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Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?

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Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 4997))

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Abstract

We study the best guarantees of efficiency approximation achievable by cost-sharing mechanisms. Our main result is the first quantitative lower bound that applies to all truthful cost-sharing mechanisms, including randomized mechanisms that are only truthful in expectation, and only β-budget-balanced in expectation. Our lower bound is optimal up to constant factors and applies even to the simple and central special case of the public excludable good problem. We also give a stronger lower bound for a subclass of deterministic cost-sharing mechanisms, which is driven by a new characterization of the Shapley value mechanism. Finally, we show a separation between the best-possible efficiency guarantees achievable by deterministic and randomized cost-sharing mechanisms.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    Shahar Dobzinski

  2. Google, Inc., Mountain View, CA, USA

    Aranyak Mehta

  3. Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, 353 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA, 94305, USA

    Tim Roughgarden & Mukund Sundararajan

Authors
  1. Shahar Dobzinski
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  2. Aranyak Mehta
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  3. Tim Roughgarden
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  4. Mukund Sundararajan
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Informatik, Universität Paderborn, Fürstenallee 11, 33102, Paderborn, Germany

    Burkhard Monien  & Ulf-Peter Schroeder  & 

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Dobzinski, S., Mehta, A., Roughgarden, T., Sundararajan, M. (2008). Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?. In: Monien, B., Schroeder, UP. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4997. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_29

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-79308-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-79309-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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