zero-knowledge proof systems. SIAM J. Comput. 25(1), 169–192 (1996)
Goldwasser, S., Kalai, Y.T.: On the (in)security of the fiat-shamir paradigm. In: FOCS, p. 102–152 (2003)
Katz, J., Wee, H.: Black-box lower bounds for non-malleable protocols (2007)
Lin, H., Pass, R., Venkitasubramaniam, M.: Concurrent non-malleable commitments from any one-way function. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 571–588. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Malkin, T., Moriarty, R., Yakovenko, N.: Generalized environmental security from number theoretic assumptions. In: Halevi, S., Rabin, T. (eds.) TCC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3876, pp. 343–359. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Naor, M.: Bit commitment using pseudorandomness. J. of Cryptology 4 (1991)
Naor, M., Yung, M.: Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. In: STOC 1990: Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pp. 427–437. ACM Press, New York (1990)
Naor, M.: On cryptographic assumptions and challenges. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 96–109. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Pass, R., Rosen, A.: Concurrent non-malleable commitments. In: FOCS, pp. 563–572 (2005)
Pass, R., Rosen, A.: New and improved constructions of non-malleable cryptographic protocols. In: STOC, pp. 533–542 (2005)
Pietrzak, K., Wikström, D.: Parallel repetition of computationally sound protocols revisited. In: Vadhan, S.P. (ed.) TCC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4392, pp. 86–102. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Prabhakaran, M., Sahai, A.: New notions of security: achieving universal composability without trusted setup. In: STOC, pp. 242–251 (2004)
Rackoff, C., Simon, D.R.: Cryptographic defense against traffic analysis. In: STOC 1993: Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pp. 672–681. ACM Press, New York (1993)
Sahai, A.: Non-malleable non-interactive zero knowledge and adaptive chosen-ciphertext security. In: FOCS, pp. 543–553 (1999)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Pandey, O., Pass, R., Vaikuntanathan, V. (2008). Adaptive One-Way Functions and Applications. In: Wagner, D. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2008. CRYPTO 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5157. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85174-5_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85174-5_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85173-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85174-5
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)